RTI: Prasar Bharati says it has no grievance reports for Waves OTT

Media Nama: New Delhi: Friday, September 18, 2026.

Prasar Bharati has no monthly grievance compliance reports for its Waves OTT platform. It also has no record of any communication from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting or any other ministry regarding this requirement, and no correspondence or action taken over its non-compliance, according to two separate RTI replies from the broadcaster’s WAVES OTT Division.
MediaNama had filed these RTIs in August 2026 after failing to find any published grievance compliance reports for Waves OTT, as required under Rule 18(3) of the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. One application was filed with Prasar Bharati and the other with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB). Both were answered by the WAVES OTT Division itself, suggesting that the MIB application was passed on internally, in line with our request to transfer it under Section 6(3) of the RTI Act if the information was held by another authority.
What the replies reveal
Whether the grievance reports exist at all: “No such monthly grievance redressal/compliance reports under Rule 18(3) of the IT Rules, 2021 are available on record with the WAVES OTT Division.”
On any Ministry circular, guideline, or communication instructing Prasar Bharati to publish these reports: We asked this question in both RTIs, and Prasar Bharati’s WAVES OTT Division gave the identical response each time: “No such communication specifically regarding publication of monthly grievance reports for WAVES OTT is available on record with the WAVES OTT Division.”
On any correspondence, show-cause notices, or action reports over non-submission or non-publication of these reports: “No such correspondence, show-cause notice, reply, or action report is available on record with the WAVES OTT Division.”
Why this matters
Rule 18(3) of the IT Rules applies to all publishers of online curated content, and platforms such as Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, JioHotstar, SonyLIV, and Aha Video already publish their monthly grievance reports. By Prasar Bharati’s own account, Waves OTT has none. This highlights a gap in internal compliance monitoring and the lack of action on grievance reports, suggesting that the requirement under the IT Rules has gone unmonitored and unenforced since the launch of Waves OTT.
We have written to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting seeking a response to the following questions:

1. Is the Ministry aware that Waves OTT has not published any monthly grievance compliance reports under Rule 18(3) since the obligation became applicable to it?
2. What action, if any, will the Ministry take to bring Waves OTT into compliance, and by when?
3. Will the Ministry direct Prasar Bharati to publish the backlog of monthly reports it has not filed so far?
4. Would the Ministry like to offer any further comment on record for this story?

Another RTI to the MIB seeking information on which OTT platforms it considers compliant with Rule 18(3), and what records it uses to track this, remains unanswered at the time of writing. We will publish an update if we hear back.

MSIC directs KHADC to forward gate-related RTI to concerned Himas

Highland Post: Shillong: Friday, September 18, 2026.

The Meghalaya State Information Commission (MSIC) has directed the Public Information Officer (PIO), Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC), to transfer an RTI application concerning toll and check gates operated by Himas to all the Himas concerned.
In an order issued on September 8, Secretary of the Commission, R. Kharbikhiew, stated that if the subject matter of the RTI does not relate to the KHADC office, Section 6(3)(ii) of the RTI Act, 2005 should be resorted to.
The direction was issued in connection with the second appeal filed by a resident of Nongkrem, Joannes JTL Lamare on August 8, who had sought information on April 7, 2026 regarding the complete list of toll gates, check gates, forest gates and non-tribal gates operated by Himas under KHADC, their locations and operators, copies of tenders, revenue collected, notified fee structure, and file notings.
The PIO, KHADC had earlier replied that such records are not maintained by the Council as the gates are under the administrative control of the respective Himas/Elakas, and had advised the applicant to approach the PIOs of the concerned Himas directly.
Disposing of the matter at the admission stage, the Commission directed that the RTI application be transferred to all Himas concerned so that the relevant Hima furnishes the information within 30 days from receipt.
The Commission has also sought a compliance report in this regard at the earliest.

Odisha’s Fast-Track RTI Model Highlighted at National Information Commissioners Summit

Pragativadi: Chandigarh: Friday, September 18, 2026.
Faster Justice, Zero Delay: How Odisha Reduced RTI Pendency Through Summary Trials

Odisha’s pioneering efforts to streamline the Right to Information (RTI) process and eliminate case backlogs took center stage at the National Conference of State Chief Information Commissioners held in Hyderabad.
Representing the state, Odisha Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) Manoj Parida detailed how the Odisha Information Commission successfully reduced its case pendency.
By adopting summary trials and curbing frequent, unnecessary adjournments, Odisha has created a faster, more accountable mechanism for citizens seeking information.
Inaugurated by Telangana Governor Shiv Pratap Shukla and presided over by the Central Information Commissioner, the national summit convened transparency chiefs to address key RTI implementation challenges across India.
Key Takeaways & National Agenda

• Odisha’s Efficiency Blueprint: CIC Manoj Parida explained that summary proceedings have significantly accelerated appeal disposals, offering a potential model for other states struggling with high case backlogs.
• Rule Revisions in Other States: The Chief Information Commissioner of Maharashtra shared recent state amendments that restrict RTI applications to a single subject and a maximum limit of 150 words.
• Focus on Suo Motu Disclosures: Central Information Commissioners urged state governments to mandate proactively uploading information on public websites, reducing the need for citizens to file formal applications.
• Preventing Misuse: Delegates highlighted strategies to prevent vested interests from misusing the law while safeguarding its core intent as a tool for common citizens.
• Impact of Data Protection Law: Participants analyzed the operational overlap between the new Personal Data Protection legislation and the RTI Act, stressing the need for grassroots training for lower-level officials.

The conference concluded with a call for state governments to equip Information Commissions with adequate staff and infrastructure, ensuring the RTI Act remains a fast, effective, and citizen-friendly mechanism nationwide.

RTI panel penalises two RTO officers in Amritsar for repeated non-compliance

Hindustan Times: Chandigarh: Friday, September 18, 2026.
State information commissioner Harpreet Sandhu imposed the penalties under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, on Khushdil Singh, then RTO-cum-PIO, RTO, Amritsar, and Mandeep Singh Sohi, ATO-cum-PIO, RTO Amritsar, in appeal case of 2024

The Punjab State Information Commission has imposed a ₹5,000 penalty each on two public information officers (PIOs) of the regional transport office (RTO), Amritsar, for repeatedly failing to comply with the commission’s directions and remaining absent from five consecutive appeal hearings.
State information commissioner Harpreet Sandhu imposed the penalties under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, on Khushdil Singh, then RTO-cum-PIO, RTO, Amritsar, and Mandeep Singh Sohi, ATO-cum-PIO, RTO Amritsar, in appeal case of 2024.
The order came after the appellant informed the commission that the information sought under the RTI Act had still not been furnished despite repeated hearings. During the proceedings, the departmental representative appearing on behalf of the PIOs was also unable to satisfactorily explain the status of the pending information or respond to the commission’s queries.
The commission observed that the two officials remained absent during five hearings held between August 2025 and May 2026. It also noted that a show-cause notice under Section 20(1) had already been issued on December 9, 2025, but the commission’s directions were not complied with.
Reiterating that timely compliance with the RTI Act and the commission’s orders is a statutory responsibility of public information officers, Sandhu observed that repeated disregard of such directions could invite appropriate legal consequences.
The commission directed that the penalties be recovered directly from the salaries of the two officials and deposited in the state treasury. The drawing and disbursing officer, RTO Amritsar, has been directed to recover the penalty from Mandeep Singh Sohi, while the secretary, personnel (PCS branch), Punjab government, has been instructed to deduct the penalty from Khushdil Singh’s salary. Singh is presently serving as deputy excise commissioner, Patiala.
Both authorities have also been directed to submit compliance reports to the commission.
The matter has been adjourned to October 16.

PM Modi की डिग्री का मामला: गुजरात यूनिवर्सिटी ने अरविंद केजरीवाल से हर्जाना मांगा, कहा- RTI अधिकारियों का समय बर्बाद नहीं होना चाहिए

Live Law: Ahmedabad: Thursday, 17^th September 2026.

गुजरात यूनिवर्सिटी ने बुधवार (16 सितंबर) को गुजरात हाईकोर्ट से आम आदमी पार्टी (AAP) के प्रमुख अरविंद केजरीवाल पर हर्जाना लगाने की मांग की। केजरीवाल ने सेंट्रल इन्फॉर्मेशन कमीशन (CIC) के उस आदेश को रद्द करने के फैसले को चुनौती देते हुए अपील की थी, जिसमें प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी की डिग्री से जुड़ी जानकारी सार्वजनिक करने का निर्देश दिया गया था।
यूनिवर्सिटी की ओर से चीफ जस्टिस सुनीता अग्रवाल और जस्टिस डीएन रे की डिवीजन बेंच के सामने पेश होते हुए सॉलिसिटर जनरल तुषार मेहता ने कहा कि हर्जाना लगाया जाना चाहिए ताकि यह सुनिश्चित हो सके कि RTI एक्ट का गलत इस्तेमाल न हो और सरकारी अधिकारियों को ऐसे अनुरोधों से निपटने में अपने काम के कीमती घंटे बर्बाद न करने पड़ें, जिनका एक्ट के मकसद से कोई लेना-देना नहीं है।
बेंच केजरीवाल की उस अपील पर सुनवाई कर रही है, जो मार्च 2023 के एक सिंगल जज के फैसले के खिलाफ है। उस फैसले में CIC के 2016 के निर्देश को रद्द कर दिया गया, जिसमें गुजरात यूनिवर्सिटी को प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी के नाम पर जारी डिग्री से जुड़ी जानकारी देने के लिए कहा गया।
सिंगल जज ने माना था कि प्रधानमंत्री की एजुकेशनल डिग्री से जुड़ी जानकारी RTI Act की धारा 8(1)(e) और 8(1)(j) के तहत सार्वजनिक करने से छूट प्राप्त है, क्योंकि इसे सार्वजनिक करने के लिए कोई बड़ा जनहित नहीं है। कोर्ट ने केजरीवाल पर ₹25,000 का हर्जाना भी लगाया।
सॉलिसिटर जनरल ने CBSE और अन्य बनाम आदित्य बंदोपाध्याय और अन्य (2011) मामले में सुप्रीम कोर्ट के फैसले का हवाला दिया। इस फैसले में RTI Act के तहत जानकारी के लिए बिना सोचे-समझे और अव्यावहारिक मांगें करने के खिलाफ चेतावनी दी गई और कहा गया कि ऐसी मांगें सरकारी अधिकारियों के संसाधनों को उत्पादक प्रशासनिक कार्यों से भटका सकती हैं।
फैसले का जिक्र करते हुए मेहता ने कहा,
"अपील पर मेरिट के आधार पर सुनवाई और फैसला हो सकता है। और हर्जाना भी लगाया जा सकता है। ताकि RTI Act के तहत विधायिका के नेक मकसद और इरादे का गलत इस्तेमाल या दुरुपयोग न हो और अधिकारी अपना समय बेकार के कामों में बर्बाद न करें... यहां जनहित क्या है? मान लीजिए किसी खास पद के लिए फिजिक्स में डॉक्टरेट जरूरी योग्यता है और कोई यह मुद्दा उठाता है कि वह व्यक्ति सार्वजनिक पद पर है लेकिन उसके पास PhD की डिग्री नहीं है। इसलिए मैं यूनिवर्सिटी से जानकारी मांग रहा हूं, तो यह जनहित होगा, क्योंकि उस पद पर बने रहना उस डिग्री पर निर्भर करता है। RTI सिर्फ़ उत्सुकता रखने वालों के लिए बनाया गया कानून नहीं है।"
शुरुआत में SG ने कहा कि यह मामला यूनिवर्सिटी से पास हुए छात्रों की डिग्री से जुड़ा है और यह देखना है कि क्या यह RTI Act की धारा 8(1)(e) और (j) के तहत छूट के दायरे में आता है।
SG ने कहा,
"सवाल जिस डिग्री का है, वह एक संवैधानिक पद पर बैठे व्यक्ति की है। यूनिवर्सिटी को इस मामले में डिग्री बताने या ज़ाहिर करने में कोई आपत्ति नहीं हो सकती। लेकिन यूनिवर्सिटी सैद्धांतिक तौर पर इसका विरोध कर रही है क्योंकि हमने लाखों छात्रों को डिग्री दी है और इसलिए इस कानून को स्पष्ट करने की ज़रूरत है..."
SG मेहता ने 'फिड्यूशरी रिलेशनशिप' (भरोसे का रिश्ता) की अवधारणा पर सुप्रीम कोर्ट के फैसलों का ज़िक्र किया, जिसका ज़िक्र धारा 8(1)(e) में है। इसके अनुसार, किसी व्यक्ति को भरोसे के रिश्ते में मिली जानकारी का खुलासा करने की ज़रूरत नहीं है, जब तक कि सक्षम अधिकारी इस बात से संतुष्ट न हो कि व्यापक जनहित में ऐसी जानकारी का खुलासा करना ज़रूरी है।
इस चरण पर कोर्ट ने मौखिक रूप से कहा,
"हमारा मानना ​​है कि कोई RTI आवेदन था ही नहीं। जानकारी मांगने के लिए कोई आगे नहीं आया।"
इस पर SG ने कहा कि कोर्ट सही कह रहा है और कोई आवेदन नहीं किया गया।
उन्होंने बताया कि कार्यवाही केजरीवाल से जुड़ी जानकारी के लिए एक अलग अनुरोध से शुरू हुई, जिसके बाद केजरीवाल ने प्रधानमंत्री की डिग्री से जुड़ी जानकारी मांगते हुए जवाब दिया।
बता दें, दूसरी अपील में CIC ने केजरीवाल के जवाब को नागरिक के तौर पर RTI आवेदन माना और जानकारी ज़ाहिर करने का आदेश दिया (जिसे बाद में रद्द कर दिया गया)।
इसके बाद कोर्ट ने मौखिक रूप से कहा कि उसकी समझ के अनुसार, ऐसा आदेश पारित करने का पहला कदम ही अधिकार क्षेत्र से बाहर है।
कोर्ट ने आगे मौखिक रूप से कहा,
"अगर कोई आवेदन नहीं है तो जानकारी ज़ाहिर करने का सवाल ही नहीं उठता, हमारी समझ के अनुसार... RTI की एक प्रक्रिया है। किसी को आवेदन दाखिल करना होता है। सही जानकारी देनी होती है कि वह क्या जानकारी मांग रहा है। तभी आवेदन पर कार्रवाई हो सकती है। आवेदन करने और उस पर कार्रवाई करने की एक प्रक्रिया है।"
SG ने सहमति जताते हुए कहा कि RTI Act अपने आप में एक पूर्ण कानून है और इसे नज़रअंदाज़ नहीं किया जा सकता। उन्होंने कहा कि न तो यूनिवर्सिटी और न ही वह व्यक्ति जिसकी जानकारी मांगी गई, इस मामले में पक्षकार थे।
इसके बाद कोर्ट ने मौखिक रूप से टिप्पणी की कि एक्ट के तहत प्रक्रिया का सख्ती से पालन किया जाना चाहिए, जिसमें अधिकारी को धारा 8 के तहत छूट पर विचार करना होगा और जिस व्यक्ति की जानकारी दी जा रही है, उसे अपील का अधिकार होगा; यहाँ वह अधिकार भी छीन लिया गया।
कोर्ट ने मौखिक रूप से कहा,
"नहीं तो इस कानून का गलत इस्तेमाल होगा।"
अब यह मामला 21 सितंबर को दोपहर 2:30 बजे केजरीवाल के जवाब (rejoinder submissions) के लिए लिस्ट किया गया।
Case title: ARVIND KEJRIWAL v/s GUJARAT UNIVERSITY & ORS.

Penalise Kejriwal, GU urges Guj HC

Ahmedabad Mirror: Ahmedabad: Thursday, 17^th September 2026.
He had challenged order quashing CIC order to disclose Narendra Modi’s degree details

Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta, on behalf of Gujarat University, urged the Gujarat High Court to impose costs on Aam Aadmi Party chief Arvind Kejriwal on Wednesday. Kejriwal has filed an appeal challenging the quashing of a Central Information Commission (CIC) order directing disclosure of information concerning Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s degree. The matter is now listed for Kejriwal’s rejoinder submissions on September 21.
Appearing for the University before a Division Bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice DN Ray, Mehta submitted that costs should be imposed to ensure that the RTI Act is not misused and government officials are not made to spend productive working hours dealing with requests that do not serve the Act’s purpose.
“The appeal may be heard and decided on merits. And costs may be imposed. So that the very noble purpose and intent of the legislature under the RTI Act is not abused or misused and the authorities do not waste their time on unproductive work,” Mehta argued. “What is public interest here? Suppose for holding a particular post, a doctorate in physics is an essential eligibility criterion and someone raises an issue that he is holding a public post and not having a PhD and therefore I’m seeking information from the University, then that would be public Interest as his being on the post depends on that degree. RTI is not an enactment for curiosity seekers,” he argued.
The Bench is hearing Kejriwal’s appeal against the single judge’s verdict which quashed the CIC’s 2016 direction to Gujarat University to provide information concerning degrees in the name of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

CIC orders DU Faculty of Law to justify withholding of exam evaluation records: Satyendra Wankhade

Bar and Bench: New Delhi: Thursday, 17^th September 2026.
The CPIO had submitted that the evaluation process was confidential and held in a fiduciary capacity.

The Central Information Commission (CIC) has directed the Delhi University (DU) Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) to justify why records on how the Faculty of Law evaluates semester exam answer scripts were withheld. [Rishabh Mishra v, The CPIO, University of Delhi]
Responding to the CPIO's argument that many of the appellant's queries were really seeking clarifications or opinions rather than facts, Information Commissioner Sudha Rani Relangi held that a CPIO cannot be compelled to answer for reasoning that isn't on record.
"The CPIO is not required to create information, give an opinion, interpret records, or furnish explanations which are not available on the record," the Commission said.
However, it clarified that existing records such as marking schemes, written instructions to examiners, notices, circulars and guidelines do constitute information under Section 2(f) of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, subject to exemptions under Section 8 or Section 9.
The CPIO had submitted that the evaluation process was confidential and held in a fiduciary capacity.
The Commission held that the mere description of information as 'confidential' does not, by itself, constitute a valid ground for denial under the RTI Act. It added that any denial must be traceable to a specific exemption under Section 8 or Section 9, and that the fiduciary exemption under Section 8(1)(e) cannot be invoked mechanically without the university establishing that relationship for the particular information sought.
The order came on a second appeal under the RTI Act filed by one Rishabh Mishra. His application sought the marking scheme, examiner training records, safeguards to keep evaluators from knowing students' identities, quality checks on the evaluation process and details of any digital evaluation used for the Faculty of Law's three-year LLB semester exams.
The CPIO forwarded the query to the Joint Registrar (Examinations) and told Mishra that a response from that office was still awaited. Dissatisfied, Mishra filed a first appeal. The First Appellate Authority directed the University to respond to him directly within two weeks. When the University did not comply, Mishra filed a second appeal with the CIC.
The Commission found that the CPIO had substantially complied with the First Appellate Authority's order but had not adequately linked the confidentiality claim to any specific exemption.
It directed the CPIO to file a signed statement identifying each withheld item, the exact provision relied upon and where Section 8(1)(e) is claimed, the fiduciary relationship involved. The CPIO must also say whether any non-exempt portions of the withheld records can be separated and disclosed, as allowed under Section 10 of the Act. It has two weeks to comply.
[Read Order]

No Law Lets the Police Jam Your Phone: IFF Files RTIs on Delhi Police's Signal Jammers

IFF: New Delhi: Thursday, 17^th September 2026.
In July 2026, mobile internet around Jantar Mantar was suspended under written orders from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Voice calls failed too, and no published order covered them.

Between 20 June and 25 July 2026 the sit-in at Jantar Mantar. On 20 July, the day of the Sansad Chalo march, and on 22 July, the day of the clashes at Tolstoy Marg and Sansad Marg, mobile networks in central Delhi went dark. The Ministry of Home Affairs ("MHA") issued six orders under Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 suspending mobile internet within roughly 1.5 kilometres of the site. People nevertheless walked two kilometres to make a voice call, and press reports attributed to police officials the statement that portable jammers were switched on to limit coordination among protesters and to reduce live streams of police action. No statute gives the Delhi Police a power to jam telecommunication. Section 48 of the 2023 Act makes possessing or using such equipment a crime unless the Central Government permits it, for a specific purpose. The only guidelines that exist, issued by the Cabinet Secretariat in 2023, cover VVIP security against radio-controlled bombs and low-powered jammers in examination halls. Nothing covers crowd control. On 8 September 2026 we filed three RTI applications with the Delhi Police, on the equipment it holds and the rules for its use on what was deployed at Jantar Mantar and on whose order; and on the record behind its statement of 8 September that no jammers were used at the Satya Niketan rescue site. We will publish every reply, and every silence.
Background
For the Jantar Mantar began on 20 June 2026 we have already documented the two Delhi Police vehicles parked at the protest running live facial recognition on the crowd, and the list of 2,873 "criminal antecedents" that system produced. This post is about another tool that effects digital rights at same site that made the phones stop working.
On 20 July 2026, the day of the Sansad Chalo march, disruption was reported from about 10.30 am. Subscribers received a message from Airtel that internet services in the area had been stopped on government instructions. That message is the trace of a written order. The MHA issued six orders between 17 and 23 July 2026, dated 17, 20, 22 and 23 July, under Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, suspending mobile internet within approximately 1.5 kilometres of Jantar Mantar. But the orders as made available suspended data but they did not suspend voice or SMS. Yet The Wire reported that people at the site walked nearly two kilometres to make calls. On 22 July, the day tear gas was used and injured police officers were taken to Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, reports attributed to police the statement that jammers were activated as the clashes began. A technology outlet, attributing the reasoning to officials, reported that portable jammers were placed to limit real-time coordination among protesters and to reduce the chance of live streams of police action.
The Delhi Police has not, in any published document, confirmed or denied that it used jammers at Jantar Mantar. Its fact-checks during those weeks addressed other claims. The allegation has since recurred for an anti-reservation demonstration at the same site on 21 August 2026, protesters again said jammers had been deployed, a claim that could not be verified.
Subsequently on 6 September 2026 a multi-storey building collapsed at Satya Niketan, killing seven young people. Within hours, social media filled with claims that jammers had been installed at the rescue site to suppress information. On 8 September the Delhi Police posted an emphatic denial on X that no jammers were used and networks were fully operational with police, NDRF and fire teams coordinating by mobile, media and citizens broadcasting live. We have no reason to doubt it since jamming at a disaster site would obstruct rescue coordination and engage duties under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. But the denial has a legal consequence and we need to hence establish the authority and statute from which jamming equipment is being used by the Delhi Police, which is distinct from an internet shutdown or a network suspension. Here, the two mechanisms produce a similar result and are governed very differently.
A suspension order under Section 20(2)(b) is a written direction to a licensed telecom service provider to withhold a specified service, in a specified area, for a specified period. It can be confined to mobile data and leave voice and SMS running. Under the Suspension Rules, 2024 it must be issued by the Union or State Home Secretary, state reasons, be published, be capped at fifteen days, and be placed within twenty-four hours before a review committee that meets within five days and can set it aside. Rule 3(4) permits an order only after the competent authority has evaluated whether the objective can be achieved by other reasonable means. The service provider knows of the order. Subscribers receive a message, as they did on 20 July. Nothing is switched off at the network; the network is told to withhold. For Delhi, where police and public order are Union subjects under Article 239AA(3)(a), the competent authority is the Union Home Secretary, which is why the July orders came from the MHA.
A jammer is a radio transmitter. The Cabinet Secretariat's own definition, at paragraph 1(a) of its Jammer Guidelines 2023, is a transmitter designed to block all radio receivers within its range on the frequency bands it covers. A cellular jammer radiates on the bands assigned to the service providers so that every handset within its radius stops hearing the base station. The effect is indiscriminate and covers voice, SMS and data, and depending on the bands, Wi-Fi and GPS, for every device, whether it belongs to a protester, a resident, a shopkeeper, a journalist, a patient or a police officer not on a separate radio net. Prima facia on our analysis there is no order to produce, no service provider to inform, no message to subscribers, no committee, no time limit and no paper trail unless the police choose to keep one.
Analysis
Now let us look at what is the governing legality around jamming equipment. The only provision in force directly applicable to jammers is Section 48 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, effective from 5 July 2024. It provides that no person shall possess or use any equipment that blocks telecommunication unless permitted by the Central Government, or by an authority the Central Government has authorised for a specific purpose. Contravention is an offence under Section 42(3)(a), punishable with imprisonment up to three years, a fine up to fifty lakh rupees, or both. The Act binds the State, as a "person" under Section 2(j) includes any body of individuals, and the rule that the Crown is not bound unless named has never applied in India (Union of India v. Jubbi, AIR 1968 SC 360). There is no exemption for police. Section 48 removes the criminal consequence of possession and use for a permitted person. It does not confer on that person a power to interfere with the communications of others. Further, the permission is purpose-specific with the words "for specific purpose" qualifying the authorisation.
The only administrative framework is the Cabinet Secretariat's Jammer Guidelines 2023 (No. 11/11/2022-SS, Office of the Secretary (Security)). They govern jammers for VVIP and VIP security against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices ("RCIEDs") and low-powered jammers for examination halls. Counter-drone and prison jammers are routed to the MHA under its office memorandum of 10 March 2023. Paragraph 3(c) permits Central Ministries, State and UT administrations, defence forces and CAPFs to use jammers only from Bharat Electronics Limited and the Electronics Corporation of India Limited, and only for the specific purpose for which permission was granted. Paragraph 3(g) requires that information on the deployment of all RF jamming solutions be maintained and shared with the Secretary (Security), the SPG and the IB. Paragraph 4(l) requires that any jammer near an SPG protectee be deployed in consultation with the SPG. The application proforma at Annexure I(A) is designed entirely around a threat perception to a VIP. The guidelines do not mention law and order, protest, assembly or crowd control. They say nothing about duration, radius, public notice, hospitals or emergency calls. They are not made under any statutory rule-making power and are not published in the Gazette.
Further, Chapter IV of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 holds the force's public order powers. Specifically under Section 28 it can issue regulations for order in public places, Section 30(3) on prohibiting assemblies for a limited period, Section 31 on arrangements at places of public assembly, Section 33 on orders for the prevention of riot. None authorises interference with telecommunication or the operation of a radio transmitter. Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits orders directed at persons in urgent cases of apprehended danger. It cannot direct a service provider and it cannot authorise jamming. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, the Supreme Court held that telecommunication may be suspended only under the suspension rules and that Section 144 CrPC was not a substitute. The same reasoning excludes Section 163 BNSS.
What follows from this legal analysis is that we can assume the Delhi Police holds jammers procured from BEL or ECIL with the approval of the Secretary (Security). That satisfies Section 48 for possession. However, such procurement says nothing about the lawfulness of switching the device on at a public assembly. As an analogy, a licence to hold a firearm is not authority to fire it. In PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, the Supreme Court treated even an express statutory power to intercept communications as one that could be exercised against citizens only with procedural safeguards, and read them in. Section 48 does not purport to be a power at all. There is no statute that says when, where, for how long and on whose authority a police force may jam the public's communications. 
If the permission the Delhi Police holds is for protectee security against RCIEDs, deployment at a protest for crowd control is used outside that permission, and on the terms of Section 42(3)(a), is used without authorisation. While we anticipate that the Government may reason that Parliament House and SPG protectees were in the vicinity during the Monsoon Session. That is an argument to be met on the record in response to our RTIs, not conceded. An RCIED jammer accompanies a protectee or a convoy and moves with it. A jammer parked at a protest site for the duration of a march is a different deployment with a different object. If the justification is protectee security, then the permission, the threat assessment and the SPG consultation required by paragraph 4(l) will all exist, and they can be produced. Hence, we have filed RTIs. 
We have taken this action to check on the proliferation of jamming equipment that may be used as a circumvention of the nominal legality and safeguards for internet shutdowns. Just in the Jantar Mantar protests the use of jamming resulted in the limitation on the following legal activities: 

1. Live Streaming : Preventing citizens from recording and transmitting police conduct in a public place is not a legitimate aim and it inverts the logic on which the Supreme Court mandated CCTV in police stations in Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, (2021) 1 SCC 184, that recording police conduct protects rights.Given that a data-only suspension order was already in force,  a barrage jammer that additionally cut voice and SMS for every resident, patient, shopkeeper and reporter in the radius cannot be the least restrictive measure when a less restrictive one was operating at the same time. 
2. Hospitals and 112 : A jammer prevents calls to 112. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital and Lady Hardinge Medical College both lie within two kilometres of Jantar Mantar. RML received the injured police officers on 22 July. The right to emergency medical care is part of Article 21 (Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 SCC 37). A measure that severs the public's means of summoning that care, without notice, engages the right directly, and where harm results, public law compensation follows (Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746). 

The denial of 8 September demonstrates that the Delhi Police treats the fact of jammer deployment, or non-deployment, at a given site on a given day as something it can verify and publish within two days. Paragraph 3(g) of the guidelines requires deployment records to be maintained and shared; records therefore exist by design. Anuradha Bhasin requires that orders restricting communication be published so that affected persons can challenge them. Sections 4(1)(c) and (d) of the RTI Act require a public authority to publish relevant facts and reasons for decisions affecting the public. A force that can deny a deployment within forty-eight hours cannot credibly claim, under Section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act, that the fact of a deployment six weeks earlier is a secret. The prompt statement on Satya Niketan, set against the silence on Jantar Mantar, is itself material.
Action
On 8 September 2026 we filed three applications under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 with the Public Information Officer, Police Headquarters, Delhi Police. Each defines "jamming equipment" to include vehicle-mounted, portable, manpack and static jammers, anti-drone systems with jamming capability and harmonious call blocking systems, whether owned, leased, hired or borrowed, so that no category can be read out of the request.

1. On the equipment and the rules (Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10072): The number, type, make, model, frequency bands and custodian of every unit the Delhi Police holds; the sanction orders and contracts with BEL and ECIL; every permission from the MHA, the Cabinet Secretariat or the Department of Telecommunications, including under Section 48 and the 2023 guidelines; every standing order or SOP governing deployment, the officers competent to authorise it, and limits on duration, radius and power; whether a deployment register is kept, and if so its format and a year-wise count of deployments since 2023 broken down by purpose (protectee security, public events, law and order or protest management, counter-drone, examinations); expenditure by financial year; any assessment of the effect on 112, hospitals and the public; correspondence with the DoT, TRAI and service providers; and seizures of unauthorised jammers and FIRs registered. Where no SOP exists, the application asks the force to say so.
2. On Jantar Mantar, 20 June to 25 July 2026 (Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10074): Whether any jamming equipment was deployed, activated or kept on standby at Jantar Mantar or within two kilometres of it, and for each deployment the time of activation and deactivation, location, model, bands, radius, unit and authorising officer; specifically for 20 and 22 July; certified copies of every order, requisition, deployment plan, wireless message and file noting; the register entries for the period; the threat assessment stating the purpose; any intimation to the DoT, service providers, the Lieutenant Governor, the MHA, emergency services, RML Hospital or Lady Hardinge; whether the Delhi Police sought or obtained any order under Section 20(2)(b) or the 2024 Rules, or made any request to a service provider to suspend or degrade services, with copies and the reasons recorded; any Section 163 BNSS order referring to mobile services, live streaming or jamming; whether any officer told the press on 22 or 23 July that jammers were activated, and the record of that statement; and the complaints received about loss of connectivity and the replies sent.
3. On Satya Niketan, 6 to 8 September 2026 (Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10077): Whether any jamming equipment was deployed or present at or within two kilometres of the collapse site; the file, notings, verification reports and correspondence on which the X post of 8 September 2026 was prepared and approved, including who verified the position at the site and any confirmation of network status obtained from a service provider or the DoT; complaints received about connectivity at the site; and the designation of the officer who approves fact-check posts on the Delhi Police's official accounts, with the SOP governing them.

Alongside these RTIs we will in the coming months taking up advocacy around the following policy reforms and writing to public authorities for the following actions: 

1. The Cabinet Secretariat should clarify, in writing, that the Jammer Guidelines 2023 do not authorise deployment for law and order, protest management or crowd control, and the Wireless Planning and Coordination Wing of the Department of Telecommunications should treat any such deployment as unauthorised use under paragraph 3(f).
2. The Department of Telecommunications should amend the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024 to state expressly that no telecommunication service may be blocked or degraded by any means, including radio-frequency jamming, other than under a written order under Section 20(2)(b).
3. Pending legislation, no jammer should be switched on against a public assembly without a written authorisation by a named senior officer stating a purpose within Article 19(2) or 19(3), a defined radius and duration, prior intimation to hospitals and emergency services within the radius, a technical requirement to preserve emergency calls where feasible, a contemporaneous log, and post facto review.
4. Parliament must legislate. Every comparable democracy that permits the State to jam communications does so by statute, for named purposes, with a regulator informed. India should not be governed on this question by a procurement circular.

Transparency work of this kind is slow and depends entirely on our members. If you believe that attending a protest should not cut you off from a hospital, become an IFF member and help us see this through.
Important documents

1. RTI application on jamming equipment held by the Delhi Police and the rules governing its deployment, dated 8 September 2026, Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10072 [Link]
2. RTI application on the deployment of jamming equipment and disruption of mobile services at Jantar Mantar, 20 June to 25 July 2026, dated 8 September 2026, Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10074 [Link]
3. RTI application on jamming equipment at the Satya Niketan collapse site and the basis for the Delhi Police statement of 8 September 2026, dated 8 September 2026, Registration No.DEPOL/R/E/26/10077 [Link]
4. Cabinet Secretariat, Jammer Guidelines 2023, No. 11/11/2022-SS [Link]
5. Delhi Police Act, 1978 [Link]
6. FCC Enforcement Advisory 2014-05 on jammers and state and local law enforcement [Link]

Citizens’ right to know and the long wait for an Information Commission: Dr Shamsul Bari and Ruhi Naz

The Daily Star: Bangladesh: Wednesday, 16^th September 2026.

For two years, citizens’ call to fill the vacant posts of the Information Commission of Bangladesh has gone largely unheeded, leaving it unable to perform its essential statutory role. A gazette notification issued on July 9 by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting confirmed the reconstitution of a selection committee to recommend candidates for the posts of chief information commissioner and two information commissioners and there has been news of a call for applications from interested candidates by the committee subsequently but no further developments have since been publicly reported. What happens to a legal right when the very institution created to protect it can no longer perform its essential function?
Over the past two years, citizens have continued to seek information and press public authorities for accountability, demonstrating both the resilience of the Right to Information Act and the consequences of leaving citizens largely on their own to enforce a right guaranteed by law. A review of RTI cases during this period reveals citizens seeking information on hospitals, schools, roads, public expenditure, social-security benefits, land administration, electricity, the environment, and local government. They were not pursuing abstract notions of transparency, but trying to solve problems affecting everyday life.
Citizens sought information about absentee doctors, medicine allocations, procurement, ambulance services, dialysis facilities, vaccination, and unauthorised charges. At the Nilphamari Mother and Child Health Welfare Centre, RTI disclosure reportedly exposed prolonged unauthorised absence of medical personnel, affecting services to thousands of mothers and children. At the Nilphamari 250-bed Hospital, more than 50 RTI applications were reportedly ignored before dialogue with officials helped secure information and service improvements. Or consider public money. Citizens asked about government vehicles and fuel expenditure, road budgets, contractor lists, work-completion certificates, and procurement. In one case concerning trees around the Teesta canal, RTI information showed that 342 government trees had been sold for Tk 24.7 lakh, leading citizens to question their valuation.
The infrastructure cases are particularly revealing. A road in Saidpur had remained problematic for about a year. After an RTI application sought information about its budget and completion, the work was reportedly completed within a day, although officials did not supply the requested information. Elsewhere, RTI inquiries helped restart an incomplete road and prompted official inspection of an unrepaired bridge.
This illustrates one of the most intriguing findings: sometimes the question itself produces an answer in the form of action. RTI applications reportedly contributed to roads being completed, a bridge being inspected, dengue-control measures being undertaken, a waste bin being installed, dormant electricity infrastructure being activated, a missing citizen charter being displayed, an ambulance being opened for public use, and an unauthorised veterinary fee being withdrawn. The prospect of having to explain an administrative failure sometimes seems enough to make an authority act. That demonstrates RTI’s power, but also presents a danger. We must not confuse action with accountability. If a road is repaired after an RTI application but the authority does not disclose its budget, contractor, or expenditure, the immediate problem may be solved, but the citizen’s legal right remains unfulfilled. The RTI law was enacted not simply to persuade government offices to act, but to establish a durable culture of openness and accountability.
Another troubling development is that some applicants reportedly faced verbal abuse, threats of legal action, home visits, collection of personal information, political labelling, and pressure to settle matters informally. Officials sometimes tried to substitute telephone conversations or verbal explanations for written responses. In one case, additional activists reportedly filed applications collectively after an individual applicant faced pressure, apparently to prevent him from being singled out. Such experiences strike at the philosophy of the RTI Act. Asking a public authority how it has exercised public power or spent public money is not an act of hostility, but an exercise of citizenship.
Social-protection cases offer another important lesson. Citizens sought lists of recipients of old-age, widow and maternity allowances, VGD rice, TCB cards, agricultural inputs and other benefits. Their questions were elementary: Who is entitled? Who was selected? Who received the benefit? Why was someone excluded? Without such information, citizens cannot know whether scarce public resources are being distributed fairly. Public authorities themselves are bound by the RTI Act to disclose essential information proactively; however, a recent review of some 37 ministries and nine divisions found that a majority of them have failed to publish their latest annual reports on their websites, despite the legal requirement, while some had never published one at all.
The experience, therefore, presents a paradox. On the one hand, RTI has demonstrated considerable grassroots strength. Citizens continued to file applications, appeal, organise collectively, and demand answers. Even without an effective apex enforcement mechanism, a single RTI application could sometimes expose administrative failure and produce corrective action. On the other hand, that resilience risks concealing the seriousness of the institutional vacuum. A statutory right should not depend upon the persistence, courage, or collective strength of the person exercising it. When an authority refuses information, the citizen must have somewhere effective to go. That is precisely why the Information Commission exists.
When that final link in the enforcement chain is weakened, the burden shifts from the institution to the citizen. People must repeatedly pursue officials, appeal, negotiate, mobilise others and sometimes withstand intimidation simply to make a right already guaranteed by law meaningful.
Bangladesh’s experience during this institutional vacuum has therefore reaffirmed the importance of the RTI Act. Citizens have demonstrated that they still believe in their right to know. The state must now demonstrate the same commitment. A right to information cannot remain indefinitely dependent on citizens’ determination to enforce it. The right to know needs its guardian back. How much longer must citizens wait? What can justify a two-year delay in appointing the Commissioners needed to make the law fully enforceable?
It’s worth recalling that Information Adviser Zahed Ur Rahman, while talking to journalists in Rangpur on August 19, said that an “effective and independent” Information Commission would be formed within a month. We hope that the government will honour that pledge and demonstrate its commitment to the RTI Act by appointing the commissioners without further delay. With the International Day for Universal Access to Information approaching later this month, there could hardly be a more appropriate way to mark the occasion, or a more convincing affirmation of citizens’ right to know.

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Dr Shamsul Bari and Ruhi Naz are chairman and assistant director (RTI), respectively, at Research Initiatives, Bangladesh (RIB). They can be reached at rib@citech-bd.com.

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Views expressed in this article are the author's own.