IFF: New Delhi: Thursday, 17th September 2026.
In July 2026, mobile internet around Jantar Mantar was suspended under written orders from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Voice calls failed too, and no published order covered them.
Between 20 June and 25
July 2026 the sit-in at Jantar Mantar. On 20 July, the day of the Sansad Chalo
march, and on 22 July, the day of the clashes at Tolstoy Marg and Sansad Marg,
mobile networks in central Delhi went dark. The Ministry of Home Affairs ("MHA")
issued six orders under Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023
suspending mobile internet within roughly 1.5 kilometres of the site. People
nevertheless walked two kilometres to make a voice call, and press reports
attributed to police officials the statement that portable jammers were
switched on to limit coordination among protesters and to reduce live streams
of police action. No statute gives the Delhi Police a power to jam
telecommunication. Section 48 of the 2023 Act makes possessing or using such
equipment a crime unless the Central Government permits it, for a specific
purpose. The only guidelines that exist, issued by the Cabinet Secretariat in
2023, cover VVIP security against radio-controlled bombs and low-powered
jammers in examination halls. Nothing covers crowd control. On 8 September 2026
we filed three RTI applications with the Delhi Police, on the equipment it
holds and the rules for its use on what was deployed at Jantar Mantar and on
whose order; and on the record behind its statement of 8 September that no
jammers were used at the Satya Niketan rescue site. We will publish every
reply, and every silence.
Background
For the Jantar Mantar began on 20 June 2026 we have already documented the two Delhi Police vehicles parked at the protest running live facial recognition on the crowd, and the list of 2,873 "criminal antecedents" that system produced. This post is about another tool that effects digital rights at same site that made the phones stop working.
On 20 July 2026, the day of the Sansad Chalo march, disruption was reported from about 10.30 am. Subscribers received a message from Airtel that internet services in the area had been stopped on government instructions. That message is the trace of a written order. The MHA issued six orders between 17 and 23 July 2026, dated 17, 20, 22 and 23 July, under Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, suspending mobile internet within approximately 1.5 kilometres of Jantar Mantar. But the orders as made available suspended data but they did not suspend voice or SMS. Yet The Wire reported that people at the site walked nearly two kilometres to make calls. On 22 July, the day tear gas was used and injured police officers were taken to Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, reports attributed to police the statement that jammers were activated as the clashes began. A technology outlet, attributing the reasoning to officials, reported that portable jammers were placed to limit real-time coordination among protesters and to reduce the chance of live streams of police action.
The Delhi Police has not, in any published document, confirmed or denied that it used jammers at Jantar Mantar. Its fact-checks during those weeks addressed other claims. The allegation has since recurred for an anti-reservation demonstration at the same site on 21 August 2026, protesters again said jammers had been deployed, a claim that could not be verified.
Subsequently on 6 September 2026 a multi-storey building collapsed at Satya Niketan, killing seven young people. Within hours, social media filled with claims that jammers had been installed at the rescue site to suppress information. On 8 September the Delhi Police posted an emphatic denial on X that no jammers were used and networks were fully operational with police, NDRF and fire teams coordinating by mobile, media and citizens broadcasting live. We have no reason to doubt it since jamming at a disaster site would obstruct rescue coordination and engage duties under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. But the denial has a legal consequence and we need to hence establish the authority and statute from which jamming equipment is being used by the Delhi Police, which is distinct from an internet shutdown or a network suspension. Here, the two mechanisms produce a similar result and are governed very differently.
A suspension order under Section 20(2)(b) is a written direction to a licensed telecom service provider to withhold a specified service, in a specified area, for a specified period. It can be confined to mobile data and leave voice and SMS running. Under the Suspension Rules, 2024 it must be issued by the Union or State Home Secretary, state reasons, be published, be capped at fifteen days, and be placed within twenty-four hours before a review committee that meets within five days and can set it aside. Rule 3(4) permits an order only after the competent authority has evaluated whether the objective can be achieved by other reasonable means. The service provider knows of the order. Subscribers receive a message, as they did on 20 July. Nothing is switched off at the network; the network is told to withhold. For Delhi, where police and public order are Union subjects under Article 239AA(3)(a), the competent authority is the Union Home Secretary, which is why the July orders came from the MHA.
A jammer is a radio transmitter. The Cabinet Secretariat's own definition, at paragraph 1(a) of its Jammer Guidelines 2023, is a transmitter designed to block all radio receivers within its range on the frequency bands it covers. A cellular jammer radiates on the bands assigned to the service providers so that every handset within its radius stops hearing the base station. The effect is indiscriminate and covers voice, SMS and data, and depending on the bands, Wi-Fi and GPS, for every device, whether it belongs to a protester, a resident, a shopkeeper, a journalist, a patient or a police officer not on a separate radio net. Prima facia on our analysis there is no order to produce, no service provider to inform, no message to subscribers, no committee, no time limit and no paper trail unless the police choose to keep one.
Analysis
Now let us look at what is the governing legality around jamming equipment. The only provision in force directly applicable to jammers is Section 48 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, effective from 5 July 2024. It provides that no person shall possess or use any equipment that blocks telecommunication unless permitted by the Central Government, or by an authority the Central Government has authorised for a specific purpose. Contravention is an offence under Section 42(3)(a), punishable with imprisonment up to three years, a fine up to fifty lakh rupees, or both. The Act binds the State, as a "person" under Section 2(j) includes any body of individuals, and the rule that the Crown is not bound unless named has never applied in India (Union of India v. Jubbi, AIR 1968 SC 360). There is no exemption for police. Section 48 removes the criminal consequence of possession and use for a permitted person. It does not confer on that person a power to interfere with the communications of others. Further, the permission is purpose-specific with the words "for specific purpose" qualifying the authorisation.
The only administrative framework is the Cabinet Secretariat's Jammer Guidelines 2023 (No. 11/11/2022-SS, Office of the Secretary (Security)). They govern jammers for VVIP and VIP security against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices ("RCIEDs") and low-powered jammers for examination halls. Counter-drone and prison jammers are routed to the MHA under its office memorandum of 10 March 2023. Paragraph 3(c) permits Central Ministries, State and UT administrations, defence forces and CAPFs to use jammers only from Bharat Electronics Limited and the Electronics Corporation of India Limited, and only for the specific purpose for which permission was granted. Paragraph 3(g) requires that information on the deployment of all RF jamming solutions be maintained and shared with the Secretary (Security), the SPG and the IB. Paragraph 4(l) requires that any jammer near an SPG protectee be deployed in consultation with the SPG. The application proforma at Annexure I(A) is designed entirely around a threat perception to a VIP. The guidelines do not mention law and order, protest, assembly or crowd control. They say nothing about duration, radius, public notice, hospitals or emergency calls. They are not made under any statutory rule-making power and are not published in the Gazette.
Further, Chapter IV of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 holds the force's public order powers. Specifically under Section 28 it can issue regulations for order in public places, Section 30(3) on prohibiting assemblies for a limited period, Section 31 on arrangements at places of public assembly, Section 33 on orders for the prevention of riot. None authorises interference with telecommunication or the operation of a radio transmitter. Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits orders directed at persons in urgent cases of apprehended danger. It cannot direct a service provider and it cannot authorise jamming. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, the Supreme Court held that telecommunication may be suspended only under the suspension rules and that Section 144 CrPC was not a substitute. The same reasoning excludes Section 163 BNSS.
What follows from this legal analysis is that we can assume the Delhi Police holds jammers procured from BEL or ECIL with the approval of the Secretary (Security). That satisfies Section 48 for possession. However, such procurement says nothing about the lawfulness of switching the device on at a public assembly. As an analogy, a licence to hold a firearm is not authority to fire it. In PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, the Supreme Court treated even an express statutory power to intercept communications as one that could be exercised against citizens only with procedural safeguards, and read them in. Section 48 does not purport to be a power at all. There is no statute that says when, where, for how long and on whose authority a police force may jam the public's communications.
If the permission the Delhi Police holds is for protectee security against RCIEDs, deployment at a protest for crowd control is used outside that permission, and on the terms of Section 42(3)(a), is used without authorisation. While we anticipate that the Government may reason that Parliament House and SPG protectees were in the vicinity during the Monsoon Session. That is an argument to be met on the record in response to our RTIs, not conceded. An RCIED jammer accompanies a protectee or a convoy and moves with it. A jammer parked at a protest site for the duration of a march is a different deployment with a different object. If the justification is protectee security, then the permission, the threat assessment and the SPG consultation required by paragraph 4(l) will all exist, and they can be produced. Hence, we have filed RTIs.
We have taken this action to check on the proliferation of jamming equipment that may be used as a circumvention of the nominal legality and safeguards for internet shutdowns. Just in the Jantar Mantar protests the use of jamming resulted in the limitation on the following legal activities:
Action
On 8 September 2026 we filed three applications under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 with the Public Information Officer, Police Headquarters, Delhi Police. Each defines "jamming equipment" to include vehicle-mounted, portable, manpack and static jammers, anti-drone systems with jamming capability and harmonious call blocking systems, whether owned, leased, hired or borrowed, so that no category can be read out of the request.
Important documents
In July 2026, mobile internet around Jantar Mantar was suspended under written orders from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Voice calls failed too, and no published order covered them.
Background
For the Jantar Mantar began on 20 June 2026 we have already documented the two Delhi Police vehicles parked at the protest running live facial recognition on the crowd, and the list of 2,873 "criminal antecedents" that system produced. This post is about another tool that effects digital rights at same site that made the phones stop working.
On 20 July 2026, the day of the Sansad Chalo march, disruption was reported from about 10.30 am. Subscribers received a message from Airtel that internet services in the area had been stopped on government instructions. That message is the trace of a written order. The MHA issued six orders between 17 and 23 July 2026, dated 17, 20, 22 and 23 July, under Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, suspending mobile internet within approximately 1.5 kilometres of Jantar Mantar. But the orders as made available suspended data but they did not suspend voice or SMS. Yet The Wire reported that people at the site walked nearly two kilometres to make calls. On 22 July, the day tear gas was used and injured police officers were taken to Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, reports attributed to police the statement that jammers were activated as the clashes began. A technology outlet, attributing the reasoning to officials, reported that portable jammers were placed to limit real-time coordination among protesters and to reduce the chance of live streams of police action.
The Delhi Police has not, in any published document, confirmed or denied that it used jammers at Jantar Mantar. Its fact-checks during those weeks addressed other claims. The allegation has since recurred for an anti-reservation demonstration at the same site on 21 August 2026, protesters again said jammers had been deployed, a claim that could not be verified.
Subsequently on 6 September 2026 a multi-storey building collapsed at Satya Niketan, killing seven young people. Within hours, social media filled with claims that jammers had been installed at the rescue site to suppress information. On 8 September the Delhi Police posted an emphatic denial on X that no jammers were used and networks were fully operational with police, NDRF and fire teams coordinating by mobile, media and citizens broadcasting live. We have no reason to doubt it since jamming at a disaster site would obstruct rescue coordination and engage duties under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. But the denial has a legal consequence and we need to hence establish the authority and statute from which jamming equipment is being used by the Delhi Police, which is distinct from an internet shutdown or a network suspension. Here, the two mechanisms produce a similar result and are governed very differently.
A suspension order under Section 20(2)(b) is a written direction to a licensed telecom service provider to withhold a specified service, in a specified area, for a specified period. It can be confined to mobile data and leave voice and SMS running. Under the Suspension Rules, 2024 it must be issued by the Union or State Home Secretary, state reasons, be published, be capped at fifteen days, and be placed within twenty-four hours before a review committee that meets within five days and can set it aside. Rule 3(4) permits an order only after the competent authority has evaluated whether the objective can be achieved by other reasonable means. The service provider knows of the order. Subscribers receive a message, as they did on 20 July. Nothing is switched off at the network; the network is told to withhold. For Delhi, where police and public order are Union subjects under Article 239AA(3)(a), the competent authority is the Union Home Secretary, which is why the July orders came from the MHA.
A jammer is a radio transmitter. The Cabinet Secretariat's own definition, at paragraph 1(a) of its Jammer Guidelines 2023, is a transmitter designed to block all radio receivers within its range on the frequency bands it covers. A cellular jammer radiates on the bands assigned to the service providers so that every handset within its radius stops hearing the base station. The effect is indiscriminate and covers voice, SMS and data, and depending on the bands, Wi-Fi and GPS, for every device, whether it belongs to a protester, a resident, a shopkeeper, a journalist, a patient or a police officer not on a separate radio net. Prima facia on our analysis there is no order to produce, no service provider to inform, no message to subscribers, no committee, no time limit and no paper trail unless the police choose to keep one.
Analysis
Now let us look at what is the governing legality around jamming equipment. The only provision in force directly applicable to jammers is Section 48 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, effective from 5 July 2024. It provides that no person shall possess or use any equipment that blocks telecommunication unless permitted by the Central Government, or by an authority the Central Government has authorised for a specific purpose. Contravention is an offence under Section 42(3)(a), punishable with imprisonment up to three years, a fine up to fifty lakh rupees, or both. The Act binds the State, as a "person" under Section 2(j) includes any body of individuals, and the rule that the Crown is not bound unless named has never applied in India (Union of India v. Jubbi, AIR 1968 SC 360). There is no exemption for police. Section 48 removes the criminal consequence of possession and use for a permitted person. It does not confer on that person a power to interfere with the communications of others. Further, the permission is purpose-specific with the words "for specific purpose" qualifying the authorisation.
The only administrative framework is the Cabinet Secretariat's Jammer Guidelines 2023 (No. 11/11/2022-SS, Office of the Secretary (Security)). They govern jammers for VVIP and VIP security against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices ("RCIEDs") and low-powered jammers for examination halls. Counter-drone and prison jammers are routed to the MHA under its office memorandum of 10 March 2023. Paragraph 3(c) permits Central Ministries, State and UT administrations, defence forces and CAPFs to use jammers only from Bharat Electronics Limited and the Electronics Corporation of India Limited, and only for the specific purpose for which permission was granted. Paragraph 3(g) requires that information on the deployment of all RF jamming solutions be maintained and shared with the Secretary (Security), the SPG and the IB. Paragraph 4(l) requires that any jammer near an SPG protectee be deployed in consultation with the SPG. The application proforma at Annexure I(A) is designed entirely around a threat perception to a VIP. The guidelines do not mention law and order, protest, assembly or crowd control. They say nothing about duration, radius, public notice, hospitals or emergency calls. They are not made under any statutory rule-making power and are not published in the Gazette.
Further, Chapter IV of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 holds the force's public order powers. Specifically under Section 28 it can issue regulations for order in public places, Section 30(3) on prohibiting assemblies for a limited period, Section 31 on arrangements at places of public assembly, Section 33 on orders for the prevention of riot. None authorises interference with telecommunication or the operation of a radio transmitter. Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits orders directed at persons in urgent cases of apprehended danger. It cannot direct a service provider and it cannot authorise jamming. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637, the Supreme Court held that telecommunication may be suspended only under the suspension rules and that Section 144 CrPC was not a substitute. The same reasoning excludes Section 163 BNSS.
What follows from this legal analysis is that we can assume the Delhi Police holds jammers procured from BEL or ECIL with the approval of the Secretary (Security). That satisfies Section 48 for possession. However, such procurement says nothing about the lawfulness of switching the device on at a public assembly. As an analogy, a licence to hold a firearm is not authority to fire it. In PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, the Supreme Court treated even an express statutory power to intercept communications as one that could be exercised against citizens only with procedural safeguards, and read them in. Section 48 does not purport to be a power at all. There is no statute that says when, where, for how long and on whose authority a police force may jam the public's communications.
If the permission the Delhi Police holds is for protectee security against RCIEDs, deployment at a protest for crowd control is used outside that permission, and on the terms of Section 42(3)(a), is used without authorisation. While we anticipate that the Government may reason that Parliament House and SPG protectees were in the vicinity during the Monsoon Session. That is an argument to be met on the record in response to our RTIs, not conceded. An RCIED jammer accompanies a protectee or a convoy and moves with it. A jammer parked at a protest site for the duration of a march is a different deployment with a different object. If the justification is protectee security, then the permission, the threat assessment and the SPG consultation required by paragraph 4(l) will all exist, and they can be produced. Hence, we have filed RTIs.
We have taken this action to check on the proliferation of jamming equipment that may be used as a circumvention of the nominal legality and safeguards for internet shutdowns. Just in the Jantar Mantar protests the use of jamming resulted in the limitation on the following legal activities:
- Live Streaming : Preventing citizens from recording and transmitting police conduct in a public place is not a legitimate aim and it inverts the logic on which the Supreme Court mandated CCTV in police stations in Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, (2021) 1 SCC 184, that recording police conduct protects rights.Given that a data-only suspension order was already in force, a barrage jammer that additionally cut voice and SMS for every resident, patient, shopkeeper and reporter in the radius cannot be the least restrictive measure when a less restrictive one was operating at the same time.
- Hospitals and 112 : A jammer prevents calls to 112. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital and Lady Hardinge Medical College both lie within two kilometres of Jantar Mantar. RML received the injured police officers on 22 July. The right to emergency medical care is part of Article 21 (Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 SCC 37). A measure that severs the public's means of summoning that care, without notice, engages the right directly, and where harm results, public law compensation follows (Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746).
Action
On 8 September 2026 we filed three applications under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 with the Public Information Officer, Police Headquarters, Delhi Police. Each defines "jamming equipment" to include vehicle-mounted, portable, manpack and static jammers, anti-drone systems with jamming capability and harmonious call blocking systems, whether owned, leased, hired or borrowed, so that no category can be read out of the request.
- On the equipment and the rules (Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10072): The number, type, make, model, frequency bands and custodian of every unit the Delhi Police holds; the sanction orders and contracts with BEL and ECIL; every permission from the MHA, the Cabinet Secretariat or the Department of Telecommunications, including under Section 48 and the 2023 guidelines; every standing order or SOP governing deployment, the officers competent to authorise it, and limits on duration, radius and power; whether a deployment register is kept, and if so its format and a year-wise count of deployments since 2023 broken down by purpose (protectee security, public events, law and order or protest management, counter-drone, examinations); expenditure by financial year; any assessment of the effect on 112, hospitals and the public; correspondence with the DoT, TRAI and service providers; and seizures of unauthorised jammers and FIRs registered. Where no SOP exists, the application asks the force to say so.
- On Jantar Mantar, 20 June to 25 July 2026 (Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10074): Whether any jamming equipment was deployed, activated or kept on standby at Jantar Mantar or within two kilometres of it, and for each deployment the time of activation and deactivation, location, model, bands, radius, unit and authorising officer; specifically for 20 and 22 July; certified copies of every order, requisition, deployment plan, wireless message and file noting; the register entries for the period; the threat assessment stating the purpose; any intimation to the DoT, service providers, the Lieutenant Governor, the MHA, emergency services, RML Hospital or Lady Hardinge; whether the Delhi Police sought or obtained any order under Section 20(2)(b) or the 2024 Rules, or made any request to a service provider to suspend or degrade services, with copies and the reasons recorded; any Section 163 BNSS order referring to mobile services, live streaming or jamming; whether any officer told the press on 22 or 23 July that jammers were activated, and the record of that statement; and the complaints received about loss of connectivity and the replies sent.
- On Satya Niketan, 6 to 8 September 2026 (Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10077): Whether any jamming equipment was deployed or present at or within two kilometres of the collapse site; the file, notings, verification reports and correspondence on which the X post of 8 September 2026 was prepared and approved, including who verified the position at the site and any confirmation of network status obtained from a service provider or the DoT; complaints received about connectivity at the site; and the designation of the officer who approves fact-check posts on the Delhi Police's official accounts, with the SOP governing them.
- The Cabinet Secretariat should clarify, in writing, that the Jammer Guidelines 2023 do not authorise deployment for law and order, protest management or crowd control, and the Wireless Planning and Coordination Wing of the Department of Telecommunications should treat any such deployment as unauthorised use under paragraph 3(f).
- The Department of Telecommunications should amend the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024 to state expressly that no telecommunication service may be blocked or degraded by any means, including radio-frequency jamming, other than under a written order under Section 20(2)(b).
- Pending legislation, no jammer should be switched on against a public assembly without a written authorisation by a named senior officer stating a purpose within Article 19(2) or 19(3), a defined radius and duration, prior intimation to hospitals and emergency services within the radius, a technical requirement to preserve emergency calls where feasible, a contemporaneous log, and post facto review.
- Parliament must legislate. Every comparable democracy that permits the State to jam communications does so by statute, for named purposes, with a regulator informed. India should not be governed on this question by a procurement circular.
Important documents
- RTI application on jamming equipment held by the Delhi Police and the rules governing its deployment, dated 8 September 2026, Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10072 [Link]
- RTI application on the deployment of jamming equipment and disruption of mobile services at Jantar Mantar, 20 June to 25 July 2026, dated 8 September 2026, Registration No. DEPOL/R/E/26/10074 [Link]
- RTI application on jamming equipment at the Satya Niketan collapse site and the basis for the Delhi Police statement of 8 September 2026, dated 8 September 2026, Registration No.DEPOL/R/E/26/10077 [Link]
- Cabinet Secretariat, Jammer Guidelines 2023, No. 11/11/2022-SS [Link]
- Delhi Police Act, 1978 [Link]
- FCC Enforcement Advisory 2014-05 on jammers and state and local law enforcement [Link]
.JPG)
.JPG)
