Allahabad High Court Imposes ₹6.7 Lakh Costs On Man For Misusing RTI Act, Disturbing Court Proceedings : Sparsh Upadhyay

Live Law: Allahabad: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.
The Allahabad High Court recently imposed costs of ₹6.70 lakh on a party-in-person after finding that he had misused the Right to Information Act, 2005, by repeatedly filing vague RTI applications concerning the Court's internal functioning and also disturbed the judicial proceedings.

A bench of Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery dismissed the writ petition challenging an order of the State Information Commission (SIC) and directed the petitioner to deposit the entire amount with the High Court Legal Service Committee within 4 weeks.
In its order, the bench also took note of recent incidents in the Supreme Court as well as in various High Courts where the petitioner-in-person had not followed the decorum of the Court and acted in a hasty and unruly manner.
Briefly put, the petitioner had challenged an order passed by the UP SIC, passed on July 28, 2023, contending that complete information sought by him under the RTI Act had not been supplied.
However, after examining the record, the High Court found that the requisite information had already been furnished through registered post and that the petitioner had neither denied receiving it nor placed the supplied information on record.
The Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the Commission's order.
While hearing the matter, the Court noted that the Registry had reported that the petitioner had filed numerous RTI applications seeking information relating to the Court proceedings in the pending writ petition itself.
Last month, the Court had restrained him from filing further RTI applications concerning the case, observing that such requests would cause hindrance in the administration of justice and directing that any pending RTI proceedings be kept in abeyance until disposal of the writ petition.
The Court recorded that despite this warning, the petitioner continued with his conduct.
Referring to a report submitted by the Deputy Registrar (RTI), the Court noted that the petitioner had filed 24 RTI applications between June 4 and July 17, 2026, seeking a wide range of internal administrative records, including office note sheets, routing sheets, action taken reports, file movement registers, backend server logs, Cisco Webex session logs, courtroom attendance registers, Bench Secretary log entries, roster-related records, reasons for supplementary cause lists and matters being marked "passed over", among other information having no concern with him.
The Court stated that such applications not only waste the time of employees of the Court but also cause hindrance in the administration of justice.
Concluding that the petitioner had misused the provisions of the RTI Act, the Court directed that all such RTI applications be consigned to record and imposed ₹5,000 costs for each of the 24 applications, amounting to ₹1.20 lakh.
The Bench further found that the petitioner had violated its earlier direction requiring him to appear physically before the Court by instead joining through video conferencing.
Justice Shamshery clarified that appearance through video conferencing is merely a mode of convenience and cannot be claimed as a fundamental right. The Court added that the permission to appear virtually lies within the Court's discretion and directions requiring personal appearance must be complied with absent any reasonable justification.
The Court also observed that the petitioner had filed an application seeking punishment of certain respondents for allegedly not filing a counter affidavit despite the record showing that the contesting respondent had already filed the affidavit and served a copy on the petitioner's counsel.
Describing that application as misconceived, based on incorrect statements and contrary to the record, the Court dismissed it with ₹50,000 costs.
The Court further noted that the petitioner had sent an email titled "Formal Written Declaration of Protest", which it found to be vague and contemptuous. Rejecting the petitioner's claim that a virtual hearing was his fundamental right, the Court clarified that video conferencing is only a convenience subject to judicial discretion.
The Court observed that although it had even offered to appoint an advocate to argue the matter if the petitioner appeared personally, he remained adamant and refused to do so despite having previously travelled to Allahabad on several occasions. Finding that the petitioner had already received the information sought under the RTI Act and that no interference with the SIC's order was required, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. It then imposed a further ₹5 lakh to discourage litigants from disturbing court proceedings and the administration of justice.
Together with the earlier ₹50,000 and ₹1.20 lakh costs, the total costs came to ₹6.70 lakh, which the petitioner has to deposit with the High Court Legal Service Committee within 4 weeks.
Case Title - Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula vs. State of U.P. and 3 others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 542 Case
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 542
(Click Here to Read/Download Order)

Can there be a blanket ban on disclosure of digital personal information under RTI Act, asks SC

The Statesman: New Delhi: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.
The Court observed that the central issue was whether Parliament could impose a blanket prohibition on disclosure of all digital personal information or whether the law was required to adopt a proportionate approach.

The Supreme Court on Friday indicated that the constitutional challenge to the amendment to Section 8 (1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, which removed the public interest exception for disclosure of personal information, would require a careful balancing of citizens’ right to information with the fundamental right to privacy.
The Court observed that the central issue was whether Parliament could impose a blanket prohibition on disclosure of all digital personal information or whether the law was required to adopt a proportionate approach.
The observations came from a Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana while hearing petitions challenging the amendment to the Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act brought through the Digital Personal Data Protection Act.
Justice Bagchi observed that the Court would have to examine whether Parliament’s decision to widen the protection available to personal information satisfies constitutional standards.
Referring to the scheme of the two enactments, he noted that while the RTI Act operates in a much wider field covering all forms of information, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act deals with a narrower category, though one that today constitutes a substantial part of the information held by public authorities.
The question, according to the Bench, was whether the legislature’s cautionary approach and the classification created by the amendment bear a reasonable and intelligible nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
The issue assumes significance because, prior to the amendment, Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act permitted withholding of personal information only in limited circumstances, while preserving disclosure where a larger public interest justified it.
The Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act before amendment read:- “(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information:
“Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.”
Appearing for the petitioners, advocate Vrinda Grover submitted that the amendment fundamentally alters the RTI regime by removing the safeguard that enabled disclosure in larger public interest while adequately protecting privacy.
Chief Justice Kant observed that the Court had, even during the earlier hearing, indicated that a balancing exercise would be necessary to determine the categories of digital personal data deserving protection.
Advocates Nisha Bhambhani and Prashant Bhushan contended that the amendment could seriously impede investigative journalism by restricting access to official records relied upon in exposing corruption and abuse of power.
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Central government, submitted that the Centre would justify the amendment in its affidavit, subject to judicial review, and sought two weeks’ time to file its response.
Accepting the request, the Court impleaded the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology as a party to the proceedings.

District cooperative banks come under RTI Act, rules K’taka Information Commission

The Times of India: Karnataka: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.

In a significant ruling, the Kalaburagi Bench of Karnataka Information Commission has declared the Kalaburagi-Yadgir District Central Cooperative Bank (DCCB) a public authority under Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005.
The ruling is expected to have wider implications for other DCCBs across Karnataka, as it clarifies that cooperative banks functioning under substantial govt control can be treated as public authorities under RTI Act.
Information Commissioner B Venkat Singh passed the order while disposing of a second appeal filed by one Rajkumar Aland, who had sought information on the action taken over a letter submitted to the bank’s Aland branch on Jan 25, 2022.
The bank had refused to furnish the information, arguing that it did not receive substantial financial assistance from govt and therefore did not fall within the ambit of RTI Act.
Unhappy with the response, Aland filed a second appeal before Karnataka Information Commission’s Kalaburagi Bench.
In its July 30, 2026 order, the commission held that the bank functions under govt rules, directions and regulatory oversight, and therefore qualifies as a public authority even though it does not receive substantial direct financial assistance from govt.
The order observed that govt has contributed share capital to the bank and appointed its CEO and managing director. It further noted that the cooperation department has the authority to investigate irregularities and that govt can supersede the bank’s management if the charges are established.
It also pointed out that govt nominates members to the bank’s board, subsidises interest on loans extended to farmers through the bank and reimburses banks whenever farm loan waiver schemes are implemented. Recruitment is also carried out with govt approval and includes govt representatives in the selection process.
The commission directed the bank to comply with Sections 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) of RTI Act by proactively disclosing information and appointing public information officers and first appellate authorities. It also instructed the principal secretary of the cooperation department, the registrar of cooperative societies and other authorities in the department to ensure compliance with the order.

Challenge to DPDP Act | Day 2: Law may impede investigative journalism, petitioners argue

Supreme Court Observer: New Delhi: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.

Constitutionality of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

Judges: Surya Kant CJI, Joymalya Bagchi J, V. Mohana J

Namrata Banerjee | 7th Aug 2026

Today, a Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana heard a batch of petitions challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) and the Rules framed under it. The petitioners contended that the Act amends Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI) by removing the public interest safeguard that earlier allowed disclosure of personal information in appropriate cases, replacing it with a broader exemption.
Petitioners: Amendment removes RTI’s public interest safeguard
Advocate Nisha Bhambhani submitted that the amendments would seriously impede investigative reporting because journalists would be required to obtain the consent of the “data principal” before publishing a report, and later erase the information at that person’s request. CJI Surya Kant responded, “The balance has to be worked out with the right to privacy.”
Advocate Vrinda Grover argued that the DPDP Act fundamentally alters the RTI framework as the amended provision exempts personal information from disclosure without preserving the balancing exercise built into the original law. This would exclude “a whole swathe of information” that citizens could previously access under Articles 19 and 21.
Advocate Prashant Bhushan argued that the balance between privacy and the right to information had already been settled by the Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019). He submitted that the original Section 8(1)(j) exempted only personal information unrelated to any public activity or public interest, or information whose disclosure would amount to an unwarranted invasion of privacy. “That balance has now been dismantled,” he argued. As a result, he contended, even information such as pending charge sheets against public officials, or details relating to welfare schemes and ration cards, could now be withheld on the ground that they constitute personal information.
How far can the RTI exemption go?
Justice Bagchi observed that both the RTI Act and the DPDP Act are central legislations and the Court would have to examine whether they operate harmoniously. He noted that the RTI Act “operates in a much larger domain”, covering all forms of information, while the DPDP Act applies to “a much narrower sliver”, although digital information today constitutes the overwhelming part of information held by the State. The Bench said it would examine whether the distinction drawn between digital personal data and other forms of information is founded on an intelligible differentia and bears a rational nexus to the object of the legislation.
Bhushan argued that the amendment extends beyond digital personal data because it expressly substitutes Section 8(1)(j). Justice Bagchi said the Court would also have to consider whether the legislation can impose “a blanket prohibition on disclosure of all digital personal information” or whether a proportionate approach is constitutionally required.
Addressing the concerns over journalism, Justice Bagchi clarified that neither Subhash Chandra Agarwal nor the RTI Act creates a separate exemption for journalists beyond the protection available under Article 19(1)(a). 
Union to justify amendments
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta informed the Bench that the Union would file its reply within two weeks and place its justification for the legislation on record, adding that it would remain “subject to judicial review.”
The matter has been directed to be listed on a non-miscellaneous day.

Supreme Court to examine impact of data protection law on RTI, investigative journalism

The Hindu: New Delhi: Saturday, 8^th August 2026.
The court said both the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 and the RTI Act were central legislations with a need to harmonise them; it would examine if this restrictive or ‘cautionary approach’ to sharing data under the DPDP Act worked to repeal earlier transparency legislations

Image used for representative purpose. | Photo Credit: Getty Images/iStockphoto

The Supreme Court on Friday (August 7, 2026) agreed to examine if the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 can be used to cripple the Right to Information Act by classifying all data as “personal” and, separately, gag investigative journalists.
The court said both the DPDP Act and the RTI Act were central legislations. There was a need to actually harmonise them.
“The earlier law (Right to Information Act, 2005) gave certain access with conditions. Here (2023 Act), there is an en bloc embargo. Is this latter law repugnant to earlier law? This has to be looked into with extreme circumspection. After all, both are central laws. There is a need to actually harmonise these two,” Justice Joymalya Bagchi remarked.
Different domain
Justice Bagchi said the RTI law operated on a “much larger domain” than the DPDP Act. It covered all forms of data, while the DPDP law was only concerned with data in a digital form. The court said this even though acknowledging that the data was now overwhelmingly in the digital format.
The judge said the court would examine if this restrictive or “cautionary approach” to sharing data under the DPDP Act worked to repeal earlier transparency legislations.
The court was hearing multiple petitions challenging provisions of the DPDP Act, primarily Section 44(3), which had amended the RTI Act to facilitate public authorities to blankly refuse information on the ground that the details sought was of a “personal” nature.
Turned on its head
The petitioners, represented by advocate Vrinda Grover, submitted that the provision has turned the fundamental right to privacy on its head. The right, meant to protect ordinary citizens against State incursion, has been extended to protect the State and public functionaries from RTI disclosures.
They have argued that Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act has amended Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. Originally, the RTI provision had exempted authorities from disclosing personal information to an applicant if the details sought had no relationship to any public activity or if disclosure would amount to unwarranted invasion of privacy. Even then, the government had to disclose if public interest outweighed privacy. The decision whether or not to reveal “personal information” was taken by a Public Information Officer or the First Appellate Authority under the RTI Act after thoroughly weighing privacy and transparency concerns.
One of the petitioners, Foundation for Media Professionals, represented by advocate Nisha Bhambhani, pointed out that the 2023 Act threatened to have a grave impact on investigative journalism.
“The Act was not granting exemption to journalists. If a journalist is reporting, they would have to seek the consent of the data principal. If the data principal wants to erase the data, they can do it. This has a direct effect on investigative journalism,” the counsel submitted.
No special category
The court said journalists cannot be considered a “special category” with unreserved access to data.
Agreeing to examine the impact of the data protection law on journalistic activities, Justice Bagchi highlighted that neither Supreme Court judgments on public transparency (Subhash Chandra Agarwal case) and press freedom (Indian Express Bombay Pvt Ltd case) nor RTI Act had considered journalists a “special category”.

Appoint capable, impartial info commissioners

The Daily Star: Bangladesh: Friday, 7^th August 2026.

The RTI Forum has called for competence, impartiality and commitment to public interest to be the top priorities in appointing the chief information commissioner and information commissioners.
The forum made the call in a letter to Justice Farah Mahbub of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, who chairs the recently reconstituted five-member Selection Committee tasked with recommending candidates for the posts of chief information commissioner and two information commissioners, according to a press release issued yesterday.
Constituted under Section 14(1) of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2009, the committee recently invited applications from qualified and interested candidates for the three posts.
Welcoming the move, the forum said the selection process presents an opportunity to fulfil the long-standing public expectation of an independent and effective Information Commission.
The forum said effective implementation of the Right to Information Act depends on a competent, impartial and citizen-oriented commission.
It urged the selection committee to assess candidates not only on their ability to discharge the responsibilities prescribed under the law but also on their competence, objectivity and impartiality to perform their duties independently, free from all forms of influence.
The letter was signed by Shaheen Anam, convener of RTI Forum and executive director of Manusher Jonno Foundation, on behalf of the forum’s core group members. They are: Badiul Alam Majumdar, secretary of Shujan; Iftekharuzzaman, executive director of TIB; Rezaul Karim Chowdhury, executive director of COAST Trust; Syed Sultan Uddin Ahmed, executive director of BILS; AHM Bazlur Rahman, chief executive officer of Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication; Zakir Hossain, chief executive of Nagorik Uddyog; Ananya Raihan, chairperson of iSocial; Barrister Sara Hossain, honorary executive director of BLAST; Rafiqul Islam Khokon, executive director of Rupantar; Hasibur Rahman, executive director of MRDI; Ruhi Naz, deputy director of Research Initiatives, Bangladesh; and Hamidul Islam Hillol, project manager of the Tobacco Tax Project at the Bureau of Economic Research, Dhaka University.

Constitution Never Approved Algorithmic Governance: Why India Needs Right To Human Decision-Making - By - Dr. Raghvendra Kumar Chaudhary

Live Law: National: Friday, 7^th August 2026.

In September 2017, an eleven-year-old girl named Santoshi Kumari died of starvation in Jharkhand's Simdega district after her family's ration card was cancelled because it could not be linked to Aadhaar. No official signed off on that cancellation in the way administrative law has traditionally understood a “decision.” A biometric authentication system flagged a mismatch, a database updated a status, and a family stopped receiving grain. Nobody applied their mind to Santoshi's case. That, in miniature, is the constitutional problem posed by algorithmic governance in India: decisions that affect life and livelihood are increasingly made, or effectively made, by systems that were never contemplated by the text of the Constitution and that resist the doctrinal tools built to discipline human decision-makers.
The Constitution of India was drafted for a state that acts through officers who apply their minds, record reasons, and can be questioned. Article 14 guarantee against arbitrariness, Article 21 promise of a fair procedure, and the natural justice principles that Indian courts have read into both, all presuppose a decision-maker capable of reasoning, of being persuaded, and of explaining itself. Nothing in the Constituent Assembly Debates, and nothing in seven decades of constitutional jurisprudence, anticipated a state that governs through scoring systems, authentication mismatches, and opaque risk models. Algorithmic governance was never approved by the constitutional design; it has simply arrived, and the doctrine is being asked to stretch to cover it.
Where the machines already govern
This is not a speculative or futuristic concern. Automated and semi-automated systems already mediate some of the most consequential encounters citizens have with the Indian state. Welfare delivery under the Public Distribution System and social security pensions has, for over a decade, depended on Aadhaar-based biometric authentication; when fingerprints fail to match, at a point-of-sale device or a server, the consequence is exclusion, not error correction. The government's own submissions before the Supreme Court have acknowledged authentication failure rates that translate, at national scale, into millions of people at risk of being wrongly denied entitlements they are legally owed. The Income Tax Department's faceless assessment scheme routes disputes through automated allocation and templated processing with limited scope for a taxpayer to make a case to an identifiable human being. Predictive policing tools and crime-mapping software, adopted by several state police forces, generate risk scores that shape patrolling and surveillance priorities without any statutory framework governing their design or accountability. And credit, insurance and even loan-recovery decisions taken by regulated financial entities increasingly rest on proprietary scoring models that borrowers cannot see and cannot meaningfully contest.
In each instance, the structure of the “decision” has changed. It is not that a human officer made a biased choice, a fact pattern administrative law knows how to handle. The decision was distributed across a database, a threshold, and a rule nobody in the room can fully articulate. The result is governance that is efficient and scalable, but largely unaccountable to the doctrines meant to constrain the state.
The doctrinal strain
Indian constitutional law's principal safeguard against arbitrary state action is the requirement that a decision reflect an application of mind and be capable of being defended with reasons. This lineage runs from the Supreme Court's insistence in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India that state action affecting life and personal liberty must be fair, just and reasonable, through decades of natural justice jurisprudence, including A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, which extended fair-hearing principles from quasi-judicial to administrative functions precisely because the line between the two had become difficult to draw. The right to know why a decision has gone against you, so that it can be tested and, where necessary, challenged, is not a procedural nicety; it is what makes judicial review possible at all.
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud's opinion in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India carried this logic into the informational age, describing privacy as encompassing the individual's right to be told why the state has acted as it has, and locating that right within the dignity guaranteed by Article 21. That reasoning was written with data collection in mind, but its implications for automated decision-making are direct. If dignity requires that a person be told why the state has intruded upon them, it is difficult to see how that requirement is satisfied by a system that cannot itself produce reasons a human being can understand, because no human being wrote the rule that produced the outcome.
The strain is structural, not a matter of poor implementation. Reasoned decision-making assumes a reasoner. Audi alteram partem assumes a hearing that can change an outcome. Article 14 proscription of arbitrariness assumes an actor whose discretion can be scrutinised for whim or malice. Machine-learning systems, and even simpler rule-based automation of the kind used in welfare authentication, do not reason in a sense a court can interrogate; they classify. A model can be biased or built on flawed data, but it cannot, as a human bureaucrat can, be asked to justify itself, and its operators can often genuinely say they do not know precisely why a given output emerged. Constitutional doctrine built for accountable human agency confronts a process that is, by design, opaque even to its own creators.
Why existing statutes do not close the gap
India's two most relevant statutes fall short of addressing this in different ways. The Right to Information Act, 2005 was designed to open up files, orders and reasons; it was not designed to compel disclosure of source code, training data, or scoring logic, and public authorities have routinely resisted such disclosure by invoking the commercial confidence exemption under Section 8(1)(d), treating proprietary algorithms as trade secrets even where they determine eligibility for statutory entitlements. Transparency built around the human-era assumption that a decision leaves behind a legible file does not transfer easily to systems whose “file” is a weighted model.
The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, meanwhile, is India's first general data protection statute, but it was drafted around consent and processing of personal data rather than around the consequences of automated decisions built on that data. Unlike the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation, which gives data subjects a qualified right under Article 22 not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing that produces legal or similarly significant effects, the DPDP Act contains no comparable entitlement. A citizen whose welfare eligibility, tax assessment, or credit access is determined by an automated system has, under Indian law, considerably weaker footing than a counterpart in the European Union, even though the Puttaswamy court grounded India's privacy jurisprudence in language at least as protective of dignity as its European counterparts.
Towards a right to human decision-making
What India needs, whether through judicial interpretation of Articles 14 and 21 or through legislative codification, is a right to human decision-making wherever automated or algorithmic systems materially affect life, liberty, livelihood or dignity. Such a right would rest on modest, workable elements rather than a wholesale rejection of technology in governance. First, meaningful human review before any adverse action, so that a person, not merely a re-run of the same model, examines a case before an entitlement is withdrawn or a penalty imposed. Second, a duty to disclose, in plain and accessible terms, the categories of factors an automated system relied upon, without necessarily requiring release of proprietary source code, on the pattern courts have already accepted for other forms of qualified disclosure. Third, a genuine right to contest an automated outcome before it takes effect, rather than after harm has occurred, reversing the current default under which exclusion happens first and appeal, if it exists at all, happens later. Fourth, periodic, independent algorithmic audits of high-stakes public systems, with findings placed in the public domain, modelled loosely on the risk-tiered obligations found in the European Union's AI Act.
None of this requires India to slow the digitisation of governance, which has brought genuine efficiency gains. It requires acknowledging that the Constitution's safeguards were built around a particular model of the state, one that reasons, explains and can be persuaded, and that this model has not been formally revised even as the practice of governance has moved on without it. Courts have shown, in Puttaswamy and in the natural justice line running through Maneka Gandhi and Kraipak, that they are capable of reading dignity and fairness into new contexts the framers did not foresee. Algorithmic governance is the next context in which that capacity will be tested. Until the right to a human decision-maker is recognised as part of the guarantee against arbitrariness, the Constitution's promise that no person shall be deprived of life or livelihood except by a fair, reasoned and answerable process will remain, for an increasing number of Indians, a promise addressed to officials who are no longer the ones deciding.
Author is an Assistant Professor at CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Delhi NCR Campus. Views are personal.

Allahabad High Court imposes ₹6.7 lakh costs on Hyderabad man for disturbing court proceedings

Bar and Bench: Allahabad: Friday, 7^th August 2026.
The Court said the petitioner-in-person filed multiple RTI applications related to the proceedings of his case and refused to physically appear before the bench.

Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court on August 5 imposed costs of ₹6.7 Lakh on a litigant for disturbing court proceedings by filing multiple applications under Right to Information (RTI) Act to seek information about his pending case [Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula v State of UP and 3 Others]
Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamashery also noted that the petitioner, one Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu, who is from Hyderabad, declined to physically appear before the Court and insisted to argue only through video-conferencing (VC).
The Court imposed costs of ₹5,000 for each of the 24 RTI applications filed by him and another ₹50,000 for making an incorrect statement in an application moved by him.
"To discourage the persons such as petitioner-in-person, not to disturb the Court’s proceedings and administration of justice, a further cost of ₹5,00,000 is imposed on petitioner," the Court added.
The total cost of ₹6.7 lakh has to be paid within four weeks to the High Court Legal Service Committee.
Vinay Vemula first approached the Court in 2024 with a petition challenging an order of the State Information Commission related to an RTI application filed by him with the police.
During the hearing of the case, High Court registry informed the bench that he filed various RTI applications related to court proceedings of his petition. 24 applications were filed between June 4 and July 17.
On July 24, the Court directed that the RTI applications be kept in abeyance till further orders and also directed Vinay Vemula to appear in person.
On August 5, he again appeared through VC. When asked why he was not present before the Court, Vinay Vemula said that he has to travel about 2,000 kms and has logistic problems.
However, the Court noted that he had earlier travelled to Allahabad on multiple occasions. The Court said appearance through VC is only to facilitate a litigant or an advocate to expedite the adjudication. 
It cannot be claimed a matter of right, the Bench added.
"It is the Court’s discretion to allow Video Conferencing or not. If a direction is passed by the Court to appear in-person, that has to be followed without any unreasonable excuse," the Court said.
The Court also noted that he had filed unnecessary RTI applications seeking internal documents and electronic record about his case.
It said that such RTI applications cannot be entertained since it not only wastes the time of employees of court but also causes hindrance in administration of justice. 
"In aforesaid circumstances, Court finds that petitioner-in-person is misusing the provisions of Right to Information Act. Therefore, his all applications seeking information under Right to Information Act are directed to be consigned to record and for 24 applications, this Court imposed a cost of ₹5,000 each, i.e., total ₹1,20,000," the Court said.
The petitioner-in-person has ample time to file various applications under RTI Act but not to appear before the court and argue the case on merit, the Bench added.
On merits of his case, the Court found that Vinay Vemula was already provided the information sought by him regarding a police complaint filed against him by a woman. It also noted that he was harassing the complainant and her daughter.
"From perusal of queries and reply, referred above, it is evident that requisite information has already been provided to petitioner. He cannot insist to provide an information which is not available with concerned authorities," the Court said, while dismissing the plea.
[Read Order]

Youth Services & Sports Deptt filled 60 posts in 5 years: RTI | KNO

KNO: Srinagar: Friday, 7^th August 2026.
Reply says 19 PELs, 35 Junior Asst and 6 MTS recruited through JKSSB, JKPSC, Police and allied agencies

The Directorate of Youth Services & Sports has said that 60 vacancies were filled in the department during the past five years.
In a reply to a query under the Right to Information (RTI) Act the department, according to the news agency Kashmir News Observer (KNO), has stated that appointments were made through the Jammu and Kashmir Services Selection Board (JKSSB), Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission (JKPSC), Police and other allied government recruitment agencies.
The department said the recruitment includes 19 Physical Education Lecturers (PEL), 35 Junior Assistants and six MultiTasking Staff (MTS), taking the total number of posts filled to 60.
Pertinently, the information was provided by the Public Information Officer of the Directorate of Youth Services & Sports in response to an RTI application filed by M.M. Shuja—(KNO)

Punjab and Haryana High Court stays order declaring Chandigarh Golf Club ‘public authority’ under RTI

The Indian Express: Chandigarh: Friday, 7^th August 2026.
The petitioner’s counsels submitted that the club has stated paying rent at the assessed market value.

According to the petition, the judgment also wrongly recorded that the Chandigarh Golf Club building had been constructed from public funds. (Express file photo)

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has stayed the single-judge order that had declared the Chandigarh Golf Club a “public authority” under Section 2(h)(ii) of the Right to Information Act (RTI), 2005. The division bench of the high court adjourned the matter to October 14 for final arguments.
Passing the interim order on August 3, the division bench of Justice Jasgurpreet Singh Puri and Justice Sanjiv Berry said, “in the meantime, the operation and effect of the impugned judgment dated May 29, 2026 passed by the learned single judge as well as the impugned order in the writ petition, shall remain stayed”.
Appearing for the Chandigarh Golf Club, Senior Advocate Chetan Mittal and Advocate Amit Sharma argued that the single judge had declared the club a public authority primarily on two grounds that the rent paid by the club was less than one per cent of the market value, amounting to a subsidised rate, and that the presence of three government nominees on its 15-member Board of Governors amounted to substantial governmental control.
The petitioner’s counsels submitted that the club has stated paying rent at the assessed market value. They further argued that “merely on the aforesaid ground, an authority cannot be termed a ‘public authority’ in view of the judgment passed by Supreme Court in Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited and others versus State of Kerala and others, (2013), wherein it was categorically held that merely on the ground of receiving subsidies, an authority cannot be termed a ‘public authority’”.
The counsels also claimed that the role of three government nominees, although having voting rights, does not constitute a majority on the Board.
The petition asserts that these three members constitute only a minority and “can neither carry nor defeat any resolution of the body”. The appeal also claims that the Administration’s only special power is to refer certain disputes to the Administrator and that no substantial control, within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, is exercised over the club.
The appeal also assails the reasoning adopted by the single judge. As per the petition, the judgment is unsustainable as it “departs from the binding division bench judgment in Paramjit Singh versus State Information Commissioner on materially similar facts, without distinguishing or following it”. It further contends that the judgment “finds substantial financing without any evidence of financial dependence”.
The club has also argued that the judge “incorrectly treated a notional internal rent assessment” as the basis for concluding that the lease was concessional, despite the Chandigarh Administration’s own committee subsequently adopting a market-rate methodology. According to the petition, the judgment also wrongly recorded that the club building had been constructed from public funds, whereas the Administration’s own lease calculation dated January 30, 2017 expressly stated that “the construction was undertaken by the appellant out of its own funds”.
The petition additionally relies upon documents sought to be brought on record to contend that the club receives no grant, aid, subsidy or financial assistance from any government authority and that the governing body comprises 15 members, of whom only three are nominated by the Chandigarh Administrator.
On behalf of the respondent, Brigadier (retired) Sukhdev Singh (complainant at CIC), Advocate Arjun Shukla accepted the notice and opposed the appeal.
The respondent counsel further argued that “once there is intervention by the UT Administration, the entity has to be declared a ‘public authority’ under the RTI Act”.
After hearing the parties, the division bench issued notice to Central Information Commission (CIC) and the complainant and listed the matter for final hearing on October 14 while staying the operation of the single judge’s order.

Intellectual Property Protection Under SHANTI Act: Promotion of innovation in India’s nuclear energy push - By Suhani Trivedi

India Legal: National: Thursday, 6^th August 2026.

The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy (SHANTI) Act, 2025 consolidates India’s nuclear energy laws, replacing outdated 1962 and 2010 statutes, to promote private and foreign investment in nuclear power generation, strengthen regulatory oversight via AERB, and, under Section 14, recalibrate liability by placing residual exposure beyond the Second Schedule on the Union Government, thereby advancing India’s clean energy and net-zero objectives.
It is a major step forward in enhancing India’s nuclear energy ecosystem by fostering technological progress, research, and innovation while promoting safe and responsible use of nuclear technology. With India aiming to boost its clean energy generation and minimise fossil fuel reliance, the role of innovation in nuclear science becomes significant.
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are therefore important in this context because they stimulate research, safeguard technological innovations, and encourage investment in public and private research and development. This framework is reflected in the Patents Act, 1970, which governs patent protection in India, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), particularly Articles 27 to 34, which establish minimum international standards for patent protection.
The technological progress of the nuclear industry, meanwhile, brings its own set of concerns, such as national security, public safety and international non-proliferation requirements. The SHANTI Act aims to balance the interests of innovation and the interests of the public as a whole.
This article delves into the intellectual property protection as provided in SHANTI Act with a special focus on patent protection, technology transfer and innovation in nuclear energy. It examines  legal and policy issues arising from the protection of nuclear IP rights, while keeping in mind national security considerations and public interest.
The Importance of Intellectual Property Rights in Nuclear Innovation
IPRs are important incentives to encourage innovation by safeguarding ideas and inventions of researchers, scientists and organizations. The legal basis for these protections is found in the Patents Act, 1970, which prescribes the criteria for patentability and identifies non-patentable inventions, while Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to make patents available for inventions in all fields of technology, subject to specified conditions.
In an industry such as nuclear power, where new technology is being developed that needs a lot of investment, the years of research needed and advanced scientific knowledge involved make IP protection an incentive to further innovation by allowing the inventor to benefit from it. This legal measure helps build trust in safer and more efficient nuclear technologies among public institutions and private companies.
The SHANTI Act acknowledges the significance of technological progress towards long-term energy goals of India. Section 38 of the SHANTI Act, 2025 permits patents for inventions relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and radiation, fostering research and innovation while barring patents on strategically reserved activities.
Development of innovative technologies like advanced reactor design, radiation safety technology, nuclear waste management technology, and improvements in fuel-cycle technology can help advance science and bolster the nation’s clean energy infrastructure.
Patent Protection and Technology Transfer under the SHANTI Act
A major driver to foster innovation in the nuclear industry is patent protection. Section 38 of the SHANTI Act, 2025 provides patent protection for inventions relating to nuclear technology, including advanced reactor designs, radiation safety systems, fuel-cycle technologies, and waste management processes. Such protection is available only where the invention satisfies the requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability under Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970.
The Act fosters research, public institutions and private enterprises to invest in technologies that enhance the efficiency, safety and sustainability of nuclear energy.
Along with patent protection, the SHANTI Act highlights how important technology transfer is in bringing scientific innovations out of the lab and into the real world. The technology transfer process allows knowledge, expertise and inventions to be transferred from research institutions to commercial enterprises via patenting, joint research, public-private partnerships and international institutions.
In the case of nuclear technology transfer, however, it is very different from transfer of ordinary commercial technologies. Nuclear technologies tend to be associated with strategic and security issues and the transfer should happen under a tightly managed legal environment, with the proper government control and respect for India’s international obligations.
The delicate balance between IP Rights, National Security and Public Interest
The need to strike a balance between the protection of IPR, national security and the public interest is one of the major issues under the SHANTI Act. While patents promote innovation through granting exclusive rights to inventors, the nuclear industry has a unique regulatory framework due to some of the strategic and security aspects of many nuclear technologies.
The Act encourages research and technological advancement, and acknowledges the requirement for protection of sensitive information. The patent system, in general, requires disclosure of technical details, but for some inventions involving nuclear technology, confidentiality may be necessary not to endanger national security, accordingly, Section 39 of the SHANTI Act overrides the RTI Act, 2005, allowing the government to declare such nuclear-related information “restricted” and exempt from disclosure.
This is based on the idea that intellectual property rights, as a legal right, can be justifiably subject to reasonable public interest regulation, reflected in Patents Act Sections 84–92, which allow compulsory licensing, and Section 100, which permits government use of patents with compensation, consistent with TRIPS Article 31’s allowance for authorized use without consent under defined conditions.
Problems in safeguarding nuclear IP
 Legal, technical and policy issues arise when it comes to protecting IP in the nuclear energy industry. Nuclear technologies are particularly sensitive, as they contain a great deal of information which is relevant to national security, public safety and international relations. Therefore, a well-balanced  legal regime is needed for effective IP protection and for ensuring that the strategic technologies are not used in an unethical manner.
One of the big problems is keeping information confidential while at the same time encouraging innovation. Normally, patenting an invention involves revealing the invention to the public, in return for which the patentee gets exclusive rights to it, but disclosure of some nuclear technologies could lead to security concerns or be inconsistent with India’s international commitments on non-proliferation. It is, therefore, up to policymakers to decide whether innovations are appropriate for patent protection or should be kept confidential.
The other challenge is to encourage technology transfer and avoid unauthorized access to sensitive technology. Research institutions, universities, government bodies and private firms must work together to make scientific advances possible. But low protection levels can lead to the risk of intellectual property theft, cyberattacks, or the misuse of confidential information. Enhanced cyber security, confidentiality and regulatory oversight are therefore critical.
—Suhani Trivedi is a second-year LL.B. student of Lloyd Law College, Greater Noida

RTI Commission fines 254 public institutions GH¢20,000 each for failing to submit annual reports

Modern Ghana: Ghana: Thursday, 6^th August 2026.
The Right to Information (RTI) Commission has sanctioned about 254 public institutions, including Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) as well as Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), with administrative fines of GH¢20,000 each for failing to submit their 2025 Right to Information Annual Reports as required by law.

In a statement issued on Wednesday, August 5, 2026, the Commission said the penalties were imposed under Section 77(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2019 (Act 989), which obliges all public institutions to file annual reports on the implementation of the RTI law.
The Commission explained that the affected institutions failed to meet the reporting requirement despite repeated reminders published in the Ghanaian Times on January 20, 2026, and the Daily Graphic on April 24, 2026.
According to the Commission, the annual reports are essential for compiling its consolidated report to Parliament, making compliance a key requirement for promoting transparency, accountability and effective implementation of the RTI Act.
It noted that the statutory deadline for preparing and submitting the consolidated 2025 report to Parliament has already elapsed, leaving it with no option but to enforce the sanctions against defaulting institutions.
The RTI Commission has therefore directed all affected institutions to settle the GH¢20,000 administrative penalty within 14 days of receiving official notification.
It cautioned that any institution that fails to comply within the stipulated period will face additional enforcement measures as provided under the law.
“The Commission reminds heads of public institutions that compliance with the reporting requirements under Act 989 is a statutory obligation and not a matter of discretion,” the statement said.
The Commission reaffirmed its commitment to ensuring full compliance with the Right to Information Act while promoting openness, accountability and public access to information across state institutions.

Grading the Courts on openness : V. Venkatesan

Supreme Court Observer: New Delhi: Thursday, 6^th August 2026.
A new index scores India's higher judiciary on disclosure, and no court clears 60 percent

On 1 August, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan of the Supreme Court, at the launch of the Judicial Transparency Index, asked whether the Collegium had “taken a step back” from transparency. He said that the last three resolutions recommending judges to the Supreme Court carried no reasons at all. 
The claim was already tested by the report. The past five resolutions recommending judges to the High Courts disclosed no reasons. Only a few resolutions recommending judges to the Supreme Court carried some reasoning, which were formulaic, stating that the candidate had been picked after “evaluating merit, integrity and competence and also accommodating a plurality of considerations.” What that evaluation actually found was not disclosed.
Justice Bhuyan stated that the citizens have a right to know who their judges are.
The remark landed in a year already marked by disclosure. A cash discovery at the Delhi residence of Justice Yashwant Varma triggered an in-house probe. The report was leaked by the media. In the aftermath, the Court resolved to declare assets of all sitting judges under a 2025 resolution. The Index turns that year into a standing yearly framework, covering the Supreme Court and all 25 High Courts. As of 4 August 2026, 28 out of the 35 sitting judges have revealed their assets. 
What the Index measures
The Index scores courts on 68 indicators across 18 themes, sorted into judicial processes, institutional governance and personnel administration. High Courts are scored out of 91 points, the Supreme Court out of 88. 
Websites were reviewed between November 2025 and February 2026. The framework was devised in an earlier 2025 report by JALDI researchers—Jyotika Randhawa, Shruthi Naik and Shreya Tripathy. Its application to the higher judiciary is authored by Randhawa with fellow researchers Abhishek Rath and Navami Krishnamurthy.
A single indicator shows why the method matters. For instance, a litigant looking to attend a virtual hearing starts with the cause list. Cause lists from 19 High Courts include a video-conferencing link, six do not. That gap ties to a 2023 Supreme Court order in Sarvesh Mathur v The Registrar General, High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which directed every High Court to make virtual access available. Formally open hearings carry little value if the route to them cannot be found.  
What the Index found
As per the Index, no High Court cleared 60 percent of the available points. Himachal Pradesh ranks first overall, with 52.5 out of 91. Tripura follows closely at 52. Orissa, Delhi and Chhattisgarh round out the top five. Meghalaya and Bombay rank lowest, at 34 and 34.7 respectively. Himachal Pradesh leads on institutional governance, with strong Right to Information (RTI), Protection of Sexual Harassment policy and budgetary disclosures. It discloses little on physical access to hearings. Tripura leads on personnel-related transparency. Chhattisgarh tops judicial processes outright but trails elsewhere, landing sixth overall.
Some findings cut across nearly every court. For instance, no High Courts except eight of them give a 24 hours notice before publishing the cause list. No High Court publishes the criteria governing case allocation or recusals. Only Delhi High Court indicates how a litigant might request one. 
Only eight High Courts published an annual report for 2024-25, and four published none. Twenty-one High Courts run online RTI portals, but fifteen have RTI rules adding exemptions beyond Section 8 of the RTI Act itself. 
Budgetary disclosure is starker. Only five High Courts had published a budget for the current financial year, 2025-26. Eight published no budget at all, and fifteen published no expenditure data for either year examined.
On personnel, only 87 of 813 judges disclose their assets to some degree—across just seven High Courts. No High Court publishes a code of conduct for judges. Only Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura publish disciplinary sanctions against district judicial officers. Translation is thin too: Delhi High Court translated its judgments consistently until 2024, then managed only six in 2025.
The Supreme Court scored 53 out of 88, unevenly spread. It scored strongest on governance—22.5 out of 31—having published ten years of annual reports, though not committee mandates or minutes. It scored 15 out of 28 on judicial processes. It live-streams only Constitution Bench matters, and does not publish the criteria behind its own roster. It scored 15.5 out of 29 on personnel, the category where its own resolutions substantiate Justice Bhuyan’s point most directly. It managed one point on six further indicators covering AI use and open data. This was not counted toward the main score.
From principle to practice
The launch itself was with a panel discussion titled “From Principle to Practice: Understanding Openness in the Indian Judiciary”. Senior Advocates Dr. Aditya Sondhi and Saurabh Kirpal joined the panel, with report co-author Randhawa moderating.
Sondhi pressed a different failing: inconsistency. He pointed out that different High Courts approach disclosure in their own way. Transparency, in his argument, flows from the right to information and access to justice. Both are pan-Indian constitutional rights. “It shouldn’t depend on which state you’re a litigant in,” he said. 
Kirpal pressed the disciplinary gap suggesting that the Supreme Court should publish the reports of in-house inquiries evaluating complaints against judges. He pointed out that the district judiciary already publishes reports when district judges face inquiry. This should work for the higher judiciary too, he said. 
Kirpal questioned the ad hoc character of the in-house machinery. The committee that examined the allegations against Justice Varma, he noted, was constituted afresh by then Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna. A standing committee, on his argument, would serve the process better. He cautioned that disclosure must be balanced. An unproven allegation can cause stigma.
The report gives his complaint empirical footing. Its reviewers found no inquiry report, and no orders recording sanctions against judges of the higher judiciary on the Supreme Court website.
The panel also embodied one of the keynote’s sharpest examples. Justice Bhuyan cited the Collegium’s January 2023 resolution reiterating Kirpal’s own recommendation for the Delhi High Court. Yet more than three and a half years on, he noted, no appointment has followed. Government inaction on reasoned and reiterated recommendations, on this account, is opacity of another kind.
Independence is not the same as secrecy
The report’s numbers point to a broader question. Why do courts which routinely require government bodies to give reasons and act through fair procedure inconsistently apply that standard to themselves?
Judicial independence protects who decides a case and how. It does not arguably require budgets, recruitment, rosters, committee mandates or disciplinary statistics to stay confidential. In Subhash Chandra Agarwal, the Court held the Chief Justice of India’s office a public authority under the RTI Act. In Swapnil Tripathi, it tied open courts to the right to receive information under Article 19(1)(a). The e-Committee’s model live-streaming rules permit narrow exceptions for sensitive matters. Openness and confidentiality were meant to coexist through defined limits, not general discretion. The Index shows where that line blurs.
What a score cannot show
A disclosure index counts documents, not decisions. A court can publish its cause list punctually while deciding cases erratically. It may say little about personnel while its judgments remain sound. The Index’s claim is narrower: sunlight on process, not the soundness of outcome. That is what makes the scoring auditable, rather than a subjective verdict on any one court.
The weighting still creates a difficulty. Basic access indicators carry substantial points; case allocation and recusals carry very few. The report is candid about its own limits too. It confined itself to what court websites proactively display, and did not assess the veracity of the information or whether it was up to date. Live-streaming and other daily-changing indicators were checked on a single working day. 
Justice Bhuyan’s own verdict was gentler than his critique itself. The judiciary, he said, has taken significant strides towards transparency, though much more remains to be done. The report’s own conclusion agrees, crediting the Supreme Court with leadership while noting that no court has achieved full transparency in any single category. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Law Ministry had issued a public response to Justice Bhuyan’s remarks as of this report. The Collegium’s most recent resolutions, the ones already found wanting in reasons, remain on the Supreme Court’s website in that form.