RTI Applicant Not Familiar With Language Of Information Cannot Bring Third Party For Inspection: Gujarat High Court

Court Book: Ahmedabad: Monday, 10 August 2026.
Gujarat High Court quashes rejection of an RTI appeal and directs records inspection, while requiring the petitioner to inspect documents personally without an accompanying person. - Vala Jodhubhai Golanbhai v. RTI Officer & Ors.

The Gujarat High Court has held that an RTI applicant who is not conversant with the language or contents of the information sought cannot insist on taking a third party along while inspecting the records. The Court observed that allowing such a person to accompany the applicant could, in effect, amount to providing the information to a third party.
Justice Nirzar S. Desai passed the order on July 31, 2026, while dealing with a petition challenging the rejection of an RTI second appeal. The Court ultimately allowed the petitioner to inspect the records, but directed that he must do so personally and without any accompanying person.
Background Of The Case
The petitioner had approached the High Court challenging an order dated April 8, 2026, by which his second appeal was rejected. He had sought information under the RTI Act along with the relevant Form K and requested access to bulky records for inspection.
According to the impugned order, the petitioner had been asked to remain present and identify the precise information he wanted from the records. During an earlier visit to the Nagdala Gram Panchayat office, he reportedly arrived with six or seven persons and insisted that the records be shown to everyone accompanying him.
The records further stated that when the Talati-cum-Mantri refused, an incident allegedly followed in which the petitioner and those accompanying him misbehaved with the woman official. The official began recording the incident on her mobile phone and warned that the police would be called, following which they left the office. The second appeal was rejected after these circumstances were taken into account.
Undertaking Given Before The High Court
During the hearing, the petitioner submitted an affidavit-cum-undertaking in response to the Court’s oral directions.
He undertook to maintain a cordial and courteous manner while visiting the RTI office. He also agreed not to carry a mobile phone, camera or other recording device during the visit and promised not to cause any disturbance or obstruction to the functioning of the office.
The undertaking also stated that he would be accompanied by a person conversant with the contents and language of the information being provided.
Court’s Observation
The respondents opposed this part of the undertaking, particularly the petitioner’s request to have another person accompany him during inspection.
Justice Nirzar S. Desai observed that if the petitioner himself was not conversant with the language or contents of the information, allowing another person to accompany him could effectively result in the information being provided to a third party.
The Court noted that this raised a prima facie concern that the petitioner could be acting on behalf of such a third party, which, according to the Court, was not the object or purpose of the RTI Act.
At the same time, the Court took note of the undertaking furnished by the petitioner and the fact that he had been denied inspection following the alleged incident involving the concerned officer.
Decision
The High Court therefore quashed and set aside the April 8, 2026 order rejecting the petitioner’s second appeal.
The Court directed the concerned respondent to permit the petitioner to inspect the records and thereafter provide the information sought within one month from July 31, 2026. It specifically clarified that the petitioner alone could inspect the records and that no accompanying person would be permitted inside the concerned office.
The Court further directed that after the inspection, photocopies of documents specifically sought by the petitioner should be supplied upon payment of the prescribed charges.
With these directions, the petition was disposed of.
Case Details
Case Title: Vala Jodhubhai Golanbhai v. RTI Officer & Ors.
Case Number: R/Special Civil Application No. 9928 of 2026
Judge: Justice Nirzar S. Desai
Decision Date: July 31, 2026
(Download Order)

RTI panel orders fresh inspection at Architecture College

Oherald: Panjim: Monday, 10 August 2026.
Information Commission flags ‘collective failure’ in RTI implementation, directs inspection by September 30

The Goa State Information Commission (GSIC), Panjim has allowed a Right to Information (RTI) complaint filed by Roy C D’Souza against the Public Information Officer (PIO), First Appellate Authority (FAA) and other officials of the Goa College of Architecture, holding that the institution failed to effectively implement the provisions of the RTI Act despite the law being in force for over two decades.
State Information Commissioner Atmaram R Barve passed the order, while disposing of the complaint that arose from an RTI application filed by D’Souza on August 6, 2025.
According to the order, the PIO had sought assistance from concerned officers under Sections 5(4) and 5(5) of the RTI Act to process the application. Although the complainant was permitted to inspect documents on several occasions, he alleged that complete information was not provided and subsequently filed a first appeal on September 16, 2025. When the appeal was not decided within the prescribed time, he approached the State Information Commission on January 9, 2026.
In its observations, the Commission described the case as highlighting a “collective failure” by the institution to correctly interpret and implement the RTI Act. It noted that while the PIO had followed the statutory procedure by seeking assistance from other officers, the overall handling of the request failed to ensure effective disclosure of information to the applicant.
The Commission also expressed concern over the institutional arrangement in which the College Principal was entrusted with responsibilities connected to both the PIO and the First Appellate Authority (FAA). It observed that such an arrangement creates an inherent conflict of interest and could adversely affect the impartial disposal of RTI appeals.
The order further stressed that appellate authorities should not be subordinate to the officials whose decisions they are expected to review and that records required for deciding appeals should not remain outside the PIO’s custody.
Allowing the complaint, the SIC directed the PIO, NeeleshJuwarkar to provide the complainant with a comprehensive inspection of all relevant records sought under the RTI application by September 30, 2026. The inspection is to be conducted with the assistance of the concerned staff and documented through written minutes signed by all participants.
The Commission also ordered that any fee collected from the complainant for providing the information be refunded.
In addition, the FAA has been directed to transfer all records that should ordinarily remain in the custody of the PIO through a properly indexed, catalogued and documented handover process within 15 days of the order.
Both the PIO and the FAA have been instructed to submit compliance reports before the Commission on October 7, 2026, failing which further proceedings may be initiated.
Further, the Commission has recommended that the Directorate of Technical Education (DTE), Government of Goa, restructure the RTI appellate mechanism for the institution. It suggested designating the Principal as the PIO while appointing a higher-ranking authority in the DTE as the First Appellate Authority to eliminate conflicts of interest and ensure greater impartiality in RTI proceedings.
No order as to costs was passed. The Commission clarified that any party aggrieved by the decision may challenge the order by filing a writ petition before the appropriate court, as no further appeal is available under the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Inspect records alone, can’t take others’ help: HC

Times of India: Ahmedabad: Monday, 10 August 2026.
An RTI applicant cannot bring along another person to help inspect official records, Gujarat High Court has ruled while allowing a 74-year-old man access to documents held by a gram panchayat.

The court directed Jodhu Vala, a resident of Nagdala village in Gir Somnath district, to inspect the records personally and without a companion. It observed that permitting another person to view the documents could amount to disclosing the information to a third party.
Vala had sought information from the village talati-cum-mantri under the Right to Information (RTI) Act. As the records were voluminous, the officer allowed him to inspect them. Vala subsequently arrived with about six villagers and insisted that they, too, be allowed access to the documents.
According to the authorities, the group created a commotion after the woman officer refused to let everyone inspect the records. Vala appealed against the decision, but the state information commissioner rejected his plea after taking note of the alleged misconduct.
Vala then approached the high court. He assured the court that he would behave courteously during his next visit and would not carry a phone or camera. However, he sought permission to bring along a person familiar with the language and contents of the records to help him identify the information he needed.
Declining the request, Justice Nirzar Desai stated, “If the petitioner himself is not conversant with the language or the contents of the information sought, prima facie, permitting another person to accompany him during the inspection would, in effect, amount to providing the information to a third party. This gives rise to a prima facie impression that the petitioner is merely acting as a pawn for such a third party, which is not the object or purpose of the RTI Act.”
However, considering his promise of not causing any inconvenience to the RTI officer, HC quashed the information commissioner’s order of denying information to him on account of his alleged misconduct before the officer.
Permitting Vala to have access to the govt records under RTI, HC said, “It is, however, clarified that the petitioner shall be permitted to inspect the records only if he himself undertakes the inspection and does not insist upon any other person accompanying him during such inspection. No information shall be furnished or inspection permitted unless the petitioner personally inspects the records without the presence of any accompanying person.”

SC Says RTI Activism Has Become a ‘New Business’, Denies Anticipatory Bail to Activist Content Copied from https://lawstreet.co

Law Street: Saket Saurav: New Delhi: Sunday, August 09, 2026.

In a significant observation on the perceived misuse of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, the Supreme Court recently remarked that RTI activism has evolved into a “new business.” The observation came while the Court was hearing a plea for anticipatory bail filed by an activist accused of obstructing a public servant during a government road construction project. A Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Vijay Bishnoi dismissed the plea for pre-arrest bail filed by Ramesh Kumar Behl and expressed strong disapproval of individuals who, under the guise of RTI activism, interfere with public works and harass government officials.

During the hearing, Justice Sandeep Mehta made sharp oral observations regarding the conduct of self-styled RTI activists. He remarked that RTI activism had effectively become a new profession and likened such conduct to “yellow journalism.” The Bench observed that when government funds are allocated for infrastructure projects, designated authorities are responsible for monitoring and supervising the work. Questioning the petitioner’s role, Justice Mehta referred to him as a “so-called RTI activist” and observed that such individuals have no role in interfering with the execution of public projects. Justice Vijay Bishnoi also questioned the petitioner’s locus standi to monitor the progress of the road construction work.

The Court asked under whose authority the petitioner was supervising the project and whether he possessed any official role empowering him to oversee the work. The Bench further observed that supervision and monitoring of public infrastructure projects fall within the exclusive domain of the authorities entrusted with their implementation. The observations reflect judicial concern that, in some cases, the RTI mechanism—intended to promote transparency and accountability—may be used to exert unauthorized influence over public administration.

The case arose from an FIR alleging that the petitioner and another accused obstructed an ongoing road construction project. According to the prosecution, the accused intimidated the site supervisor and labourers present at the location. The FIR further alleged that the petitioner assaulted the supervisor, while the co-accused physically attacked the supervisor by kicking him. The prosecution also alleged that caste-based derogatory remarks were made against labourers working at the site. Based on these allegations, an FIR was registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, along with provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court after the Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected his application for anticipatory bail.

The High Court had observed that the allegations disclosed specific involvement of the petitioner in obstructing government work and found no grounds to grant the discretionary relief of pre-arrest protection. Upon consideration of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s assessment and declined to interfere. The Court noted that public projects are executed through established governmental frameworks and that interference by self-appointed monitors can hamper infrastructure development. By describing such conduct as a “business” and comparing it to “yellow journalism,” the Court drew a distinction between genuine efforts to promote transparency and actions that create administrative hurdles under the guise of activism.

Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition and permitted the investigation to proceed in accordance with law. 

Case Title: Ramesh Kumar Behl v. State of Punjab | SLP (Crl.) No. 10257 of 2026

Supreme Court Seeks Centre's Response on Pleas Challenging DPDP Act, RTI Amendments.

Lawbeat: Sukriti Mishra: New Delhi: Sunday, August 09, 2026.

The Supreme Court examined whether the DPDP Act had created a blanket exemption for personal information and directed the Centre to file its response.

The Supreme Court on Friday commenced hearing a batch of petitions challenging provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023, particularly its amendment to the Right to Information (RTI) Act, with petitioners contending that the legislation substantially weakens citizens' right to access information by creating an expansive exemption for "personal information."

The Bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana considered submissions that the amendment to Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act upsets the constitutional balance between the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to privacy.

Appearing for one of the petitioners, Advocate Vrinda Grover submitted that the DPDP Act effectively rewrites Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act by removing the safeguards that earlier governed disclosure of personal information.She argued that under the previous framework, information could be withheld only if it had no relationship with any public activity or public interest and its disclosure would amount to an unwarranted invasion of privacy.

According to the petitioners, those safeguards have now been removed, with "all personal information" effectively becoming exempt from disclosure. Grover submitted that the amendment directly affects the constitutional balance previously recognised by the Supreme Court between the citizen's right to know and the individual's right to privacy.

"The right of citizens to be informed about important public issues is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)," she argued, relying on earlier Supreme Court precedents governing RTI and privacy.

The petitioners further contended that the amendment extends beyond protecting genuinely private information and could potentially allow authorities to deny access to information concerning public officials, public functions and matters involving public interest merely by classifying such information as "personal."

Addressing another aspect of the challenge, Senior Advocate Nisha Bhambani argued that the DPDP Act could significantly impede investigative journalism.

She submitted that the legislation does not carve out any specific exemption for journalists and that investigative reporting involving personal data could become contingent upon obtaining consent from the concerned individual.

Ambani further argued that journalists could even face requests for erasure of data from individuals whose information forms part of investigative reports, thereby adversely affecting press freedom and investigative journalism.

Chief Justice Surya Kant observed during the hearing that a balance has to be maintained between the right to privacy and the public's right to information.

The petitioners, however, maintained that the DPDP framework tilts that balance disproportionately in favour of privacy, affecting transparency in governance.

Advocate Prashant Bhushan also challenged the amendment, arguing that the issue had already been settled by the Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, where the Court harmonised the competing claims of privacy and transparency.

Bhushan submitted that while the original Section 8(1)(j) exempted only personal information unrelated to public activity or public interest, the amended provision effectively shields all personal information, enabling authorities to deny access even to information relating to pending charge sheets against public officials or records connected with welfare schemes.

Justice Joymalya Bagchi observed that while the RTI Act and the DPDP Act operate in different spheres, they also overlap in certain respects, requiring the Court to examine whether both legislations coexist harmoniously.

He further remarked that the Court would consider whether there exists an intelligible differentia for treating digital personal data differently and whether the DPDP Act indirectly overrides the RTI Act by creating a wider embargo on disclosure.

Responding to the Bench's observations, Bhushan argued that the amendment is not confined to digital personal data but fundamentally alters the RTI framework itself.

Justice Bagchi also noted that the Court would examine whether the State's more cautionary approach towards disclosure satisfies the constitutional test of reasonable classification and whether a blanket restriction on disclosure of digital personal information can be justified.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Union of India, sought two weeks' time to file the Centre's response and assured the Bench that the government would justify the legislative amendments.

Accepting the request, the Supreme Court directed the Union to file its reply and ordered that the matter be listed before an appropriate non-miscellaneous Bench for further hearing.

Case Title: Venkatesh Nayak, National Campaign for Peoples Right to Information, Anjali Bhardwaj, Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union of India

Bench: CJI Surya Kant, Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana ; Hearing Date: August 7, 2026

Allahabad High Court Imposes ₹6.7 Lakh Costs On Man For Misusing RTI Act, Disturbing Court Proceedings : Sparsh Upadhyay

Live Law: Allahabad: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.
The Allahabad High Court recently imposed costs of ₹6.70 lakh on a party-in-person after finding that he had misused the Right to Information Act, 2005, by repeatedly filing vague RTI applications concerning the Court's internal functioning and also disturbed the judicial proceedings.

A bench of Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery dismissed the writ petition challenging an order of the State Information Commission (SIC) and directed the petitioner to deposit the entire amount with the High Court Legal Service Committee within 4 weeks.
In its order, the bench also took note of recent incidents in the Supreme Court as well as in various High Courts where the petitioner-in-person had not followed the decorum of the Court and acted in a hasty and unruly manner.
Briefly put, the petitioner had challenged an order passed by the UP SIC, passed on July 28, 2023, contending that complete information sought by him under the RTI Act had not been supplied.
However, after examining the record, the High Court found that the requisite information had already been furnished through registered post and that the petitioner had neither denied receiving it nor placed the supplied information on record.
The Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the Commission's order.
While hearing the matter, the Court noted that the Registry had reported that the petitioner had filed numerous RTI applications seeking information relating to the Court proceedings in the pending writ petition itself.
Last month, the Court had restrained him from filing further RTI applications concerning the case, observing that such requests would cause hindrance in the administration of justice and directing that any pending RTI proceedings be kept in abeyance until disposal of the writ petition.
The Court recorded that despite this warning, the petitioner continued with his conduct.
Referring to a report submitted by the Deputy Registrar (RTI), the Court noted that the petitioner had filed 24 RTI applications between June 4 and July 17, 2026, seeking a wide range of internal administrative records, including office note sheets, routing sheets, action taken reports, file movement registers, backend server logs, Cisco Webex session logs, courtroom attendance registers, Bench Secretary log entries, roster-related records, reasons for supplementary cause lists and matters being marked "passed over", among other information having no concern with him.
The Court stated that such applications not only waste the time of employees of the Court but also cause hindrance in the administration of justice.
Concluding that the petitioner had misused the provisions of the RTI Act, the Court directed that all such RTI applications be consigned to record and imposed ₹5,000 costs for each of the 24 applications, amounting to ₹1.20 lakh.
The Bench further found that the petitioner had violated its earlier direction requiring him to appear physically before the Court by instead joining through video conferencing.
Justice Shamshery clarified that appearance through video conferencing is merely a mode of convenience and cannot be claimed as a fundamental right. The Court added that the permission to appear virtually lies within the Court's discretion and directions requiring personal appearance must be complied with absent any reasonable justification.
The Court also observed that the petitioner had filed an application seeking punishment of certain respondents for allegedly not filing a counter affidavit despite the record showing that the contesting respondent had already filed the affidavit and served a copy on the petitioner's counsel.
Describing that application as misconceived, based on incorrect statements and contrary to the record, the Court dismissed it with ₹50,000 costs.
The Court further noted that the petitioner had sent an email titled "Formal Written Declaration of Protest", which it found to be vague and contemptuous. Rejecting the petitioner's claim that a virtual hearing was his fundamental right, the Court clarified that video conferencing is only a convenience subject to judicial discretion.
The Court observed that although it had even offered to appoint an advocate to argue the matter if the petitioner appeared personally, he remained adamant and refused to do so despite having previously travelled to Allahabad on several occasions. Finding that the petitioner had already received the information sought under the RTI Act and that no interference with the SIC's order was required, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. It then imposed a further ₹5 lakh to discourage litigants from disturbing court proceedings and the administration of justice.
Together with the earlier ₹50,000 and ₹1.20 lakh costs, the total costs came to ₹6.70 lakh, which the petitioner has to deposit with the High Court Legal Service Committee within 4 weeks.
Case Title - Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula vs. State of U.P. and 3 others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 542 Case
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 542
(Click Here to Read/Download Order)

Can there be a blanket ban on disclosure of digital personal information under RTI Act, asks SC

The Statesman: New Delhi: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.
The Court observed that the central issue was whether Parliament could impose a blanket prohibition on disclosure of all digital personal information or whether the law was required to adopt a proportionate approach.

The Supreme Court on Friday indicated that the constitutional challenge to the amendment to Section 8 (1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, which removed the public interest exception for disclosure of personal information, would require a careful balancing of citizens’ right to information with the fundamental right to privacy.
The Court observed that the central issue was whether Parliament could impose a blanket prohibition on disclosure of all digital personal information or whether the law was required to adopt a proportionate approach.
The observations came from a Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana while hearing petitions challenging the amendment to the Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act brought through the Digital Personal Data Protection Act.
Justice Bagchi observed that the Court would have to examine whether Parliament’s decision to widen the protection available to personal information satisfies constitutional standards.
Referring to the scheme of the two enactments, he noted that while the RTI Act operates in a much wider field covering all forms of information, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act deals with a narrower category, though one that today constitutes a substantial part of the information held by public authorities.
The question, according to the Bench, was whether the legislature’s cautionary approach and the classification created by the amendment bear a reasonable and intelligible nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
The issue assumes significance because, prior to the amendment, Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act permitted withholding of personal information only in limited circumstances, while preserving disclosure where a larger public interest justified it.
The Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act before amendment read:- “(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information:
“Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.”
Appearing for the petitioners, advocate Vrinda Grover submitted that the amendment fundamentally alters the RTI regime by removing the safeguard that enabled disclosure in larger public interest while adequately protecting privacy.
Chief Justice Kant observed that the Court had, even during the earlier hearing, indicated that a balancing exercise would be necessary to determine the categories of digital personal data deserving protection.
Advocates Nisha Bhambhani and Prashant Bhushan contended that the amendment could seriously impede investigative journalism by restricting access to official records relied upon in exposing corruption and abuse of power.
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Central government, submitted that the Centre would justify the amendment in its affidavit, subject to judicial review, and sought two weeks’ time to file its response.
Accepting the request, the Court impleaded the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology as a party to the proceedings.

District cooperative banks come under RTI Act, rules K’taka Information Commission

The Times of India: Karnataka: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.

In a significant ruling, the Kalaburagi Bench of Karnataka Information Commission has declared the Kalaburagi-Yadgir District Central Cooperative Bank (DCCB) a public authority under Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005.
The ruling is expected to have wider implications for other DCCBs across Karnataka, as it clarifies that cooperative banks functioning under substantial govt control can be treated as public authorities under RTI Act.
Information Commissioner B Venkat Singh passed the order while disposing of a second appeal filed by one Rajkumar Aland, who had sought information on the action taken over a letter submitted to the bank’s Aland branch on Jan 25, 2022.
The bank had refused to furnish the information, arguing that it did not receive substantial financial assistance from govt and therefore did not fall within the ambit of RTI Act.
Unhappy with the response, Aland filed a second appeal before Karnataka Information Commission’s Kalaburagi Bench.
In its July 30, 2026 order, the commission held that the bank functions under govt rules, directions and regulatory oversight, and therefore qualifies as a public authority even though it does not receive substantial direct financial assistance from govt.
The order observed that govt has contributed share capital to the bank and appointed its CEO and managing director. It further noted that the cooperation department has the authority to investigate irregularities and that govt can supersede the bank’s management if the charges are established.
It also pointed out that govt nominates members to the bank’s board, subsidises interest on loans extended to farmers through the bank and reimburses banks whenever farm loan waiver schemes are implemented. Recruitment is also carried out with govt approval and includes govt representatives in the selection process.
The commission directed the bank to comply with Sections 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) of RTI Act by proactively disclosing information and appointing public information officers and first appellate authorities. It also instructed the principal secretary of the cooperation department, the registrar of cooperative societies and other authorities in the department to ensure compliance with the order.

Challenge to DPDP Act | Day 2: Law may impede investigative journalism, petitioners argue

Supreme Court Observer: New Delhi: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.

Constitutionality of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

Judges: Surya Kant CJI, Joymalya Bagchi J, V. Mohana J

Namrata Banerjee | 7th Aug 2026

Today, a Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana heard a batch of petitions challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) and the Rules framed under it. The petitioners contended that the Act amends Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI) by removing the public interest safeguard that earlier allowed disclosure of personal information in appropriate cases, replacing it with a broader exemption.
Petitioners: Amendment removes RTI’s public interest safeguard
Advocate Nisha Bhambhani submitted that the amendments would seriously impede investigative reporting because journalists would be required to obtain the consent of the “data principal” before publishing a report, and later erase the information at that person’s request. CJI Surya Kant responded, “The balance has to be worked out with the right to privacy.”
Advocate Vrinda Grover argued that the DPDP Act fundamentally alters the RTI framework as the amended provision exempts personal information from disclosure without preserving the balancing exercise built into the original law. This would exclude “a whole swathe of information” that citizens could previously access under Articles 19 and 21.
Advocate Prashant Bhushan argued that the balance between privacy and the right to information had already been settled by the Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019). He submitted that the original Section 8(1)(j) exempted only personal information unrelated to any public activity or public interest, or information whose disclosure would amount to an unwarranted invasion of privacy. “That balance has now been dismantled,” he argued. As a result, he contended, even information such as pending charge sheets against public officials, or details relating to welfare schemes and ration cards, could now be withheld on the ground that they constitute personal information.
How far can the RTI exemption go?
Justice Bagchi observed that both the RTI Act and the DPDP Act are central legislations and the Court would have to examine whether they operate harmoniously. He noted that the RTI Act “operates in a much larger domain”, covering all forms of information, while the DPDP Act applies to “a much narrower sliver”, although digital information today constitutes the overwhelming part of information held by the State. The Bench said it would examine whether the distinction drawn between digital personal data and other forms of information is founded on an intelligible differentia and bears a rational nexus to the object of the legislation.
Bhushan argued that the amendment extends beyond digital personal data because it expressly substitutes Section 8(1)(j). Justice Bagchi said the Court would also have to consider whether the legislation can impose “a blanket prohibition on disclosure of all digital personal information” or whether a proportionate approach is constitutionally required.
Addressing the concerns over journalism, Justice Bagchi clarified that neither Subhash Chandra Agarwal nor the RTI Act creates a separate exemption for journalists beyond the protection available under Article 19(1)(a). 
Union to justify amendments
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta informed the Bench that the Union would file its reply within two weeks and place its justification for the legislation on record, adding that it would remain “subject to judicial review.”
The matter has been directed to be listed on a non-miscellaneous day.

Supreme Court to examine impact of data protection law on RTI, investigative journalism

The Hindu: New Delhi: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.
The court said both the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 and the RTI Act were central legislations with a need to harmonise them; it would examine if this restrictive or ‘cautionary approach’ to sharing data under the DPDP Act worked to repeal earlier transparency legislations

Image used for representative purpose. | Photo Credit: Getty Images/iStockphoto

The Supreme Court on Friday (August 7, 2026) agreed to examine if the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 can be used to cripple the Right to Information Act by classifying all data as “personal” and, separately, gag investigative journalists.
The court said both the DPDP Act and the RTI Act were central legislations. There was a need to actually harmonise them.
“The earlier law (Right to Information Act, 2005) gave certain access with conditions. Here (2023 Act), there is an en bloc embargo. Is this latter law repugnant to earlier law? This has to be looked into with extreme circumspection. After all, both are central laws. There is a need to actually harmonise these two,” Justice Joymalya Bagchi remarked.
Different domain
Justice Bagchi said the RTI law operated on a “much larger domain” than the DPDP Act. It covered all forms of data, while the DPDP law was only concerned with data in a digital form. The court said this even though acknowledging that the data was now overwhelmingly in the digital format.
The judge said the court would examine if this restrictive or “cautionary approach” to sharing data under the DPDP Act worked to repeal earlier transparency legislations.
The court was hearing multiple petitions challenging provisions of the DPDP Act, primarily Section 44(3), which had amended the RTI Act to facilitate public authorities to blankly refuse information on the ground that the details sought was of a “personal” nature.
Turned on its head
The petitioners, represented by advocate Vrinda Grover, submitted that the provision has turned the fundamental right to privacy on its head. The right, meant to protect ordinary citizens against State incursion, has been extended to protect the State and public functionaries from RTI disclosures.
They have argued that Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act has amended Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. Originally, the RTI provision had exempted authorities from disclosing personal information to an applicant if the details sought had no relationship to any public activity or if disclosure would amount to unwarranted invasion of privacy. Even then, the government had to disclose if public interest outweighed privacy. The decision whether or not to reveal “personal information” was taken by a Public Information Officer or the First Appellate Authority under the RTI Act after thoroughly weighing privacy and transparency concerns.
One of the petitioners, Foundation for Media Professionals, represented by advocate Nisha Bhambhani, pointed out that the 2023 Act threatened to have a grave impact on investigative journalism.
“The Act was not granting exemption to journalists. If a journalist is reporting, they would have to seek the consent of the data principal. If the data principal wants to erase the data, they can do it. This has a direct effect on investigative journalism,” the counsel submitted.
No special category
The court said journalists cannot be considered a “special category” with unreserved access to data.
Agreeing to examine the impact of the data protection law on journalistic activities, Justice Bagchi highlighted that neither Supreme Court judgments on public transparency (Subhash Chandra Agarwal case) and press freedom (Indian Express Bombay Pvt Ltd case) nor RTI Act had considered journalists a “special category”.

Appoint capable, impartial info commissioners

The Daily Star: Bangladesh: Friday, 7^th August 2026.

The RTI Forum has called for competence, impartiality and commitment to public interest to be the top priorities in appointing the chief information commissioner and information commissioners.
The forum made the call in a letter to Justice Farah Mahbub of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, who chairs the recently reconstituted five-member Selection Committee tasked with recommending candidates for the posts of chief information commissioner and two information commissioners, according to a press release issued yesterday.
Constituted under Section 14(1) of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2009, the committee recently invited applications from qualified and interested candidates for the three posts.
Welcoming the move, the forum said the selection process presents an opportunity to fulfil the long-standing public expectation of an independent and effective Information Commission.
The forum said effective implementation of the Right to Information Act depends on a competent, impartial and citizen-oriented commission.
It urged the selection committee to assess candidates not only on their ability to discharge the responsibilities prescribed under the law but also on their competence, objectivity and impartiality to perform their duties independently, free from all forms of influence.
The letter was signed by Shaheen Anam, convener of RTI Forum and executive director of Manusher Jonno Foundation, on behalf of the forum’s core group members. They are: Badiul Alam Majumdar, secretary of Shujan; Iftekharuzzaman, executive director of TIB; Rezaul Karim Chowdhury, executive director of COAST Trust; Syed Sultan Uddin Ahmed, executive director of BILS; AHM Bazlur Rahman, chief executive officer of Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication; Zakir Hossain, chief executive of Nagorik Uddyog; Ananya Raihan, chairperson of iSocial; Barrister Sara Hossain, honorary executive director of BLAST; Rafiqul Islam Khokon, executive director of Rupantar; Hasibur Rahman, executive director of MRDI; Ruhi Naz, deputy director of Research Initiatives, Bangladesh; and Hamidul Islam Hillol, project manager of the Tobacco Tax Project at the Bureau of Economic Research, Dhaka University.

Constitution Never Approved Algorithmic Governance: Why India Needs Right To Human Decision-Making - By - Dr. Raghvendra Kumar Chaudhary

Live Law: National: Friday, 7^th August 2026.

In September 2017, an eleven-year-old girl named Santoshi Kumari died of starvation in Jharkhand's Simdega district after her family's ration card was cancelled because it could not be linked to Aadhaar. No official signed off on that cancellation in the way administrative law has traditionally understood a “decision.” A biometric authentication system flagged a mismatch, a database updated a status, and a family stopped receiving grain. Nobody applied their mind to Santoshi's case. That, in miniature, is the constitutional problem posed by algorithmic governance in India: decisions that affect life and livelihood are increasingly made, or effectively made, by systems that were never contemplated by the text of the Constitution and that resist the doctrinal tools built to discipline human decision-makers.
The Constitution of India was drafted for a state that acts through officers who apply their minds, record reasons, and can be questioned. Article 14 guarantee against arbitrariness, Article 21 promise of a fair procedure, and the natural justice principles that Indian courts have read into both, all presuppose a decision-maker capable of reasoning, of being persuaded, and of explaining itself. Nothing in the Constituent Assembly Debates, and nothing in seven decades of constitutional jurisprudence, anticipated a state that governs through scoring systems, authentication mismatches, and opaque risk models. Algorithmic governance was never approved by the constitutional design; it has simply arrived, and the doctrine is being asked to stretch to cover it.
Where the machines already govern
This is not a speculative or futuristic concern. Automated and semi-automated systems already mediate some of the most consequential encounters citizens have with the Indian state. Welfare delivery under the Public Distribution System and social security pensions has, for over a decade, depended on Aadhaar-based biometric authentication; when fingerprints fail to match, at a point-of-sale device or a server, the consequence is exclusion, not error correction. The government's own submissions before the Supreme Court have acknowledged authentication failure rates that translate, at national scale, into millions of people at risk of being wrongly denied entitlements they are legally owed. The Income Tax Department's faceless assessment scheme routes disputes through automated allocation and templated processing with limited scope for a taxpayer to make a case to an identifiable human being. Predictive policing tools and crime-mapping software, adopted by several state police forces, generate risk scores that shape patrolling and surveillance priorities without any statutory framework governing their design or accountability. And credit, insurance and even loan-recovery decisions taken by regulated financial entities increasingly rest on proprietary scoring models that borrowers cannot see and cannot meaningfully contest.
In each instance, the structure of the “decision” has changed. It is not that a human officer made a biased choice, a fact pattern administrative law knows how to handle. The decision was distributed across a database, a threshold, and a rule nobody in the room can fully articulate. The result is governance that is efficient and scalable, but largely unaccountable to the doctrines meant to constrain the state.
The doctrinal strain
Indian constitutional law's principal safeguard against arbitrary state action is the requirement that a decision reflect an application of mind and be capable of being defended with reasons. This lineage runs from the Supreme Court's insistence in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India that state action affecting life and personal liberty must be fair, just and reasonable, through decades of natural justice jurisprudence, including A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, which extended fair-hearing principles from quasi-judicial to administrative functions precisely because the line between the two had become difficult to draw. The right to know why a decision has gone against you, so that it can be tested and, where necessary, challenged, is not a procedural nicety; it is what makes judicial review possible at all.
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud's opinion in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India carried this logic into the informational age, describing privacy as encompassing the individual's right to be told why the state has acted as it has, and locating that right within the dignity guaranteed by Article 21. That reasoning was written with data collection in mind, but its implications for automated decision-making are direct. If dignity requires that a person be told why the state has intruded upon them, it is difficult to see how that requirement is satisfied by a system that cannot itself produce reasons a human being can understand, because no human being wrote the rule that produced the outcome.
The strain is structural, not a matter of poor implementation. Reasoned decision-making assumes a reasoner. Audi alteram partem assumes a hearing that can change an outcome. Article 14 proscription of arbitrariness assumes an actor whose discretion can be scrutinised for whim or malice. Machine-learning systems, and even simpler rule-based automation of the kind used in welfare authentication, do not reason in a sense a court can interrogate; they classify. A model can be biased or built on flawed data, but it cannot, as a human bureaucrat can, be asked to justify itself, and its operators can often genuinely say they do not know precisely why a given output emerged. Constitutional doctrine built for accountable human agency confronts a process that is, by design, opaque even to its own creators.
Why existing statutes do not close the gap
India's two most relevant statutes fall short of addressing this in different ways. The Right to Information Act, 2005 was designed to open up files, orders and reasons; it was not designed to compel disclosure of source code, training data, or scoring logic, and public authorities have routinely resisted such disclosure by invoking the commercial confidence exemption under Section 8(1)(d), treating proprietary algorithms as trade secrets even where they determine eligibility for statutory entitlements. Transparency built around the human-era assumption that a decision leaves behind a legible file does not transfer easily to systems whose “file” is a weighted model.
The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, meanwhile, is India's first general data protection statute, but it was drafted around consent and processing of personal data rather than around the consequences of automated decisions built on that data. Unlike the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation, which gives data subjects a qualified right under Article 22 not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing that produces legal or similarly significant effects, the DPDP Act contains no comparable entitlement. A citizen whose welfare eligibility, tax assessment, or credit access is determined by an automated system has, under Indian law, considerably weaker footing than a counterpart in the European Union, even though the Puttaswamy court grounded India's privacy jurisprudence in language at least as protective of dignity as its European counterparts.
Towards a right to human decision-making
What India needs, whether through judicial interpretation of Articles 14 and 21 or through legislative codification, is a right to human decision-making wherever automated or algorithmic systems materially affect life, liberty, livelihood or dignity. Such a right would rest on modest, workable elements rather than a wholesale rejection of technology in governance. First, meaningful human review before any adverse action, so that a person, not merely a re-run of the same model, examines a case before an entitlement is withdrawn or a penalty imposed. Second, a duty to disclose, in plain and accessible terms, the categories of factors an automated system relied upon, without necessarily requiring release of proprietary source code, on the pattern courts have already accepted for other forms of qualified disclosure. Third, a genuine right to contest an automated outcome before it takes effect, rather than after harm has occurred, reversing the current default under which exclusion happens first and appeal, if it exists at all, happens later. Fourth, periodic, independent algorithmic audits of high-stakes public systems, with findings placed in the public domain, modelled loosely on the risk-tiered obligations found in the European Union's AI Act.
None of this requires India to slow the digitisation of governance, which has brought genuine efficiency gains. It requires acknowledging that the Constitution's safeguards were built around a particular model of the state, one that reasons, explains and can be persuaded, and that this model has not been formally revised even as the practice of governance has moved on without it. Courts have shown, in Puttaswamy and in the natural justice line running through Maneka Gandhi and Kraipak, that they are capable of reading dignity and fairness into new contexts the framers did not foresee. Algorithmic governance is the next context in which that capacity will be tested. Until the right to a human decision-maker is recognised as part of the guarantee against arbitrariness, the Constitution's promise that no person shall be deprived of life or livelihood except by a fair, reasoned and answerable process will remain, for an increasing number of Indians, a promise addressed to officials who are no longer the ones deciding.
Author is an Assistant Professor at CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Delhi NCR Campus. Views are personal.

Allahabad High Court imposes ₹6.7 lakh costs on Hyderabad man for disturbing court proceedings

Bar and Bench: Allahabad: Friday, 7^th August 2026.
The Court said the petitioner-in-person filed multiple RTI applications related to the proceedings of his case and refused to physically appear before the bench.

Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court on August 5 imposed costs of ₹6.7 Lakh on a litigant for disturbing court proceedings by filing multiple applications under Right to Information (RTI) Act to seek information about his pending case [Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula v State of UP and 3 Others]
Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamashery also noted that the petitioner, one Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu, who is from Hyderabad, declined to physically appear before the Court and insisted to argue only through video-conferencing (VC).
The Court imposed costs of ₹5,000 for each of the 24 RTI applications filed by him and another ₹50,000 for making an incorrect statement in an application moved by him.
"To discourage the persons such as petitioner-in-person, not to disturb the Court’s proceedings and administration of justice, a further cost of ₹5,00,000 is imposed on petitioner," the Court added.
The total cost of ₹6.7 lakh has to be paid within four weeks to the High Court Legal Service Committee.
Vinay Vemula first approached the Court in 2024 with a petition challenging an order of the State Information Commission related to an RTI application filed by him with the police.
During the hearing of the case, High Court registry informed the bench that he filed various RTI applications related to court proceedings of his petition. 24 applications were filed between June 4 and July 17.
On July 24, the Court directed that the RTI applications be kept in abeyance till further orders and also directed Vinay Vemula to appear in person.
On August 5, he again appeared through VC. When asked why he was not present before the Court, Vinay Vemula said that he has to travel about 2,000 kms and has logistic problems.
However, the Court noted that he had earlier travelled to Allahabad on multiple occasions. The Court said appearance through VC is only to facilitate a litigant or an advocate to expedite the adjudication. 
It cannot be claimed a matter of right, the Bench added.
"It is the Court’s discretion to allow Video Conferencing or not. If a direction is passed by the Court to appear in-person, that has to be followed without any unreasonable excuse," the Court said.
The Court also noted that he had filed unnecessary RTI applications seeking internal documents and electronic record about his case.
It said that such RTI applications cannot be entertained since it not only wastes the time of employees of court but also causes hindrance in administration of justice. 
"In aforesaid circumstances, Court finds that petitioner-in-person is misusing the provisions of Right to Information Act. Therefore, his all applications seeking information under Right to Information Act are directed to be consigned to record and for 24 applications, this Court imposed a cost of ₹5,000 each, i.e., total ₹1,20,000," the Court said.
The petitioner-in-person has ample time to file various applications under RTI Act but not to appear before the court and argue the case on merit, the Bench added.
On merits of his case, the Court found that Vinay Vemula was already provided the information sought by him regarding a police complaint filed against him by a woman. It also noted that he was harassing the complainant and her daughter.
"From perusal of queries and reply, referred above, it is evident that requisite information has already been provided to petitioner. He cannot insist to provide an information which is not available with concerned authorities," the Court said, while dismissing the plea.
[Read Order]