Aid Of Third Parties In Inspecting Documents Under RTI Act: Ammar Shahid & Syed Raiyyan

Live Law: Ahmedabad: Sunday, 6^th September 2026.
Recently, in Vala Jodhubhai Golanbhai v. RTI Officer,[1] the Gujarat High Court (“GHC”) has held that it is impermissible for an information seeker under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“Act”) to be accompanied by third parties during the inspection of documents accessed through the Act.

In the case, the nature of the application filed under the Act necessitated the applicant's inspection of bulky records to cull out the information they desired. Since the applicant was not conversant with the language of the documents containing such records, they sought assistance from third parties to translate them. The Public Authority, however, refused access on the ground that the applicant was not empowered to be attended by third parties during the inspection. The GHC upheld the decision on appeal, and found that the applicant was prohibited from involving a third party in the process.
As to where this prohibition arises, the GHC did not say much. The GHC merely stated that permitting another person to accompany the applicant during inspection of records would be tantamount to providing information to a third party. It further found that third parties' involvement suggests that “the petitioner is merely acting as a pawn for such third party, which is not the object or purpose of the Right to Information Act.”
The premise of the proposition is unconvincing. Whether a person acts independently or as a pawn of any third party, they are statutorily entitled to access information if it is not restricted under the Act. Moreover, the third party, if they are an Indian citizen, are also empowered to receive information under the Act.
More importantly, such a restriction is absent from the Act's framework. Therefore, the restriction is at odds with the principle that limitations of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution (which include the right to information) must be rooted in a legislative Act and not stem from executive discretion.
This piece argues that the GHC verdict, being unsupported by the Act, violates the right to information in both text and spirit. Moreover, it attempts to offer a better paradigm for handling cases akin to the one before the GHC.
Framework of the Act
The Act enables citizens of India to access information, including records, documents, and reports, possessed by public authorities. Significantly, Section 2(j) of the Act defines the right to information as including the right to inspect work, documents, and records overseen by the concerned public authority. Any citizen seeking such information may apply to the said public authority, which shall be bound to furnish the requested information, unless it is exempted under the Act itself.
Restriction Out of Thin Air
These exemptions are narrow and provided under Sections 8, 9, 11, and 24 of the Act. Under Section 8, Public Authorities are exempted from furnishing information on certain subjects, such as information related to national security, detrimental to international relations, involving personal information of third parties, and so on. Section 9 exempts information that would result in copyright infringement of persons other than the state. Section 11 stipulates that if the information sought by any person relates to a third party or has been supplied by a third party to the public authority, the third party must be allowed to make a representation regarding the disclosure of that information. Section 24 empowers the Central Government to exclude certain public authorities from the purview of the Act. Along with these, the Delhi High Court in Shishir Chand v. The Central Information Commission[2] and the Central Information Commission in Mr Ramesh Chand Jain v. Government of NCT of Delhi[3] have added an extra-statutory ground of previous disclosure of information for refusing to furnish information, which has since become a recognised exception.
None of these envisages that the right to inspect public documents may be refused because the applicant had involved a third party, as has been held by the GHC.
In fact, the Act only mentions third parties in a very specific context. Third parties are defined as legal persons other than the citizen requesting information (and, logically, the public authority from which the information is sought, although not explicitly stated in the Act). However, the Act refers to third parties only for creating additional fortification against providing information that concerns them, such as those made under Sections 8 and 11. Other than that, no further restrictions have been incorporated in the Act to prevent third-party access to the information. The invented restriction is thus nowhere to be found in the Act.
Right to Information, Intelligent Decisions
At this point, it is critical to note that the GHC, technically, did not foreclose all avenues for the applicant. It allowed them to inspect the documents provided no third-party escorts them. However, the GHC completely overlooked that such an inspection would be well-nigh meaningless, as the applicant would not understand the documents themselves. While this does not formally restrict the applicant's right to information, in substance, it rendered it nugatory.
 
The decision, while made under the rubric of protecting the Act's object, undermines the very concept of the right to information. The right to information, although effectuated through the Act, is rooted in Article 19(1)(a). It is considered critical for the health of a democracy, as it enables citizens to access and utilise information to form informed opinions and take intelligent decisions. In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reform, one of the foremost cases concerning the right to information in India, the SC had noted that “the members of a democratic society should be sufficiently informed so that they may influence intelligently the decisions which may affect them. . .”[4] If the information provided to individuals cannot be understood, assessed, and used to form opinions and make informed decisions, then dissemination of the information is merely a procedural formality and not an effective exercise of the right. The GHC has shown plumb disregard for these crucial elements.
Rights cannot be restricted through backdoor intrusion by the Executive/Court.
Consequently, the GHC's invented restriction effectively curtails the applicant's right to information, in a manner not prescribed by the Act. Certainly, reasonable restrictions on the right to information, enshrined in Article 19(1)(a), by virtue of Article 19(2), are permissible and no right can be considered absolute.
However, the SC has held that imposing limitations on the said rights is primarily the legislature's domain. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, it clarified that “[t]he reasonable restrictions [on fundamental rights] sought to be imposed must be through “a law” having statutory force and not a mere Executive or Departmental instruction. The restraint upon the Executive not to have a backdoor intrusion applies equally to Courts.”[5] As a result, the restriction imposed by an executive and judicial imagination is unconstitutional for violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The GHC, unfortunately, does not analyse this facet in its judgment.
What might be done?
Admittedly, unbridled license to involve as many people as the applicant wishes in the inspection of documents under the Act is unfeasible. However, this could have been handled better than by the GHC.
Frankly, there is no clear provision that addresses the odd circumstances of the case. The Act does consider the country's linguistic diversity in allowing applications to be made and answered in English, Hindi, or in the area's official language where the public authority is situated. However, it does not envision a situation in which existing documents in a particular language are examined by someone who is not well-versed in the same. There can be two potential solutions for this peculiarity.
The first would be an affidavit attached to the application attesting that the applicant is not conversant with the language of the documents they require to inspect, and therefore, needs the support of a third party. To align this with the provisions of the Act, it may be mandated that in such cases, the third party accompanying the applicant must also be a citizen of India, and thus, entitled to the same right as the applicant to scrutinise the public documents under the Act. Interestingly, in the present case, the applicant had adopted this mechanism to resolve their quandary. Unfortunately, the GHC rode roughshod over the applicant's proposed method without giving it any consideration.
Second, the burden of effectively communicating the information to the applicant may be shifted onto the public authorities themselves. The Act itself stipulates special accommodations for certain classes of individuals. For instance. Section 7(4) of the Act requires that arrangements be made for sensorily disabled applicants. A similar remedy may be incorporated for those who require aid in accessing information due to linguistic obstacles. This may involve translating the records into either English or the language requested by the applicant, or providing a translator on the applicant's request to accompany them during the inspection.
Out of the two, the former is empirically and economically effective. In the latter case, if the applicant has any grievance with the translator or translations at the behest of the public authority, it may open a new source of litigation on an already overburdened judicial system. On the other hand, it would ensure that everyone, including those who may not be able to employ or convince third parties to assist them, will have equitable access to documents and records. Perhaps a conjoined framework, with the affidavit route as the default and authority-provided translation as a fallback for applicants who can't arrange their own help, is plausible. These suggestions, of course, are not iron-clad and will require fine-tuning before implementation.
Nevertheless, they attempt to go beyond the unthought-out restriction that the GHC upheld, and reconcile administrative feasibility with fruitful exercise of the right to information.
The case before the GHC presented it with the opportunity to pioneer an interpretation over a question that had, till now, remained untraversed. Surely, there was no straightforward path for the Court; however, it could still have ventured to chart out a clearer path for such situations. The slapdash and inert manner in which it responded to it is disappointing to say the least. One can only hope that this judgment will provoke a more detailed and, with luck, better solution to the issue.

Student seeks evaluated Answer Script, University demands ₹1,000: CIC Says RTI Rules Override: By Ankita Kumari

SCC Online: New Delhi: Sunday, 6^th September 2026.
“It is noteworthy that when any Rules/Bye Laws are found inconsistent with the RTI Act, 2005 then the non-obstante clause of Section 22 becomes operative.”

Central Information Commission: In a second appeal against the demand of ₹1000 for providing a copy of the appellant’s evaluated answer script for the FYUG 2nd Semester Examination, 2025, Information Commissioner Sudha Rani Relangi, allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned decision of Patharkandi College affiliated with Assam University. Relying on Section 22, RTI Act, the Commission held that where an answer script is sought under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act), the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) can charge only the photocopying fee prescribed under the Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2012 (RTI Rules), and cannot enforce university regulations inconsistent with the statutory fee structure.
Background:
The appellant, a student of Patharkandi College affiliated with Assam University, Silchar (a Central University established under the Central Universities Act, 2009), sought a certified photocopy of his evaluated answer script for the FYUG 2nd semester examination, 2025, in Philosophy (Paper Code PHPDSM151), after securing 35 out of 70 marks. The CPIO demanded ₹1000 for providing the answer script, and the First Appellate Authority upheld the demand on the ground that Assam University, being an autonomous institution, had prescribed the fee under its own notification. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a second appeal before the Commission.
The appellant contended that the demand violated Rule 4(a), RTI Rules, 2012, which prescribes photocopying charges at ₹2 per page, and that Section 22, RTI Act overrides inconsistent rules or regulations. The CPIO, however, maintained that the University was entitled to frame its own rules and had demanded ₹1000 pursuant to its Notification dated 18 June 2023.
The appellant also relied on CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497, in which the Supreme Court held that an evaluated answer book constitutes “information” under Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, as it contains the examiner’s opinion.
The appellant further relied on Alka Matoria v. Maharaja Ganga Singh University, 2012 SCC On Line Raj 3593, where the Rajasthan High Court, on facts identical to the present case, quashed a university regulation demanding ₹1,000 for a copy of an answer book, observing that the charge appeared to be “an ill-intended attempt… to somehow discourage students from seeking certified copies of their answer books.” The Special Leave Petition against that judgment was dismissed in limine by the Supreme Court.
Analysis:
The Commission, observed that the core issue in the instant appeal was the demand of additional fees of ₹1000 by the CPIO under the Assam University Rules, which was alleged to be contrary to the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005. The CPIO, submitted that Assam University, being an autonomous body, was entitled to frame its own Rules and that the demand of ₹1000 had been made in terms of Assam University Notification No. AUK-202/8/2004 dated 18 June 2023. The CPIO further stated that the appellant had sought similar information through RTI applications previously and had paid the requisite fees without protest. It was also submitted that, being a part of the University, the CPIO was obligated to follow its Rules and bye-laws and had accordingly communicated the applicable fee to the appellant as part of the procedure followed by the University for disclosure of evaluated answer scripts to students.
At the outset, the Commission agreed with the appellant that the demand of additional fees of ₹1000 by the CPIO for providing the evaluated answer script sought under the RTI Act was not within the confines of the RTI Act and the RTI Rules. The Commission observed that although the CPIO advised the appellant to obtain a copy of the documents in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Assam University Notification No. AUK-202/8/2004 dated 18 June 2023, it is not permissible to take recourse to any other rules or regulations for supplying information or stipulating fees for providing copies of documents inconsistent with the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005 and the Rules made thereunder.
“It is noteworthy that when any Rules/Bye Laws are found inconsistent with the RTI Act, 2005 then the non-obstante clause of Section 22 becomes operative.”
The Commission further found weightage in the case law cited by the appellant, namely, ICSI v. Paras Jain, Civil Appeal No. 5665 of 2014, wherein it was held that the institutional mechanism and the RTI route for obtaining answer scripts are not mutually exclusive. Where a candidate seeks the answer script under the RTI Act, the fee must be charged in accordance with the RTI Rules. Applying the aforesaid ratio, the Commission held that the CPIO was required to provide the answer script by charging photocopying charges strictly as per the RTI Rules, 2012, and cautioned the CPIO to exercise due diligence in future.
Allowing the second appeal, the Commission set aside the impugned decision of the respondent and directed the CPIO to provide the appellant’s own answer script for the FYUG 2nd Semester Examination, 2025, for paper code PHPDSM151 M, free of cost. The CPIO was directed to comply with the aforesaid direction within 2 weeks from the date of receipt of the order, under due intimation to the Commission.
[Ahmed Shakir v. The CPIO Assam University, CIC/ASUVR/A/2025/657621, decided on 6-7-2026]

RTI data: Nearly 40% of EWS applications rejected in J&K in last 5 years

Hindustan Times: Jammu: Saturday, 5^th September 2026.
The Kathua tehsildar said 6,963 applications for issuance of EWS certificates were received between 2022 and 2027 (to date). Of these, 4,276 certificates were issued, while 2,687 applications, were rejected.
Nearly 40% of the applications for economically weaker section (EWS) certificates filed in Kathua tehsil over the last five years have been rejected, according to data obtained under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.

In response to Jammu-based RTI activist Raman Kumar Sharma, the Kathua tehsildar said 6,963 applications for issuance of EWS certificates were received between 2022 and 2027 (to date). Of these, 4,276 certificates were issued, while 2,687 applications, close to 40%, were rejected.
Year-wise, data show a rise in both applications and rejections. In FY 2022-23, 480 EWS applications were received, 282 certificates were issued, and 198 were rejected. The numbers rose sharply in FY 2023-24, with 1,566 applications, 1,144 certificates issued and 422 rejected. In 2024-25, 1,372 out of 2,461 applications were approved, while 1,089 were rejected.
The following year, 2025-26, saw 2,205 applications, with 1,325 issued and 880 rejected. For 2026-27 (to date), 251 applications have been received, with 153 certificates issued and 98 rejected.
The tehsil office, however, did not provide data for FY 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22, stating that EWS certificates during this period were issued offline, and asked the applicant to approach the office separately for that record.
Commenting on the rejection figures, Sharma said a rejection rate of nearly 40% warranted an audit and called for a white paper to examine the reasons behind the rejections.
“Either residents are not adequately aware of the eligibility requirements for obtaining EWS certificates, or there is some other issue that can come to the fore only after a proper audit or probe,” he said.
The figures, he added, should be examined to determine whether applicants were rejected due to incomplete documentation, ineligibility or other reasons, and whether adequate opportunities were being provided to rectify deficiencies.

CCTV Footage Cannot Be Given Directly Under RTI: Allahabad High Court: By Salil Tiwari

Law Beat: Allahabad: Saturday, 5^th September 2026.
Court says CCTV footage exempt under Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act cannot be directly supplied, but may be preserved and summoned by a court or commission.

The Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) has held that a person cannot simply ask for CCTV footage through an RTI application. Court said CCTV footage containing sensitive information cannot be supplied directly to an RTI applicant when it is covered by the exemption under Section 8(1)(g) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. However, court or an appropriate forum can order its preservation and call for the actual footage if a complaint is filed before it.
A division bench of Justices Shekhar B. Saraf and Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary passed the order in a case filed by Shobhit Kashayap against the Uttar Pradesh government and six others, including the State Information Commission. Kashayap was represented by advocates Suraj Kumar Nishad, Atul Raj and Yogesh Soni, while the state was represented by government counsel and advocate Shikhar Anand.
Why did the petitioner seek CCTV footage under RTI?
Kashayap had approached the high court under Article 226 challenging a May 14 order passed by the State Information Commission. Among other reliefs, he sought complete information in response to his RTI application dated March 20, 2025, and sought a maximum penalty of Rs 25,000 against the concerned respondent under the RTI Act. He also sought compensation for the alleged harassment caused to him.
The proceedings before the high court specifically raised the issue of access to CCTV footage.
Counsel appearing for the State Information Commission submitted that the footage contained sensitive information and was covered by the exemption under Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act. However, the Commission said that the footage could be made available to the court or the Commission if directed, though it could not be handed over directly to the applicant.
What did the high court say about preservation of CCTV footage?
Court considered the Supreme Court's judgment in Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh and Others, on which the petitioner relied to contend that preservation of CCTV footage was his right.
The Supreme Court had dealt with the preservation and production of CCTV footage in the context of complaints of human rights violations. It had said that the concerned Commission or court could immediately summon CCTV footage for its safe keeping and that such footage could subsequently be made available to an investigating agency.
The Supreme Court had also directed that CCTV footage in police stations and investigative or enforcement agencies be preserved for a minimum period of six months, and said that a victim had a right to have the footage secured in cases of human rights violations.
On examining these observations, court said it was “clear that a Court/Commission has the power to call for CCTV footage and to direct preservation of the said footage".
Why was the CCTV footage not handed over to the petitioner?
Court drew a distinction between the power of a court or commission to secure CCTV footage and an individual's direct entitlement to obtain it through an RTI request.
“We are of the view that the petitioner has, till date, not filed any complaint before any Court or Commission and has simpliciter sought the CCTV footage,” the bench said.
In these circumstances, court held, the footage could not be supplied directly to Kashayap because it was covered by the exemption contained in Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act.
Court, however, did not foreclose access to the footage altogether.
It said that if the petitioner files a complaint before the appropriate forum or court, that forum “may very well direct preservation of the CCTV footage, as well as call for the actual footage” for the purpose of verifying the complaint.
The high court accordingly disposed of the writ petition with these directions.
Case Title: Shobhit Kashayap v. State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Prin. Secy., Administrative Reform Deptt., Lko. and 6 Others
Bench: Justices Shekhar B. Saraf and Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary
Order Date: September 2, 2026

RTI reveals UIDAI did not track Bihar Aadhaar DOB changes after pension hike announcement

Mid-Day: New Delhi: Friday, 4^th September 2026.
In June 2025, Kumar announced that the monthly pension for elderly citizens, persons with disabilities and widowed women under the Social Security Pension Scheme would be increased from Rs 400 to Rs 1,100, effective July 2025

A Right to Information (RTI) query has revealed that the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) did not maintain separate data on Aadhaar holders in Bihar who changed their dates of birth after the then Chief Minister Nitish Kumar announced a major pension hike ahead of the 2025 Assembly election.
In June 2025, Kumar announced that the monthly pension for elderly citizens, persons with disabilities and widowed women under the Social Security Pension Scheme would be increased from Rs 400 to Rs 1,100, effective July 2025.
RTI seeks details of Aadhaar DOB changes
The applicant sought the total number of Aadhaar holders in Bihar who updated their date of birth after the pension hike announcement, along with month-wise and district-wise details of such changes.
The RTI query also asked whether the UIDAI, which maintains the Aadhaar system, had conducted any internal review or flagged unusual patterns in date-of-birth updates following the revision.
UIDAI says data was not available
UIDAI initially said the information sought was not covered under the RTI Act.
However, in the first appeal, the authority clarified that "no such information" was available for the questions relating to the number and breakup of date-of-birth changes. The query regarding an internal review was stated to be "not applicable".
During the hearing before the Central Information Commission (CIC), the authority said it did not maintain separate data on Aadhaar holders who had updated their dates of birth after the pension enhancement announcement.
It also said no month-wise or district-wise compilation of such updates was available.
The authority further submitted that no internal review or flagging of unusual patterns, as referred to in the RTI, was applicable or available in its records.
CIC says public authority need not create information
The CIC said the RTI Act does not require a public authority to create, compile or generate information that is not maintained in its records in the form sought by an applicant.
Information Commissioner P R Ramesh, however, observed that the CPIO's initial response, which stated that the information was not covered under the RTI Act, was "not appropriate".
(With PTI inputs)

In RTI reply, MEA silent over CM’s US clearance

The Times of India: Hyderabad: Friday, 4^th September 2026.
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has refused to disclose file notings, correspondence and other records related to political clearance for chief minister A Revanth Reddy’s proposed US visit, citing RTI Act provisions protecting information that could affect India’s relations with foreign countries.

In its reply to an RTI application, the MEA said political clearance requests were processed based on various factors, some of which could contain sensitive information and have a bearing on India’s diplomatic relations with the concerned country.
The ministry, however, confirmed that political clearance was granted for Revanth Reddy’s UK visit in Aug 2026. It did not clarify whether clearance for his proposed US visit was granted, denied or withheld.
The RTI application, filed by activist Robin Zaccheus, sought certified copies of records, file notings, correspondence, criteria documents, statistical data and other material relating to the political clearance process for foreign visits by chief ministers. It specifically sought details of the Telangana gov’s applications for Revanth Reddy’s proposed UK and US visits in Aug as part of the Telangana Rising programme.
The MEA invoked Section 8(1)(a) of the RTI Act, saying disclosure of the records could have implications for diplomatic relations.
It also said the information sought in the specific format was not maintained by the ministry. Compiling it would require extensive collation of data on individual visits from state govts, ministries and departments, amounting to creation of new information beyond its obligations under the RTI Act.
The ministry further cited Section 7(9), stating that undertaking such an exercise would result in inappropriate diversion of its resources.
The reply, received after the application was filed on Aug 23 and disposed of on Sept 3, comes amid questions over the cancellation of Revanth Reddy’s proposed US leg.
However, the MEA response does not establish why the US visit was cancelled or clarify whether political clearance for the trip had been granted or denied.

Growing RTI discomfort puts J&K Govt offices under CIC scanner

Daily Excelsior: Jammu: Friday, 4^th September 2026.
The Right to Information Act promises citizens a legal route to obtain information from Public Authorities, but latest proceedings before the Central Information Commission (CIC) suggest that several Government offices in Jammu and Kashmir are still struggling or reluctant to deal with such queries in the manner mandated by law.

In four separate matters involving the Social Welfare Department, Jammu Municipal Corporation, Block Development Office, Bhaderwah and office of Deputy Commissioner Jammu, the CIC has flagged a series of lapses in handling RTI applications, including failure to respond within the prescribed timeframe, deemed refusal, an RTI application being addressed to none (Blank), an invalid transfer under Section 6(3), failure to appreciate statutory exemptions and repeated non-compliance with the Commission's directions.
The order concerning the Social Welfare Department is particularly significant as the information sought related to the National Crèche Scheme, Grant-in-Aid released to NGOs/VOs and Utilization Certificates and PFMS-generated payment advice concerning liabilities of 2017-18 and 2018-19.
The CIC found that the CPIO's submissions did not explain why the September 18, 2024 letter forwarding the RTI application was addressed to "none", nor did they explain the inordinate delay in initiating action on March 26, 2025.
The Commission further observed that no reply had been provided within the prescribed timeframe, resulting in a deemed refusal under Section 7(2) of the RTI Act. It also held that the CPIO had erroneously transferred the RTI application under Section 6(3) to the concerned NGOs, which were not shown as Public Authorities.
The CPIO had sought to explain that the records were maintained by the concerned NGOs/VOs and that efforts were made to obtain them. However, the CIC said the reply did not clarify whether the information was available with the department and held that the CPIO could not simply shift the onus to the NGOs.
According to the Commission, Sections 2(f) and 2(j) envisage that a Public Authority should provide information under their control or information which can be accessed from the record-holder office/private body under any law. A cogent reply was therefore required instead of simply shifting the onus to the NGOs and alleging their inaction or non-response.
The CPIO has been asked to submit a cogent response explaining why action should not be taken under Section 20 for failure to reply within the stipulated timeframe, the letter dated September 18, 2024 being addressed to "none", and the invalid transfer under Section 6(3).
In the Block Development Office, Bhaderwah case, the CIC has gone a step further, warning the CPIO of ex-parte imposition of maximum penalty and disciplinary action in case of any further non-compliance.
The applicant had sought detailed information about works undertaken in Panchayat Dheraja during 2023-24, including funds received for clearing vendor bills and skilled labour payments, details of vendor bills and skilled payments, names and addresses of skilled labourers, amounts credited, Gram Sabha register and copies of files and measurement books relating to payments.
After the First Appellate Authority directed the PIO to provide complete information within 15 days, the matter reached the CIC following non-compliance. In its earlier proceedings, the Commission held that failure to provide a reply under Section 7(1) amounted to a deemed refusal, while failure to comply with the FAA's order constituted a gross violation of the RTI Act.
The CIC had also directed the CPIO to show-cause why action should not be taken under Section 20 and to furnish a point-wise reply after examining the information sought under Section 2(f) and applicable exemptions under Section 8(1). But when the show-cause hearing was held few days back, the CPIO again remained absent.
The Commission took grave exception to the non-compliance and reiterated its directions, making it clear that this was the last opportunity to plead the case and comply with the CIC's directions. Any further non-compliance, the Commission warned, would render the CPIO liable for ex-parte imposition of maximum penalty and disciplinary action under Section 20(1) and 20(2) of the RTI Act.
The Jammu Municipal Corporation case presents a different but equally revealing facet.
The applicant had sought copies of attendance registers maintained by NGOs for Safai Karamcharies working in Wards 23 and 23-A from 2006 to 2012. The CPIO initially stated that the record pertaining to 2006, being 18 years old, was not traceable at present and would be supplied if and when traced.
The appellant pointed out that the request covered records up to 2012 and sought the available records for other years. The FAA and Joint Commissioner subsequently directed the CPIO to provide the desired information as per record available.
The CPIO later reported that the concerned Sanitary Inspector and Supervisor had stated that the records were 18 years old and hence not traceable. The CIC, however, found that the CPIO and FAA had failed to appreciate another crucial aspect of the RTI application-that the information sought entails the personal information of third parties and ought to have been denied under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
Though the CIC declined penal action yet it directed the JMC PIO to submit a written explanation for prima-facie disregarding the hearing notice by remaining absent from the proceedings without any advance prayer for leave.
The Deputy Commissioner's Office Jammu matter has raised equally serious concerns. The RTI sought details of fards issued by Tehsildar Bahu, construction on Khasra No. 1149 at Chowadhi and action taken on a court order directing status quo. The CIC found that the CPIO had failed to provide a proper point-wise reply and that the documents relied upon did not establish compliance.
It further observed apparent shifting of onus to the Tehsildar Bahu and said the conduct suggested a lackadaisical approach and a prima-facie intent of misleading the Commission by withholding the facts of the case.

Sensitive CCTV footage can't be directly shared under RTI: Allahabad High Court

India Today: Lucknow: Friday, 4^th September 2026.
The Allahabad High Court ruled that sensitive CCTV footage cannot be handed over directly under the RTI Act. It said applicants can seek preservation and production of the recording only through a competent court or forum.

The Allahabad High Court ruled that sensitive CCTV footage cannot be handed over directly under the RTI Act.

The Allahabad High Court has held that CCTV footage sought under the Right to Information (RTI) Act cannot be directly disclosed to an applicant if it contains sensitive information and falls within the exemptions under the law. The court said such footage may be protected from disclosure under Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act.
At the same time, the Lucknow bench clarified that a person can seek preservation of such footage by filing a complaint before an appropriate court or competent commission. The concerned forum can then order the CCTV recording to be preserved and summon it for examination, if required.
The order was passed by a bench of Justices Shekhar B Saraf and Abhdesh Kumar Chaudhary while disposing of a writ petition filed by Shobhit Kashyap.
Kashyap had filed an RTI application on March 20, 2025, seeking various information, including complete CCTV footage. He also sought the imposition of the maximum penalty of Rs 25,000 on the official concerned for allegedly failing to provide the information, besides compensation for the harassment he claimed to have suffered.
During the hearing, the State Information Commission told the court that the CCTV footage contained sensitive information and could not be disclosed directly to Kashyap under Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act.
However, it said the footage could be made available if a court or competent commission directed its production.
Kashyap had relied on a Supreme Court judgment to contend that preservation of CCTV footage was a citizen's right.
The court noted that courts and competent commissions have the power to direct preservation of CCTV footage and call for its production. However, it observed that Kashyap had not filed any complaint before a court or commission and had sought the footage only through the RTI route.
In those circumstances, the bench held that the footage could not be supplied directly to him under the RTI Act. It clarified that if Kashyap files a complaint before an appropriate court or competent forum, that authority can order preservation of the recording and summon the original footage for examination as part of the proceedings.
The court's ruling thus draws a distinction between obtaining sensitive CCTV footage directly through an RTI application and securing its preservation and production through a judicial or other competent forum.

IFF sends Representation to the to the DGP regarding the Maharashtra State panel’s suggestions to police social media posts

IFF: Maharashtra: Thursday, 3^rd September 2026.
IFF writes to the DGP of Maharashtra and files an RTI application seeking information on the particulars of the suggestions

The Sadanand Date Committee, formed under the Maharashtra government in May 2026, reportedly recommended a change to India’s criminal code, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (“BNS”), to specifically cover “defamatory social media posts”, as reported by the Indian Express on 21st August 2026. This move raises eyebrows, legally speaking, because their changes reportedly veer close to reinstating the spirit of Section 66A IT Act (“66A”); a provision which was struck down by the Supreme Court in, with the timing of such recommendations being ill-perceived given as it arrives just as the government faces increased scrutiny and criticism on social media over student-led protests over exam system integrity and school quality. Concerned about the threat to free speech and constitutionally protected dissent, IFF sent a representation to Shri Sadanand Date, DGP, Maharashtra, and filed an RTI with the department requesting the text of the Government Resolution, draft text of proposed amendment, and the safeguards the Committee is considering to prevent a repeat of 66A’s unconstitutionality.
Background 
In May 2026, The Indian Express, The Mumbai Mirror, and The Free Press Journal reported about Maharashtrian Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis expressing interest in the Maharashtra Assembly, about constituting a committee headed by Director-General of Police (“DGP”), Sadanand Date, to study legal provisions and suggest amendment to deal effectively with cases of social media defamation, stating “There is a growing trend of using social media platforms to defame people without any evidence or proof. All kinds of people are facing this, especially women. So a committee will be formed under the DGP. Their recommendations will be taken”. In August 2026, The Indian Express reported on the Sadanand Date Committee’s (“the Committee”) panel decision recommending a change to the BNS directly, since as the Indian Express’ source expressed, “it will be vetted at multiple levels and have a stronger footing if challenged in court, as compared to just amending the state law”; with the larger recommendation reportedly pointing towards reinstating the spirit of Section 66A itself. 
Before it was repealed, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, was a law which criminalized “Any person who sends, by means of a computer resources or a communication device…”, any information considered “grossly offensive”, knowingly false information to cause “annoyance, inconvenience”, with an imprisonment for a term extendable to three years, plus a fine. 66A was infamously misused in both personal and political contexts; with the constitutionality of such a provision was challenged and brought to court after an incident in 2012; wherein the Mumbai Police apprehend two girls, Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan, for posting a lambasted remark on Facebook against a then-imposed bandh imposed in the wake of a prominent politician’s death. The girls were later released, however, their apprehension was widely criticised across the country, spurring multiple petitions challenging 66A’s constitutionality and its violation of freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. Chief among these was the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by Shrey Singhal, a then Delhi-based law student, arguing that 66A was vaguely phrased, violative of Article 14, 19(1)(a) and 21.
In the ensuing landmark judgement of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015 (“Shreya Singhal”), a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Section 66A in its entirety as unconstitutional, resting on the following findings:

1. Vagueness and overbreadth, due to expressions like “grossly offensive”, “annoyance” were incapable of any legal meaning, and highly subjective. It was a criminal provision which failed to give citizens fair notice of what speech was prohibited.
2. Chilling effect on free speech, since it resulted in citizens potentially self-policing and restricting themselves to avoid even permissible speech, out of fear of prosecution. 
3. Article 19(2) already exhaustively laid down eight grounds on restrictions to freedom of speech; which made recourse to free-standing judicial/legislative invented ground on restraint on speech unnecessary.
4. Advocacy not being tantamount to incitement, because the former is protected under Article 19(1)(a).

Further, Section 66A was itself declared void ab initio in 2015, yet never got fully purged from the criminal justice system. In IFF’s 2018 working paper, “Section 66A and Other Legal Zombies”, documented police stations and lower courts keeping on still registering and prosecuting cases under this dead provision, years after Shreya Singhal; largely because the judgement never really got systematically disseminated to law enforcement. This prompted the People's Union For Civil Liberties (“PUCL”), the original petitioner, to return to the Supreme Court in 2019 seeking directions on actual dissemination of the knowledge about the struck down provision. To track the scale of the issue, IFF and CivicDataLab launched the Zombie Tracker in January 2021, which is a public database of prosecutions which still happened to invoke Section 66A. As of last database update (15.02.2020), the Tracker recorded 1,307 fresh cases registered after Shreya Singhal, 570 still pending, and 104 which reached judgement. A subsequent All-India status report, which was placed on record by the Union Government counsel before the Supreme Court on 12.10.2022 in PUCL v. UOI (MA No. 901 of 2021 in WP(Cr) No. 199 of 2013) confirmed that this 66A backlog’s existence persisted well beyond the Tracker’s own cut off date.
The lesson therein for the Committee is that even a provision which already has been unanimously, unambiguously invalidated by the Supreme Court is still being weaponised against citizens, without efforts for correction. A “social media defamation” provision which just happens to be worded differently, and might be similarly vague, would risk years of continued prosecution even after the courts strike it down.
In a similar vein, Kerala in 2020 had a similar experience with Section 118A of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 which criminalized communication intended to “threaten, abuse, humiliate, or defame” a person, making it a cognizable and bailable offence, carrying imprisonment of up to three years. It was justified publicly on the grounds of “curbing cyberbullying and misinformation” but due to public backlash of it being a resurrection of Section 66A IT Act, the Kerala Government rightfully repealed the provision within a week. 
Kerala is not the only precedent in this regard. July 2025 saw Karnataka’s draft Fake News Bill propose a “Fake News on Social Media Regulatory Authority” (which IFF has previously talked about) with penalties up to seven years imprisonment, and Rs 10 Lakh fines for offences built around undefined terms like “disrespect to culture”. IFF’s submission on that Bill asked the Karnataka Government to drop the criminal provisions therein instead pursuing narrowly tailored, rights respecting civil and administrative measures. 
Read together, a clear pattern emerges from the post-Shreya Singhal era’s Kerala and Karnataka examples: whatever the label, be it “cyberbullying”, “misinformation”, “fake news”, or now, “social media defamation”, any such easily invoked, vaguely worded, executively administrated route to restrict online speech has resurfaced in some permutation or variation in India various times since Shreya Singhal; and has been always struck down, or repealed.
Lastly, defamation in India isn’t an unprosecuted activity either; with Section 356 of the BNS defining defamation as the making or publication of “… any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person…”. This definition is technologically neutral, applied with equal force to a statement printed in a newspaper, versus spoken at a public meeting, versus posted on Instagram, Facebook, or Twitter/X. Section 356 also carries ten statutorily built-in exceptions: public good, good-faith opinion on conduct of a public servant, and many others, all of them balancing the right to reputable under Article 21 against the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The premise which moulds the Committee’s reported recommendation (that a “legal vacuum” exists in respect of online defamatory content) doesn’t withstand scrutiny, when put up against the text of Section 356 of the BNS. What appears to be sought is the creation of a new, lower-threshold, more easily invoked and criminalized route specifically targeting online speech; which brings the Sadanand Date Committee’s proposal squarely within constitutional infirmities which led the Supreme Court to strike down Section 66A of the IT Act, 11 years ago in Shreya Singhal.
Analysis 
RTI disclosures reported by The Indian Express on 18th August 2026 revealed that the Union Government issued nearly 1.95 Lakh blocking orders to Instagram / Facebook / Youtube between March and July 2026 alone. The surge is reported and commonly understood to coincide directly with the period of the student-led protests against examination system irregularities at Jantar Mantar, Delhi. Under IT Act, the Sahyog portal currently operates without procedural safeguards laid down in Shreya Singhal, and is itself the subject of ongoing litigation before the courts on these grounds.
This also comes at a time when India’s press freedom index, academic freedom index, etc indicators have been at their most rapid decline in decades; with India ranking 157th out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Press Freedom index 2026, and in the bottom 10-20% of 179 countries in the Academic Freedom Index 2026, published by the V-Dem Institute. We cite these indices not for their precise ordinal rank (which is contestable, contested, and always debated over), but only for the consistent and convergent direction of travel they document across the decades, across independent, methodologically distinct international indices. The Committee's proposal risks accelerating, rather than arresting such a downward trajectory.
In such a climate, unstructured public criticism on social media, for a great many citizens, is close to the only avenue left, which constitutes a large part of citizen’s civic and democratic speech participation. Young citizens in particular have turned to social media as their primary forum for expressing frustration with the state of governance, examinations, employment, and public services. Further, such expression many times happens to be an unavoidable feature of unmediated mass public discourse in every genuine democracy. It is not, by itself, a constitutionally sufficient reason to criminalize it beyond the well-settled boundaries of defamation, incitement, and the other Article 19(2) grounds. The words of the Supreme Court in Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya, 2021, are apt in this context:
"India is a plural and multicultural society. The promise of liberty, enunciated in the Preamble, manifests itself in various provisions which outline each citizen’s rights; they State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 12
include the right to free speech, to travel freely and settle (subject to such reasonable restrictions that may be validly enacted) throughout the length and breadth of India. At times, when in the legitimate exercise of such a right, individuals travel, settle down or carry on a vocation in a place where they find conditions conducive, there may be resentments, especially if such citizens prosper, leading to hostility or possibly violence. In such instances, if the victims voice their discontent, and speak out, especially if the state authorities turn a blind eye, or drag their feet, such voicing of discontent is really a cry for anguish, for justice denied – or delayed. This is exactly what appears to have happened in this case."
Any broadened, more easily invoked criminal offence (akin to the stuck down 66A) would risk capturing and fritzing away exactly this category of legitimate democratic expression, right at a moment when the space for its other outlets is already visibly narrowing.
Action 
IFF wishes to be clear, we believe that the defamation issue has uncontroversially already been settled by constitutional law, and has adequate measles under the BNS. IFF has filed a representation to the office of the DGP of Maharashtra, Shri Sadanand Date, and also filed an RTI request to the department. In our official representation, we submitted the following recommendations, respectfully urging the Committee to:

1. Decline to recommend a state-specific amendment for “social media defamation”; on the ground that Section 356 BNS already comprehensively governs that field, in a manner technologically neutral and constitutionally balanced
2. As an alternative, should the Committee still consider some legislative response necessary, such a legislative response recommendation should not lower the existing threshold of culpability, should not alter the non-cognizable character of the offence, and should not introduce any term or standard broader or vaguer than the language which is already upheld in Section 356 BNS
3. Practice transparency, by making public and subject to genuine pre-legislative consultation for the Committee’s final report, precise text of proposed amendment, and also the “safeguards against misuse” referred to in press reports, alongside any legal opinion obtained from the Advocate General of Maharashtra. This would be consistent with the Union Government’s own Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014. and
4. In formulating any recommendation, expressly record and kindly have regard for the cumulative empirical context set out in Part D of the representation letter, pertaining to the current political and civil-liberties climate. This includes: current scale of content-restriction activity, trajectories reflected in independent press-freedom and academic freedom indices, etc.

This post has been drafted with great assistance from R. Aditya, Policy Intern at IFF.
Important Links

1. IFF’s Representation to the Office of the DGP of Maharashtra [Link] 
2. RTI Request filed on 24.08.2026 to the Home Department of the Maharashtra Government [Link]
3. IFF and CivicDataLab, Zombie Tracker [Link]

J&K RTI Portal Logs 65,243 Applications In 19 Months

Kashmir Observer: Jammu: Thursday, 3^rd September 2026.

The online RTI portal for Jammu and Kashmir has received more than 65,000 RTI applications and 9,000 first appeals in 19 months since its launch, highlighting the increasing use of online mechanisms by citizens across the Union territory for accessing information, officials said.
The figures were disclosed by the General Administration Department (GAD) in response to an RTI application filed by Jammu-based RTI activist Raman Kumar Sharma.
According to the official reply issued on August 27, the J&K RTI online portal was officially launched on January 10, 2025, to facilitate citizens in filing Right to Information (RTI) applications online.
“According to the available records, the portal received 65,243 RTI applications between January 10, 2025, and August 26, 2026,” the GAD said, adding that 9,033 first appeals were also received during the same period.
The J&K portal was launched by Chief Minister Omar Abdullah in 2025 whereas the Central online portal has been operational since 2013.
On queries about the number of public authorities, central public information officers (CPIOs) and first appellate authorities onboarded on the J&K portal, the GAD said the applications are transferred to the National Informatics Centre (NIC), J&K, under Section 6(3) of the RTI Act, 2005, for furnishing the requisite information.
The department said the procedure for onboarding public authorities, CPIOs or first appellate authorities is in consonance with the relevant provisions of the RTI Act, 2005.
The GAD said a list of public authorities and details of nodal officers are available on the RTI portal.
Sharma said the substantial number of applications received within a relatively short period highlighted the increasing reliance of citizens on the online RTI system.
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He demanded the inclusion of more public authorities on the RTI portal, including officials at the district, tehsil and block levels.
Sharma cited the example of the education department and said while PIOs at the directorate level in both Kashmir and Jammu divisions are available on the RTI portal, the offices of chief education officers are unavailable.
He said the same is the case with the district offices of the police department and the rural development department.
“The GAD must ensure a clear, transparent policy for onboarding new authorities instead of giving vague replies or transferring queries to the NIC,” Sharma said.
He also appealed to Chief Minister Omar Abdullah to intervene and expedite the process, especially for grassroots-level offices, so that the common man can benefit from the transparency promised by the RTI Act.

MDU ex-VC Prof Rajbir’s 2 official cars clocked 3.5 lakh km in 7 years: RTI reply

Times of India: Rohtak: Thursday, 3^rd September 2026.
Two official vehicles used by Rohtak’s Maharshi Dayanand University (MDU) former vice chancellor Professor Rajbir Singh covered more than 3.5 lakh kilometres over nearly seven years, according to information furnished by the university under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.

The information was provided by MDU in response to an RTI application filed by activist Jaipal Dhankar, who has alleged irregularities in the use of the university vehicles and sought a vigilance inquiry into the matter.
According to the university’s reply, Singh used the two official vehicles from January 7, 2019, when he was appointed temporary vice-chancellor, until February 20, 2026, when his second consecutive term ended. The two vehicles together recorded an average travel of around 135 km a day during the period.
Singh served as temporary VC from January 2019 to February 2020 while also holding the charge of Vice-Chancellor of Dada Lakhmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts. He subsequently served two consecutive three-year terms as MDU VC from February 21, 2020, to February 20, 2026.
Dhankar has questioned several entries in the vehicle logbooks, claiming that the distances recorded for some journeys were substantially higher than the usual road distance between the destinations.
For instance, the normal round-trip distance between Rohtak and Panchkula is around 456 km, while the MDU vehicle logbook recorded 684 km for a journey on July 2, 2020. Another journey on the same route on August 25, 2020, was recorded at 720 km.
Similarly, the round-trip distance between Rohtak and Gurugram is around 160 km, whereas the logbook showed 288 km for a journey on April 3, 2021.
In another instance, a Rohtak-Jind journey on June 22, 2021, was recorded at 243 km, despite the usual round-trip distance between the two cities being around 136 km. The entry also mentioned local travel in Jind.
Likewise, the round-trip distance between Rohtak and Narnaul in Mahendragarh district is around 260 km, while the vehicle logbook recorded 360 km.
Dhankar said the discrepancies warranted a detailed scrutiny of the vehicle logbooks, route details and official travel records.
When contacted by TOI, Prof Singh dismissed the allegations and said all procedures had been followed as per the rules. “Everything was done as per rules. We followed due procedural law,” he said.