Wednesday, March 22, 2023

Section 19(3) of RTI Act by Public Information Officer Is Maintainable Even in the Event No First Appeal Is Preferred Under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act: Karnataka HC

Law Trend: Karnataka: Wednesday, 22 March 2023.
Recently, The Karnataka HC stated that Section 19(3) of RTI Act by the Public Information Officer is maintainable even in event no first appeal is preferred under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act.
The bench of Justice K.S. Hemalekha was dealing with the petition filed by the Public Information Officer seeking to quash the order passed by the 1st respondent.
In this case, The 1st respondent has dismissed the appeal filed by the Public Information Officer on the ground that the petitioner being the Public Information Officer cannot maintain the second appeal under Section 19(3) of the Right to Information Act and the appeal is not maintainable when the appeal under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act is not preferred by the petitioner and accordingly, dismissed the second appeal of the petitioner.
Sri Venkatesh S. Arbatti, counsel for the petitioner after relying upon the case of Sri. G.H. Sharanappa Vs. The Commissioner and Others. submitted that the issue in the lis is squarely covered by the decision of the Court and it is no more res integra and submitted that the second appeal under Section 19(3) of the RTI Act by the Public Information Officer is maintainable even in the event no first appeal is preferred under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act.
In the case of Sri. G.H. Sharanappa Vs. The Commissioner and Others. it was held that “The procedure contemplated under Section 19 is an appellate procedure. A right of appeal is always a creature of the statute. It is a valuable statutory right conferred upon an aggrieved person to enter a superior forum for invoking its aid and interposition to correct error of the inferior forum, which is a very valuable right. Therefore, when the statute confers such a right of appeal, that must be exercised by a person who is aggrieved. One aspect is clear that the statute confers the right of appeal to be exercised by any person aggrieved not confining itself to the refusal or reason to furnish.”
In view of the above judgment, the bench allowed the petition in part and set aside the impugned order.