IFF: New Delhi: Saturday, June 21, 2025.
This post is the Part 2 of our investigation around fact check unites based on RTIs filed with states and Union Territories. The responses reveal distinct models of fact checking that give rise to concerns for free expression.
Through Right to Information
requests to all States and Union Territories, we sought details on the measures
taken by state governments on dealing with misinformation. The responses reveal
serious concerns like vague procedures and lack of independent oversight
raising the threat of arbitrary censorship and erosion of free speech. In this
blogpost, which forms Part 2 of a three part series, we will analyse the state
responses claiming to have constituted a fact check unit (or a similar
authority) to curb fake, false and misleading information.
Why should you care?
The state governments are constituting fact check units without any legal backing, standard of procedure or any transparency regarding their functioning. Even though the state responses claim that the fact check units do not have the power to order modification or takedown of the content, the threat of political influence still looms. The lack of legal clarity and procedural transparency creates a grey area where even advisory roles can carry significant influence. In the absence of safeguards, there is a risk that these units may be used to indirectly pressure platforms or individuals, leading to self-censorship or biased content moderation.
Background
In this second installment of our series on government-run Fact-Checking Units (“FCU”), we turn our attention to a rapidly expanding but poorly scrutinised trend: the rise of state-level FCUs in India. Following the controversy and legal challenge to the Centre’s FCU under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023 ("IT Rules, 2023"), several states have moved to establish their own mechanisms to police so-called “fake news.”
In this post, we examine specific state responses which reveal how governments are quietly reconstituting similar powers at the state level, bypassing legislative scrutiny and raising fresh constitutional concerns. These FCUs, while claiming to tackle misinformation in the “public interest,” often operate with undefined mandates, political affiliations, and the chilling potential of criminal referrals all under the guise of “fact-checking.” What emerges is a fragmented, legally dubious framework where speech regulation is outsourced to opaque executive bodies. This not only raises serious questions about federal overreach under the Information Technology (“IT”) Act, 2000, but also directly conflicts with judicial warnings against the state assuming the role of an official arbiter of truth.
Establishment of Fact Check Units
1. Relevant Responses
We also received responses from several regions stating that they have constituted FCUs to address misinformation. Anantnag district in Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, has claimed that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir has set up an FCU under the Press Information Bureau in November 2019. This unit plays a vital role in verifying content but does not have the authority to modify or block the dissemination of information. The response is also relevant because responses from other districts of Jammu and Kashmir provide no such information. Similarly, Tamil Nadu (responses to specific and generic RTIs, 2024) and Chandigarh have established FCUs within their Public Relations Departments to monitor and counter misinformation. The Tamil Nadu government responded by requesting an additional fee to provide a copy of the Government Order establishing the FCU. However, due to logistical constraints, we were unable to make the payment and obtain the document. We have since filed a fresh set of RTIs and will update you as soon as we receive a copy of the Government Order.
Curiously, we received a response from the Uttarakhand Home Department stating that they have constituted a Review Committee, established under Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act and Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules. Technically, this committee primarily oversees the interception of communications for national security, public order, and safety. While not directly tasked with checking misinformation, the committee’s role can intersect with misinformation when it concerns threats to public order or national security, such as the spread of false information that could incite violence or harm public safety.
2. Our Concerns
The Bombay High Court’s observations in Kunal Kamra and Ors. v. Union of India brings to the forefront the inherent dangers of government-run FCUs, particularly when they operate without transparent processes, independent oversight, or statutory authority. The Court cautioned against assigning the government the dual role of both disseminator and arbiter of information, especially in politically sensitive contexts. Entrusting the state with such unchecked evaluative power risks eroding foundational constitutional values, most notably the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
While Jammu and Kashmir’s response states that they lack takedown powers or the ability to coerce platforms into content removal, this does not immunise them from constitutional scrutiny. The absence of direct censorship mechanisms does not eliminate the very real threat of indirect suppression. When a government declares information to be “fake,” “false,” or “misleading”, especially without clear definitions, standard procedures, or independent review mechanisms it can still stigmatise content, dissuade platforms from hosting it, and chill public discourse. The reputational damage and fear of legal consequences can lead individuals and media entities to self-censor, even in the absence of formal removal requests. Without transparency and clarity, the process becomes opaque, vulnerable to political manipulation, and indistinguishable from state-sponsored narrative control.
The Tamil Nadu FCU, as per reports, is empowered to escalate “actionable” content to law enforcement agencies; the implications become even more severe. This opens the door to criminalisation of speech and the weaponisation of state machinery against critics, journalists, and political opponents. The mere threat of investigation or prosecution, even if rarely acted upon, can have a disproportionate chilling effect, particularly in digital spaces where expression is more immediate, far-reaching, and vulnerable to surveillance. We discussed more about the criminalisation of misinformation in Part 1. Even though the Chandigarh response does not provide specific details about the functioning or structure of its FCU, the unit appears to be constituted by police officials, raising similar concerns.
Uttarakhand's response reflects a fundamental misalignment between legal mandate and intended function. This committee is legally tasked with reviewing interception orders for national security or public order concerns not with monitoring or verifying public information or online misinformation. While misinformation may occasionally intersect with public safety concerns, invoking a surveillance oversight body to address it blurs the lines between lawful interception and speech regulation, raising concerns about potential overreach and misuse.
Validity of FCUs
1. The Kunal Kamra Case
In a petition, comedian Kunal Kamra, along with the Editors Guild of India and the Association of Indian Magazines, challenged the constitutional validity of Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of the IT Rules, 2023, in the Bombay High Court. The impugned rule allowed the Union government to constitute a FCU that could label online content as "fake, false or misleading" if it pertained to the “business of the government.” Non-compliance by intermediaries (like X or Meta) could strip them of their "safe harbour" protection under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act (“IT Act”), 2000, essentially holding them liable for content they host.
The petitioners contended that Article 19(1)(a) protects free speech broadly, not just speech deemed “truthful” by the state and that the government has no constitutional authority to filter information based on its own version of the truth. They argued that vague and overbroad terms like “fake,” “false,” and “misleading,” especially when linked to the undefined “business of the Central Government,” open the door to arbitrary interpretation and abuse. The petitioners also argued that the impugned rule violated Article 14 by unfairly targeting digital media while sparing print, without justification. Most critically, it conferred unchecked power on the executive by allowing it to act as both judge and enforcer of what counts as misinformation, eroding constitutional safeguards and enabling potential censorship.
After a split verdict in early 2023 (read more here), the tie-breaking opinion by Justice A.S. Chandurkar on September 20, 2023, declared the rule unconstitutional, holding that it violated:
2. Supreme Court’s Intervention
Before Justice Chandurkar’s deciding opinion in the Kunal Kamra case, the Supreme Court stayed the Centre’s notification empowering the Press Information Bureau (“PIB”) to act as a FCU due to serious concerns over free speech, executive overreach, and lack of procedural safeguards. Petitioners argued that allowing a government agency to unilaterally label content as “fake, false, or misleading” would have a chilling effect on dissent and enable censorship without independent oversight. The Court found merit in these concerns, especially as the PIB would act as both the subject of criticism and the arbiter of truth, without any transparent procedures or appeal mechanisms
State-Level FCUs
1. Karnataka's Information Disorder Tackling Unit
We discussed the responses received from a few districts of Karnataka in Part 1 of this series. To briefly recapitulate, a few districts in Karnataka have formed district police teams under the leadership of Police Sub-Inspector, while in other districts the aggrieved may approach the police and appropriate action will be taken under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) and the IT Act, 2000. We have received no more responses.
Interestingly, as per reports the government of Karnataka has indeed established an FCU at the state level. In March, 2024, the Karnataka government established the Information Disorder Tackling Unit (“IDTU”) to address online misinformation and disinformation in partnership with four private firms Gauri Media, Logically Infomedia Private Limited, Trylika Technology Limited, and Newsplus Communications. The IDTU was first announced in June 2023, following the controversy over the Centre’s now-stayed PIB FCU. The Karnataka Chief Minister had directed the police to tackle fake news, claiming there were signs that misinformation could be used to incite communal tensions before the 2024 elections.
More recently, the Karnataka government has merged the IDTU with Cyber Command Unit (“CCU”) under the Karnataka Home Department. At the core of CCU is the deployment of Agentic artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems designed to independently scan the internet for harmful content and flag it for review. In the case of misinformation, it will be published on a government platform called satya.gov.in. It is imperative to mention here that Agentic AI systems are different from the Generative AI systems (like ChatGPT). Agentic AI is a powerful tool that enhances, not replaces, human expertise. Agentic AI automates complex, multistep tasks across systems, making decisions and using tools independently.
While Karnataka’s IT Minister Priyank Kharge stated that the unit will only fact-check news in the "public interest" and not censor speech, the lack of a clear definition of "public interest" and absence of transparency or statutory backing has triggered criticism. The involvement of the police in the fact-checking process, along with the possibility of legal referrals is also alarming. Additionally, under the IT Act, 2000, state governments do not have independent authority to constitute FCUs.
Moreover, the experts have noted that the lack of independence and potential partisan influence in the functioning of such government-run units stands in direct contrast to international best practices, such as those outlined by the International Fact-Checking Network (“IFCN”), which emphasise neutrality and transparency. While Karnataka argues that the IDTU differs because it lacks takedown powers and operates within existing legal frameworks, the potential for criminalisation of speech, executive overreach, and lack of procedural safeguards remains. With no clear standard of procedures or independent oversight, and FIRs being filed based on the unit’s assessments, Karnataka’s IDTU still risks enabling censorship and suppression of dissent under the guise of tackling misinformation.
Even with human supervision, significant concerns remain regarding the use of Agentic AI in fact-checking and misinformation detection. These systems can surface biased or unreliable sources, subtly sway human judgment with misleading suggestions, or overlook important context and nuance. Since AI models are trained on historical data, they often inherit existing societal biases, which can be further compounded by potential prejudices within law enforcement. Additionally, the risk of automation bias where human reviewers place undue trust in AI outputs—can undermine critical oversight. Ethical concerns around mass surveillance, content moderation, and scalability also persist, especially when such systems are deployed at large scale. We have filed an RTI with the Karnataka government seeking information on the legal basis, structure, powers, data practices, and safeguards of the Bengaluru Police's AI-based monitoring. We have also inquired about the roles of officials, authority to censor content, criteria for flagging posts, data access and retention, user consent rights, and measures to prevent bias and protect free speech. We will update you as soon as we receive a response.
2. Tamil Nadu's Fact Check Unit
Amidst this central-level controversy in the Bombay High Court, Tamil Nadu government also created its own FCU through a Government Order (“GO”) in October 2023. Unlike the Centre’s attempt through the IT Rules, 2023, this move also did not rely on any statutory authority under the IT Act, 2000. According to the GO, the FCU is responsible for: i) identifying and verifying information concerning the state government that is alleged to be fake or misleading; ii) using “fact-checking tools” to determine the accuracy of the information; iii) categorising flagged content into two buckets:
A Public Interest Litigation (“PIL”) titled R. Nirmal Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others [W.P. 32768 of 2023] was filed in the Madras High Court by R. Nirmal Kumar, Joint Secretary of the AIADMK’s IT Wing, challenging the establishment of the Tamil Nadu FCU. The petitioner argued that the GO creating the FCU lacked legal backing under the Information Technology Act, 2000, which vests such powers solely with the Union government. He further raised concerns about the lack of transparency in the appointment process, alleging political bias. The petition also warned that the FCU could become a tool for covert censorship, potentially criminalising legitimate dissent and criticism of the state government. It was stressed during the proceedings that the FCU was not established through proper legislative processes, thereby increasing the risk of overreach and misuse of power.
The Tamil Nadu government argued that the Bombay High Court’s ruling in the Kunal Kamra case did not apply as the central government’s FCU was created under IT Rules, 2023, which was invalidated as unconstitutional. In contrast, Tamil Nadu’s FCU was established through a state GO and does not issue take-down orders to intermediaries or threaten “safe harbour” protections. Therefore, the government maintained that its FCU functions solely as an advisory body, unlike the central FCU that acted as a coercive regulator. The case was last listed on April 6, 2024, when it was adjourned to a later date.
Conclusion
The establishment of state-level FCUs raises serious constitutional, legal, and operational concerns. These units have been constituted without a clear statutory mandate, making their legal validity under the IT Act, 2000, highly questionable. The absence of standard operating procedures, definitional clarity, or publicly accessible criteria further exacerbates the issue, as these bodies operate in an opaque manner with little oversight. Despite claims of advisory roles, both Karnataka’s IDTU and Tamil Nadu’s FCU are actively enabling criminalisation of misinformation by referring content to law enforcement, a practice that has already been flagged by the Madras High Court. This fragmented, state-specific approach to online misinformation not only undermines consistency in enforcement but also poses significant challenges for intermediaries in ensuring compliance across jurisdictions. Moreover, rulings from the Bombay High Court and broader observations from the Supreme Court have questioned the constitutional propriety of such executive-led truth-verification mechanisms, especially when they risk infringing upon the fundamental right to free speech.
Important Links
This post is the Part 2 of our investigation around fact check unites based on RTIs filed with states and Union Territories. The responses reveal distinct models of fact checking that give rise to concerns for free expression.
Why should you care?
The state governments are constituting fact check units without any legal backing, standard of procedure or any transparency regarding their functioning. Even though the state responses claim that the fact check units do not have the power to order modification or takedown of the content, the threat of political influence still looms. The lack of legal clarity and procedural transparency creates a grey area where even advisory roles can carry significant influence. In the absence of safeguards, there is a risk that these units may be used to indirectly pressure platforms or individuals, leading to self-censorship or biased content moderation.
Background
In this second installment of our series on government-run Fact-Checking Units (“FCU”), we turn our attention to a rapidly expanding but poorly scrutinised trend: the rise of state-level FCUs in India. Following the controversy and legal challenge to the Centre’s FCU under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023 ("IT Rules, 2023"), several states have moved to establish their own mechanisms to police so-called “fake news.”
In this post, we examine specific state responses which reveal how governments are quietly reconstituting similar powers at the state level, bypassing legislative scrutiny and raising fresh constitutional concerns. These FCUs, while claiming to tackle misinformation in the “public interest,” often operate with undefined mandates, political affiliations, and the chilling potential of criminal referrals all under the guise of “fact-checking.” What emerges is a fragmented, legally dubious framework where speech regulation is outsourced to opaque executive bodies. This not only raises serious questions about federal overreach under the Information Technology (“IT”) Act, 2000, but also directly conflicts with judicial warnings against the state assuming the role of an official arbiter of truth.
Establishment of Fact Check Units
1. Relevant Responses
We also received responses from several regions stating that they have constituted FCUs to address misinformation. Anantnag district in Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, has claimed that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir has set up an FCU under the Press Information Bureau in November 2019. This unit plays a vital role in verifying content but does not have the authority to modify or block the dissemination of information. The response is also relevant because responses from other districts of Jammu and Kashmir provide no such information. Similarly, Tamil Nadu (responses to specific and generic RTIs, 2024) and Chandigarh have established FCUs within their Public Relations Departments to monitor and counter misinformation. The Tamil Nadu government responded by requesting an additional fee to provide a copy of the Government Order establishing the FCU. However, due to logistical constraints, we were unable to make the payment and obtain the document. We have since filed a fresh set of RTIs and will update you as soon as we receive a copy of the Government Order.
Curiously, we received a response from the Uttarakhand Home Department stating that they have constituted a Review Committee, established under Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act and Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules. Technically, this committee primarily oversees the interception of communications for national security, public order, and safety. While not directly tasked with checking misinformation, the committee’s role can intersect with misinformation when it concerns threats to public order or national security, such as the spread of false information that could incite violence or harm public safety.
2. Our Concerns
The Bombay High Court’s observations in Kunal Kamra and Ors. v. Union of India brings to the forefront the inherent dangers of government-run FCUs, particularly when they operate without transparent processes, independent oversight, or statutory authority. The Court cautioned against assigning the government the dual role of both disseminator and arbiter of information, especially in politically sensitive contexts. Entrusting the state with such unchecked evaluative power risks eroding foundational constitutional values, most notably the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
While Jammu and Kashmir’s response states that they lack takedown powers or the ability to coerce platforms into content removal, this does not immunise them from constitutional scrutiny. The absence of direct censorship mechanisms does not eliminate the very real threat of indirect suppression. When a government declares information to be “fake,” “false,” or “misleading”, especially without clear definitions, standard procedures, or independent review mechanisms it can still stigmatise content, dissuade platforms from hosting it, and chill public discourse. The reputational damage and fear of legal consequences can lead individuals and media entities to self-censor, even in the absence of formal removal requests. Without transparency and clarity, the process becomes opaque, vulnerable to political manipulation, and indistinguishable from state-sponsored narrative control.
The Tamil Nadu FCU, as per reports, is empowered to escalate “actionable” content to law enforcement agencies; the implications become even more severe. This opens the door to criminalisation of speech and the weaponisation of state machinery against critics, journalists, and political opponents. The mere threat of investigation or prosecution, even if rarely acted upon, can have a disproportionate chilling effect, particularly in digital spaces where expression is more immediate, far-reaching, and vulnerable to surveillance. We discussed more about the criminalisation of misinformation in Part 1. Even though the Chandigarh response does not provide specific details about the functioning or structure of its FCU, the unit appears to be constituted by police officials, raising similar concerns.
Uttarakhand's response reflects a fundamental misalignment between legal mandate and intended function. This committee is legally tasked with reviewing interception orders for national security or public order concerns not with monitoring or verifying public information or online misinformation. While misinformation may occasionally intersect with public safety concerns, invoking a surveillance oversight body to address it blurs the lines between lawful interception and speech regulation, raising concerns about potential overreach and misuse.
Validity of FCUs
1. The Kunal Kamra Case
In a petition, comedian Kunal Kamra, along with the Editors Guild of India and the Association of Indian Magazines, challenged the constitutional validity of Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of the IT Rules, 2023, in the Bombay High Court. The impugned rule allowed the Union government to constitute a FCU that could label online content as "fake, false or misleading" if it pertained to the “business of the government.” Non-compliance by intermediaries (like X or Meta) could strip them of their "safe harbour" protection under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act (“IT Act”), 2000, essentially holding them liable for content they host.
The petitioners contended that Article 19(1)(a) protects free speech broadly, not just speech deemed “truthful” by the state and that the government has no constitutional authority to filter information based on its own version of the truth. They argued that vague and overbroad terms like “fake,” “false,” and “misleading,” especially when linked to the undefined “business of the Central Government,” open the door to arbitrary interpretation and abuse. The petitioners also argued that the impugned rule violated Article 14 by unfairly targeting digital media while sparing print, without justification. Most critically, it conferred unchecked power on the executive by allowing it to act as both judge and enforcer of what counts as misinformation, eroding constitutional safeguards and enabling potential censorship.
After a split verdict in early 2023 (read more here), the tie-breaking opinion by Justice A.S. Chandurkar on September 20, 2023, declared the rule unconstitutional, holding that it violated:
- Article 14 (Right to Equality),
- Article 19(1)(a) (Right to Freedom of Speech), and
- Article 19(1)(g) (Right to Practice Any Profession)
2. Supreme Court’s Intervention
Before Justice Chandurkar’s deciding opinion in the Kunal Kamra case, the Supreme Court stayed the Centre’s notification empowering the Press Information Bureau (“PIB”) to act as a FCU due to serious concerns over free speech, executive overreach, and lack of procedural safeguards. Petitioners argued that allowing a government agency to unilaterally label content as “fake, false, or misleading” would have a chilling effect on dissent and enable censorship without independent oversight. The Court found merit in these concerns, especially as the PIB would act as both the subject of criticism and the arbiter of truth, without any transparent procedures or appeal mechanisms
State-Level FCUs
1. Karnataka's Information Disorder Tackling Unit
We discussed the responses received from a few districts of Karnataka in Part 1 of this series. To briefly recapitulate, a few districts in Karnataka have formed district police teams under the leadership of Police Sub-Inspector, while in other districts the aggrieved may approach the police and appropriate action will be taken under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) and the IT Act, 2000. We have received no more responses.
Interestingly, as per reports the government of Karnataka has indeed established an FCU at the state level. In March, 2024, the Karnataka government established the Information Disorder Tackling Unit (“IDTU”) to address online misinformation and disinformation in partnership with four private firms Gauri Media, Logically Infomedia Private Limited, Trylika Technology Limited, and Newsplus Communications. The IDTU was first announced in June 2023, following the controversy over the Centre’s now-stayed PIB FCU. The Karnataka Chief Minister had directed the police to tackle fake news, claiming there were signs that misinformation could be used to incite communal tensions before the 2024 elections.
More recently, the Karnataka government has merged the IDTU with Cyber Command Unit (“CCU”) under the Karnataka Home Department. At the core of CCU is the deployment of Agentic artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems designed to independently scan the internet for harmful content and flag it for review. In the case of misinformation, it will be published on a government platform called satya.gov.in. It is imperative to mention here that Agentic AI systems are different from the Generative AI systems (like ChatGPT). Agentic AI is a powerful tool that enhances, not replaces, human expertise. Agentic AI automates complex, multistep tasks across systems, making decisions and using tools independently.
- Concerns
While Karnataka’s IT Minister Priyank Kharge stated that the unit will only fact-check news in the "public interest" and not censor speech, the lack of a clear definition of "public interest" and absence of transparency or statutory backing has triggered criticism. The involvement of the police in the fact-checking process, along with the possibility of legal referrals is also alarming. Additionally, under the IT Act, 2000, state governments do not have independent authority to constitute FCUs.
Moreover, the experts have noted that the lack of independence and potential partisan influence in the functioning of such government-run units stands in direct contrast to international best practices, such as those outlined by the International Fact-Checking Network (“IFCN”), which emphasise neutrality and transparency. While Karnataka argues that the IDTU differs because it lacks takedown powers and operates within existing legal frameworks, the potential for criminalisation of speech, executive overreach, and lack of procedural safeguards remains. With no clear standard of procedures or independent oversight, and FIRs being filed based on the unit’s assessments, Karnataka’s IDTU still risks enabling censorship and suppression of dissent under the guise of tackling misinformation.
Even with human supervision, significant concerns remain regarding the use of Agentic AI in fact-checking and misinformation detection. These systems can surface biased or unreliable sources, subtly sway human judgment with misleading suggestions, or overlook important context and nuance. Since AI models are trained on historical data, they often inherit existing societal biases, which can be further compounded by potential prejudices within law enforcement. Additionally, the risk of automation bias where human reviewers place undue trust in AI outputs—can undermine critical oversight. Ethical concerns around mass surveillance, content moderation, and scalability also persist, especially when such systems are deployed at large scale. We have filed an RTI with the Karnataka government seeking information on the legal basis, structure, powers, data practices, and safeguards of the Bengaluru Police's AI-based monitoring. We have also inquired about the roles of officials, authority to censor content, criteria for flagging posts, data access and retention, user consent rights, and measures to prevent bias and protect free speech. We will update you as soon as we receive a response.
2. Tamil Nadu's Fact Check Unit
Amidst this central-level controversy in the Bombay High Court, Tamil Nadu government also created its own FCU through a Government Order (“GO”) in October 2023. Unlike the Centre’s attempt through the IT Rules, 2023, this move also did not rely on any statutory authority under the IT Act, 2000. According to the GO, the FCU is responsible for: i) identifying and verifying information concerning the state government that is alleged to be fake or misleading; ii) using “fact-checking tools” to determine the accuracy of the information; iii) categorising flagged content into two buckets:
- Non-actionable: Where no further steps are taken,
- Actionable: Where the matter may be escalated to law enforcement authorities.
A Public Interest Litigation (“PIL”) titled R. Nirmal Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others [W.P. 32768 of 2023] was filed in the Madras High Court by R. Nirmal Kumar, Joint Secretary of the AIADMK’s IT Wing, challenging the establishment of the Tamil Nadu FCU. The petitioner argued that the GO creating the FCU lacked legal backing under the Information Technology Act, 2000, which vests such powers solely with the Union government. He further raised concerns about the lack of transparency in the appointment process, alleging political bias. The petition also warned that the FCU could become a tool for covert censorship, potentially criminalising legitimate dissent and criticism of the state government. It was stressed during the proceedings that the FCU was not established through proper legislative processes, thereby increasing the risk of overreach and misuse of power.
The Tamil Nadu government argued that the Bombay High Court’s ruling in the Kunal Kamra case did not apply as the central government’s FCU was created under IT Rules, 2023, which was invalidated as unconstitutional. In contrast, Tamil Nadu’s FCU was established through a state GO and does not issue take-down orders to intermediaries or threaten “safe harbour” protections. Therefore, the government maintained that its FCU functions solely as an advisory body, unlike the central FCU that acted as a coercive regulator. The case was last listed on April 6, 2024, when it was adjourned to a later date.
- Concerns
Conclusion
The establishment of state-level FCUs raises serious constitutional, legal, and operational concerns. These units have been constituted without a clear statutory mandate, making their legal validity under the IT Act, 2000, highly questionable. The absence of standard operating procedures, definitional clarity, or publicly accessible criteria further exacerbates the issue, as these bodies operate in an opaque manner with little oversight. Despite claims of advisory roles, both Karnataka’s IDTU and Tamil Nadu’s FCU are actively enabling criminalisation of misinformation by referring content to law enforcement, a practice that has already been flagged by the Madras High Court. This fragmented, state-specific approach to online misinformation not only undermines consistency in enforcement but also poses significant challenges for intermediaries in ensuring compliance across jurisdictions. Moreover, rulings from the Bombay High Court and broader observations from the Supreme Court have questioned the constitutional propriety of such executive-led truth-verification mechanisms, especially when they risk infringing upon the fundamental right to free speech.
Important Links