Lexology: India: Friday, 25th September 2026.
The Board of Control for
Cricket in India (“BCCI”), a private society registered under the Tamil
Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, is among the most powerful sports
governing bodies in the world. It controls India’s representation in
international cricket, operates the commercially dominant Indian Premier
League, domestic cricket in India and commands annual revenues exceeding those
of many national sports federations combined.
The BCCI is neither created by statute nor sustained by government grants. While the BCCI does not receive any direct funding or financing by the Government of India or state governments, it does receive indirect public support, including by way of tax exemptions, concessional leases from the relevant state cricket associations and security deployments by government personnel.
This structural anomaly has generated two decades of litigation over whether the BCCI should be subject to public accountability norms, particularly the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”). This note examines whether the enactment of the National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (“NSG Act”) has advanced the debate, as was widely expected.
The BCCI’s Current Legal Position
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India[1] remains the foundational ruling on the BCCI’s constitutional status. In the context of a writ petition challenging the cancellation of television rights as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1949, as amended (the “Constitution”), the Supreme Court held that the BCCI is not “State” or “other authorities” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as: (i) it was not created by statute, (ii) it was not financially dependent on the government, (iii) it was not subject to deep and pervasive State control and (iv) its monopoly over cricket was “de facto” rather than State-conferred or State-protected. The majority by 3:2 therefore held that the BCCI would not be subject to Article 12 of the Constitution and held that while writ jurisdiction under Article 32 would not be available, an aggrieved party could approach a High Court pursuant to Article 226 of the Constitution.
A decade later, in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar,[2] the Supreme Court went further and observed that the BCCI performs “important public functions,” exercises monopolistic control over cricket in India, selects national teams and regulates player livelihoods. The Justice R.M. Lodha Committee, appointed pursuant to such decision, recommended sweeping governance reforms, treating the BCCI as a body exercising quasi-public authority.
Accordingly, the BCCI maintains a hybrid status that is private in registration, public in function and judicially accountable under Article 226 but not under Article 32.
RTI Act Applicability: The Pre-NSG Act Position
Section 2(h) of the RTI Act defines “public authority” to include bodies and non-governmental organizations “owned, controlled or substantially financed” by funds provided by the appropriate government. The central question with respect to the BCCI has been whether the indirect public support (including tax exemptions, concessional leases from the relevant state cricket associations and security deployment of government personnel) constitutes “substantial financing.”
The Supreme Court’s decision in Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala (“Thalappalam”)[3] narrowed the “substantial financing” test, and held that regulatory benefits, tax exemptions and privileges do not amount to “substantial financing” unless the body depends on such support for its very existence or basic functioning.
The Law Commission of India, in its Report No. 275 (issued in 2018), analyzed the legal status of the BCCI, reviewed the findings in the Thalappalam case and documented tax exemptions amounting to INR 21.68 billion between 1997 and 2007, concessional stadium leases (including a Himachal Pradesh lease at INR 1 per month for 99 years), and regular state deployments of police and infrastructure for matches. The Law Commission noted that: (i) the BCCI is the entity permitted “de facto” by the State to represent the country at the international stage, with the BCCI selecting the Indian team and the players wearing the national colors; (ii) the International Cricket Council recognizes the BCCI as the ‘official’ body representing India; (iii) neither the Government nor the BCCI have challenged such status; (iv) the BCCI practically enjoys a monopolistic status in controlling and regulating the game of cricket in India and policy formulation related to cricket and its implementation, which is effectively a state function; (v) the BCCI and its actions directly and indirectly affect the fundamental rights of citizens, players and other functionaries. Noting that this bears a striking resemblance to a ‘State-like’ entity wielding ‘State-like’ powers, it recommended that the BCCI and similarly situated state cricket associations be brought within the ambit of the RTI Act.
Subsequently, the Central Information Commission (“CIC”), in its May 2026 order in Geeta Rani v. Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports and BCCI,[4] applied Thalappalam to hold that the BCCI is not a public authority under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The CIC reasoned that the BCCI is financially self-sustaining through media rights, sponsorship, broadcasting and ticketing revenues, and that indirect benefits such as tax concessions do not cross the Thalappalam threshold. Accordingly, the 2026 CIC order effectively closed the administrative route to RTI Act coverage, subject to legislative intervention or a subsequent contrary decision.
The NSG Act Framework
The NSG Act, of which certain provisions came into effect on January 1, 2026, introduces a broader governance architecture for national sports bodies. Its preamble recognizes that such bodies “discharge important public functions” and should manage affairs “in an open, fair and transparent manner in the public interest.” It establishes a National Sports Board empowered to grant “Board recognition” to sports organizations. Bodies previously recognized by the Central Government are deemed recognized under the new regime.
Governance obligations
Recognized sports bodies must comply with several accountability requirements under the NSG Act including mandatory publication of annual audited accounts, a Code of Ethics, a Safe Sports Policy and internal grievance redressal mechanisms. The National Sports Board established under the NSG Act may inquire into complaints concerning welfare of sportspersons or misuse of public funds and may suspend or cancel recognition for non-compliance. A National Sports Tribunal, with civil court powers, provides an adjudicatory backstop.
The limited RTI Act trigger under Section 14(2) of the NSG Act
Section 14(1) of the NSG Act provides that only a recognized sports organization is eligible to receive grants or other financial assistance from the Central Government. Section 14(2) of the NSG Act provides that a recognized sports organization “receiving grants or any other financial assistance” from the Central or State Government “shall be considered as a public authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005, with respect to utilization of such grants or any other financial assistance.”
Two features of this provision are significant. First, the RTI Act obligation is triggered only by actual receipt of government grants or financial assistance, rather than recognition alone or the performance of public functions. Second, even where triggered, the scope of disclosure is confined to “utilization of such grants or any other financial assistance”, and not the body’s operations generally.
For a body like the BCCI, assuming it is considered as “previously recognized by the Central Government”, if it does not receive direct government grants, Section 14(2) of the NSG Act may be inapplicable.
Interlocking legislations
The harmonious interpretation of the RTI Act and the NSG Act together would be that Section 14(2) of the NSG Act is a deeming provision. Where a recognized sports organization receives government grants or financial assistance, the NSG Act dispenses with the RTI Act’s Section 2(h) inquiry and deems the body to be a public authority, but only for utilization of that assistance. Where such assistance is absent, Section 14(2) does not answer the broader RTI Act question of whether the body may independently satisfy the “owned, controlled or substantially financed” test.
This distinction matters because the NSG Act gives recognized sports bodies a public-law character independent of funding. Recognition is the gateway to participation in the statutory sports-governance structure; the National Sports Board can grant, suspend or cancel recognition, maintain registers of national sports bodies and affiliates, issue ethics and safe-sport frameworks and route disputes to a tribunal with civil court powers. The Act also regulates the use of the words “India”, “Indian” and “National”, and the national insignia or symbols in sporting affairs. These provisions connect recognition with public representation, not merely with government funding.
The object of the NSG Act is transparency and accountability in the management of sports; the object of the RTI Act is disclosure by public authorities.
Evidently, Section 14(2) of the NSG Act uses financial dependence as a proxy for public accountability even though the Act elsewhere treats public function, recognition and national representation as the central regulatory concerns. It is noteworthy that earlier drafts of the NSG Act treated all recognized sports organizations as public authorities; the enacted text limits the RTI Act to recognized organizations that receive government or State financial assistance, and only for the use of that assistance.
Indirect Support and the Limits of the Funding Trigger
The BCCI’s relationship with the State has not been one of direct fiscal dependency but of extensive indirect facilitation. The principal forms of indirect public support are well documented:
Tax exemptions
The BCCI historically has benefited from income tax exemptions under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on the basis of its registration as a charitable trust promoting sports. The Law Commission calculated that the cumulative revenue foregone by the exchequer between 1997 and 2007 exceeded INR 21.68 billion. While the BCCI’s current tax status has been subject to reassessment, the magnitude of historical tax exemptions illustrates the scale of indirect state support.
Concessional leases and public infrastructure
The BCCI’s state associations operate from stadiums built on government land or leased to such associations at nominal rates. State police forces are routinely deployed for crowd management and security at matches, typically without full cost recovery. These are quantifiable public resource transfers that benefit the BCCI’s commercial operations.
Broadcasting and regulatory facilitation
The Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007 and the framework established in Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal[5] treat cricket broadcasting as implicating the public’s right to access information via airwaves, which are public property. The BCCI’s media-rights ecosystem is sustained, in part, by a regulatory environment that validates the public-interest character of cricket viewing.
Competition considerations
The Competition Commission of India has found the BCCI dominant in the relevant market for organization of professional domestic cricket leagues in India, citing market share, economic power, consumer dependence and entry barriers.[6] The BCCI’s exclusive authority to select teams representing India in international competitions is a function that, for virtually every other sport, is performed by a body receiving government grants and subject to full RTI Act coverage.
None of these forms of support constitutes a “grant” within the ordinary meaning of Section 14(2) of the NSG Act. Accordingly, while linking RTI to direct financial assistance the NSG Act has created a framework that recognizes public function in its preamble but does not draw the consequence in its operative provisions, at least for self-funded bodies.
Practical Implications and Conclusion
The NSG Act represents a meaningful advance in the sports governance architecture. It could operate independently of the RTI Act and address some of the governance deficits identified by the Lodha Committee. However, it does not resolve the RTI question for self-funded bodies or indirectly funded bodies such as the BCCI. Section 14(2) of the NSG Act creates only a conditional and narrow disclosure pathway. The Central Government’s power under Section 34 of the NSG Act to exempt specific sports bodies from the Act’s provisions introduces a further variable. The result is that the “accountability gap” identified by the Law Commission.
The practical question is whether a body that selects India’s teams, controls participation in the country’s most commercially significant sport, and benefits from public infrastructure should be outside the framework of RTI scrutiny solely because that support is not recorded as a government grant (particularly where there are indirect benefits accorded to such body). The authors submit that a workable framework should preserve the BCCI’s operational autonomy while attaching targeted disclosure obligations to public-resource use, national representation and recognized sports-governance status. Until that distinction is made express, the NSG Act regulates the ecosystem around the BCCI, but does not fully answer the public-accountability question with respect to it.
The BCCI is neither created by statute nor sustained by government grants. While the BCCI does not receive any direct funding or financing by the Government of India or state governments, it does receive indirect public support, including by way of tax exemptions, concessional leases from the relevant state cricket associations and security deployments by government personnel.
This structural anomaly has generated two decades of litigation over whether the BCCI should be subject to public accountability norms, particularly the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”). This note examines whether the enactment of the National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (“NSG Act”) has advanced the debate, as was widely expected.
The BCCI’s Current Legal Position
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India[1] remains the foundational ruling on the BCCI’s constitutional status. In the context of a writ petition challenging the cancellation of television rights as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1949, as amended (the “Constitution”), the Supreme Court held that the BCCI is not “State” or “other authorities” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as: (i) it was not created by statute, (ii) it was not financially dependent on the government, (iii) it was not subject to deep and pervasive State control and (iv) its monopoly over cricket was “de facto” rather than State-conferred or State-protected. The majority by 3:2 therefore held that the BCCI would not be subject to Article 12 of the Constitution and held that while writ jurisdiction under Article 32 would not be available, an aggrieved party could approach a High Court pursuant to Article 226 of the Constitution.
A decade later, in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar,[2] the Supreme Court went further and observed that the BCCI performs “important public functions,” exercises monopolistic control over cricket in India, selects national teams and regulates player livelihoods. The Justice R.M. Lodha Committee, appointed pursuant to such decision, recommended sweeping governance reforms, treating the BCCI as a body exercising quasi-public authority.
Accordingly, the BCCI maintains a hybrid status that is private in registration, public in function and judicially accountable under Article 226 but not under Article 32.
RTI Act Applicability: The Pre-NSG Act Position
Section 2(h) of the RTI Act defines “public authority” to include bodies and non-governmental organizations “owned, controlled or substantially financed” by funds provided by the appropriate government. The central question with respect to the BCCI has been whether the indirect public support (including tax exemptions, concessional leases from the relevant state cricket associations and security deployment of government personnel) constitutes “substantial financing.”
The Supreme Court’s decision in Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala (“Thalappalam”)[3] narrowed the “substantial financing” test, and held that regulatory benefits, tax exemptions and privileges do not amount to “substantial financing” unless the body depends on such support for its very existence or basic functioning.
The Law Commission of India, in its Report No. 275 (issued in 2018), analyzed the legal status of the BCCI, reviewed the findings in the Thalappalam case and documented tax exemptions amounting to INR 21.68 billion between 1997 and 2007, concessional stadium leases (including a Himachal Pradesh lease at INR 1 per month for 99 years), and regular state deployments of police and infrastructure for matches. The Law Commission noted that: (i) the BCCI is the entity permitted “de facto” by the State to represent the country at the international stage, with the BCCI selecting the Indian team and the players wearing the national colors; (ii) the International Cricket Council recognizes the BCCI as the ‘official’ body representing India; (iii) neither the Government nor the BCCI have challenged such status; (iv) the BCCI practically enjoys a monopolistic status in controlling and regulating the game of cricket in India and policy formulation related to cricket and its implementation, which is effectively a state function; (v) the BCCI and its actions directly and indirectly affect the fundamental rights of citizens, players and other functionaries. Noting that this bears a striking resemblance to a ‘State-like’ entity wielding ‘State-like’ powers, it recommended that the BCCI and similarly situated state cricket associations be brought within the ambit of the RTI Act.
Subsequently, the Central Information Commission (“CIC”), in its May 2026 order in Geeta Rani v. Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports and BCCI,[4] applied Thalappalam to hold that the BCCI is not a public authority under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The CIC reasoned that the BCCI is financially self-sustaining through media rights, sponsorship, broadcasting and ticketing revenues, and that indirect benefits such as tax concessions do not cross the Thalappalam threshold. Accordingly, the 2026 CIC order effectively closed the administrative route to RTI Act coverage, subject to legislative intervention or a subsequent contrary decision.
The NSG Act Framework
The NSG Act, of which certain provisions came into effect on January 1, 2026, introduces a broader governance architecture for national sports bodies. Its preamble recognizes that such bodies “discharge important public functions” and should manage affairs “in an open, fair and transparent manner in the public interest.” It establishes a National Sports Board empowered to grant “Board recognition” to sports organizations. Bodies previously recognized by the Central Government are deemed recognized under the new regime.
Governance obligations
Recognized sports bodies must comply with several accountability requirements under the NSG Act including mandatory publication of annual audited accounts, a Code of Ethics, a Safe Sports Policy and internal grievance redressal mechanisms. The National Sports Board established under the NSG Act may inquire into complaints concerning welfare of sportspersons or misuse of public funds and may suspend or cancel recognition for non-compliance. A National Sports Tribunal, with civil court powers, provides an adjudicatory backstop.
The limited RTI Act trigger under Section 14(2) of the NSG Act
Section 14(1) of the NSG Act provides that only a recognized sports organization is eligible to receive grants or other financial assistance from the Central Government. Section 14(2) of the NSG Act provides that a recognized sports organization “receiving grants or any other financial assistance” from the Central or State Government “shall be considered as a public authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005, with respect to utilization of such grants or any other financial assistance.”
Two features of this provision are significant. First, the RTI Act obligation is triggered only by actual receipt of government grants or financial assistance, rather than recognition alone or the performance of public functions. Second, even where triggered, the scope of disclosure is confined to “utilization of such grants or any other financial assistance”, and not the body’s operations generally.
For a body like the BCCI, assuming it is considered as “previously recognized by the Central Government”, if it does not receive direct government grants, Section 14(2) of the NSG Act may be inapplicable.
Interlocking legislations
The harmonious interpretation of the RTI Act and the NSG Act together would be that Section 14(2) of the NSG Act is a deeming provision. Where a recognized sports organization receives government grants or financial assistance, the NSG Act dispenses with the RTI Act’s Section 2(h) inquiry and deems the body to be a public authority, but only for utilization of that assistance. Where such assistance is absent, Section 14(2) does not answer the broader RTI Act question of whether the body may independently satisfy the “owned, controlled or substantially financed” test.
This distinction matters because the NSG Act gives recognized sports bodies a public-law character independent of funding. Recognition is the gateway to participation in the statutory sports-governance structure; the National Sports Board can grant, suspend or cancel recognition, maintain registers of national sports bodies and affiliates, issue ethics and safe-sport frameworks and route disputes to a tribunal with civil court powers. The Act also regulates the use of the words “India”, “Indian” and “National”, and the national insignia or symbols in sporting affairs. These provisions connect recognition with public representation, not merely with government funding.
The object of the NSG Act is transparency and accountability in the management of sports; the object of the RTI Act is disclosure by public authorities.
Evidently, Section 14(2) of the NSG Act uses financial dependence as a proxy for public accountability even though the Act elsewhere treats public function, recognition and national representation as the central regulatory concerns. It is noteworthy that earlier drafts of the NSG Act treated all recognized sports organizations as public authorities; the enacted text limits the RTI Act to recognized organizations that receive government or State financial assistance, and only for the use of that assistance.
Indirect Support and the Limits of the Funding Trigger
The BCCI’s relationship with the State has not been one of direct fiscal dependency but of extensive indirect facilitation. The principal forms of indirect public support are well documented:
Tax exemptions
The BCCI historically has benefited from income tax exemptions under Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on the basis of its registration as a charitable trust promoting sports. The Law Commission calculated that the cumulative revenue foregone by the exchequer between 1997 and 2007 exceeded INR 21.68 billion. While the BCCI’s current tax status has been subject to reassessment, the magnitude of historical tax exemptions illustrates the scale of indirect state support.
Concessional leases and public infrastructure
The BCCI’s state associations operate from stadiums built on government land or leased to such associations at nominal rates. State police forces are routinely deployed for crowd management and security at matches, typically without full cost recovery. These are quantifiable public resource transfers that benefit the BCCI’s commercial operations.
Broadcasting and regulatory facilitation
The Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007 and the framework established in Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal[5] treat cricket broadcasting as implicating the public’s right to access information via airwaves, which are public property. The BCCI’s media-rights ecosystem is sustained, in part, by a regulatory environment that validates the public-interest character of cricket viewing.
Competition considerations
The Competition Commission of India has found the BCCI dominant in the relevant market for organization of professional domestic cricket leagues in India, citing market share, economic power, consumer dependence and entry barriers.[6] The BCCI’s exclusive authority to select teams representing India in international competitions is a function that, for virtually every other sport, is performed by a body receiving government grants and subject to full RTI Act coverage.
None of these forms of support constitutes a “grant” within the ordinary meaning of Section 14(2) of the NSG Act. Accordingly, while linking RTI to direct financial assistance the NSG Act has created a framework that recognizes public function in its preamble but does not draw the consequence in its operative provisions, at least for self-funded bodies.
Practical Implications and Conclusion
The NSG Act represents a meaningful advance in the sports governance architecture. It could operate independently of the RTI Act and address some of the governance deficits identified by the Lodha Committee. However, it does not resolve the RTI question for self-funded bodies or indirectly funded bodies such as the BCCI. Section 14(2) of the NSG Act creates only a conditional and narrow disclosure pathway. The Central Government’s power under Section 34 of the NSG Act to exempt specific sports bodies from the Act’s provisions introduces a further variable. The result is that the “accountability gap” identified by the Law Commission.
The practical question is whether a body that selects India’s teams, controls participation in the country’s most commercially significant sport, and benefits from public infrastructure should be outside the framework of RTI scrutiny solely because that support is not recorded as a government grant (particularly where there are indirect benefits accorded to such body). The authors submit that a workable framework should preserve the BCCI’s operational autonomy while attaching targeted disclosure obligations to public-resource use, national representation and recognized sports-governance status. Until that distinction is made express, the NSG Act regulates the ecosystem around the BCCI, but does not fully answer the public-accountability question with respect to it.
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